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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
Argentine farmers operate in a complex, unstable and 
generally adverse policy environment. Macroeconomic policies 
often result in triple-digit inflation rates that make 
planning difficult. Overvalued exchange rates and high export 
taxes discourage agricultural exports. New political regimes 
often decree profound changes in policy. Meanwhile, important 
competing countries subsidize production and exports, 
depressing world market prices. 
The complexity and instability of policies affecting 
Argentine agriculture also make life difficult for the policy 
analyst. High and variable rates of inflation mean that 
nominal prices, exchange rates, and price indices should be 
treated carefully, especially when they are reported as annual 
averages. Frequent policy changes make it difficult to 
identify the relationship between world and domestic Argentine 
prices. Major shifts in policy which occur after military 
coups or democratic elections may change the structure of 
policy enough to make time series analysis difficult or even 
inappropriate. 
In spite of the difficulties, farmers continue to farm 
and analysts continue to analyze. This study will address two 
problems. The first is concerned specifically with Argentina, 
while the second is more concerned with the nature of policy 
analysis; 
2 
1) What are the consequences for Argentina of alternative 
U.S. and Argentine trade and agricultural policies? An 
econometric model of Argentine agriculture is developed to 
examine a number of policy scenarios for the period 1985-1995. 
The baseline projection assumes a continuation of current 
policies in both the United States and Argentina. One 
alternative scenario is designed to obtain an estimate of the 
impacts on Argentina of the U.S. Food Security Act of 1985. 
Other alternatives are designed to examine the impacts of 
several measures Argentina could take to counteract the 
effects of the U.S. legislation. 
2) How does one maximize the utility of a policy model, 
subject to data, time, budget and other constraints? Any 
model is necessarily an abstraction of reality, better 
equipped to examine some issues than others. While the model 
developed here is general and flexible enough to consider a 
variety of issues, it has important limitations. The study 
points out some of these limitations, discusses how they might 
be overcome, and explains why the model takes its present 
form. Thus, the Argentine model is treated as a case study to 
examine the broader question of how one develops models which 
are appropriate to the problem at hand. 
This study is motivated, in a number of different ways, 
by work performed at the Center for Agricultural and Rural 
Development (CARD). CARD maintains commodity trade models for 
wheat, feed grains and soybeans. Even though Argentina is an 
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important exporter in ail three markets, the Argentine sub-
sectors of the CARD trade models were not well developed 
before work began on this study (e.g., Meyers et al. 1986, 
Bahrenian et al. 1986, Devadoss et al. 1986). Particularly 
problematic were equations linking domestic prices in the 
United States and Argentina, and equations determining the 
area harvested of each commodity. This study developed out of 
work done to correct some of those deficiencies (Westhoff 
1986). 
The Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute 
(FAPRI) is comprised of researchers from CARD and the Center 
for National Food and Agricultural Policy (CNFAP). FAPRI 
analysis of the effect on U.S. agriculture of various policy 
options (e.g., FAPRI 1986, 1987) also helped inspire this 
study. While FAPRI focuses on the consequences for U.S. 
agriculture, many of the policies examined by FAPRI also have 
major consequences for other trading countries, like 
Argentina. The Food Security Act of 1985 (FSA-85) is a prime 
example. The net effect of the FSA-85 is to substantially 
lower world prices for a number of agricultural commodities. 
This benefits importing countries, but imposes severe 
hardships on competing exporters, such as Argentina. Just as 
FAPRI analysis attempts to quantify some of the costs and 
benefits of alternative policies for U.S. agriculture, this 
study attempts to quantify some of the effects for Argentine 
agriculture. 
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A final way in which this study is motivated by work done 
at CARD concerns the general question of developing models 
appropriate for policy analysis. Participation in the 
development and operation of various policy models encourages 
a healthy skepticism concerning the value of such models. If 
a model is to yield the most useful and believable results, it 
should be developed in a manner consistent with the best 
available economic and econometric theory. Experience, 
however, indicates that models developed according to the best 
theory sometimes yield results that violate common sense, 
making them less useful for policy analysis. This study 
argues that theory cannot and should not be disregarded. 
However, a policy model is of value only if it can be used to 
"tell a story" that is generally plausible. Given time, data 
and other constraints, pragmatic concerns may sometimes result 
in taking shortcuts that are not always completely consistent 
with the best theory. This study is frank in detailing when 
and why such shortcuts are taken. 
This dissertation is divided into seven chapters. After 
this introductory chapter, literature relevant to developing a 
policy model of Argentine agriculture is reviewed in Chapter 
II. The chapter provides a brief overview of Argentine 
agriculture, the country's place in world commodity markets, 
agricultural and trade policies affecting Argentine 
agriculture, and important current policy issues. The chapter 
also reviews some previous attempts to develop models to 
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analyze policies affecting agriculture in Argentina and 
elsewhere. Strengths and weaknesses of these models are 
discussed, and lessons for this study are derived. 
Chapter III presents the basic theoretical framework for 
the Argentine policy model. The core of the model determines 
Argentine prices, supply, domestic use and trade of four major 
crops—wheat, corn, sorghum and soybeans. The model also 
includes a simple representation of the livestock sector, and 
identities used to derive a number of general indicators 
concerning Argentine agriculture, trade and international 
debt. The model estimation results are presented in Chapter 
IV, including parameter estimates, associated statistics and 
key elasticities. 
The model is validated and a baseline projection is 
presented in Chapter V. Simulation statistics and a 
comparison of actual and simulated values of key variables are 
used to validate the model. The baseline projection utilizes 
assumptions of world prices and other exogenous variables that 
were consistent with the best available information in early 
1987. The reasonableness of the assumptions and the baseline 
projection is assessed using a number of criteria, including 
post-sample information. 
Chapter VI presents the results of four alternative 
scenarios. The first freezes U.S. commodity prices at 1984 
levels as a rough approximation of what might have occurred 
had the_FSA-85 not reduced U.S. loan rates and world commodity 
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prices. The second devalues the Argentine austral by 10 
percent. The third eliminates Argentine export taxes on the 
four major crops. The fourth combines a 10-percent 
devaluation with the elimination of export taxes. The second, 
third and fourth alternatives are examined holding U.S. prices 
and other assumptions at baseline levels. A slight variation 
on the fourth alternative allows feedback to occur, so that 
U.S. prices and Argentine inflation rates change in response 
to the devaluation and elimination of export taxes. 
Chapter VII summarizes the major empirical results of the 
study, and examines some of the implications of the study for 
the practice of policy analysis. Strengths and weaknesses of 
the Argentine policy model are discussed, and possible 
improvements are suggested. The study concludes with a 
discussion of some of the criteria to consider when developing 
a policy model. 
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CHAPTER II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A comprehensive review of the literature relevant to this 
study would draw from a number of disciplines. Historians 
provide context by tracing the development of the Argentine 
state and the agro-export economy. Political scientists 
examine the shifting alignments of power which determine the 
shape of agricultural and trade policies. Agronomists and 
animal scientists assess the suitability of Argentina's 
resources for crop and livestock production. A comprehensive 
review is beyond the scope of this study, but the need to look 
beyond the traditional boundaries of economics is recognized. 
The first section of this chapter provides background 
information to set the study in its Argentine context. The 
second section examines a number of policy issues of relevance 
to Argentine agriculture. The third section focuses on models 
and modeling. 
Background 
Argentina has been a major agricultural exporter for many 
decades. By 1900, Argentina regularly exported more than 1 
million metric tons per year of both wheat and corn. As shown 
in Figure 2.1, wheat and corn exports reached levels in the 
late 1920s and early 1930s that were not attained again until 
the early 1980s (Bolsa de Cereales 1985: 354). Between 1924 
and 1933, Argentina accounted for 65 percent of world corn 
trade, and 18 percent of world wheat trade (Diaz Alejandro 
1970: 201). Grain exports fell sharply with the onset of 
8 
million metric tons 
1900-04 10-14 20-24 30-34 40-44 50-54 60-64 70-74 80-84 
5-year period 
Wheat Corn Sorghum Beans, Products 
Figure 2.1. Argentine grain and soybean exports since 1900 
(Bolsa de Cereales 1985) 
million head 
1937 1942 1947 1952 1957 1962 1967 1972 1977 1982 
year 
Slaughter for Export 
Figure 2.2. Argentine cattle slaughter for export (Bolsa de 
Cereales 1985) 
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World War II, and only began to recover in the 1960s. Grain 
sorghum became an important export crop in the 1960s, and 
soybeans in the 1970s. In fact, 1987 exports of soybeans and 
soybean products exceeded those of wheat or corn (USDA 1988a, 
1988b). Other important export crops include sunflowers, 
linseed and oats. 
Beef and mutton exports have also been of great 
importance to Argentina for many decades. Figure 2.2 
indicates that approximately 2 million cattle per year have 
been slaughtered for export ever since the late 1930s. Sheep 
slaughter for export peaked at 9 million head in 1944, but 
fell to less than 2 million head by the early 1980s (Bolsa de 
Cereales 1985; 348). Land-use patterns indicate the dominance 
of livestock grazing in Argentina—in 1969, 102.5 million 
hectares were used for pasture, while 32.7 million hectares 
were devoted to annual and permanent crops (Institute Nacional 
de Estadistica y Censos 1980: 289). 
The export orientation of Argentine agriculture is hardly 
unusual for a Latin American country. Nor is the unequal 
distribution of land among Argentine farmers—in 1969, 41 
percent of the farmers controlled less than 1 percent of the 
land, while less than 1 percent of the farmers controlled over 
33 percent of the land (Martin 1981: 36). As elsewhere, small 
farms use labor much more intensively and large farmers use 
capital more intensively. Productivity per hectare is eight 
times greater on the smallest farms than on the largest, while 
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productivity per worker is six times greater on the largest 
farms than on the smallest (Carracedo 1980; 51). 
While Argentina is part of Latin America, it is also a 
temperate-zone country producing the same crop and livestock 
products as North America and Europe. In many important 
respects, agriculture in Argentina resembles that in the 
United States more than that in the rest of Latin America: 
—The average farm is very large by Latin American 
standards. To take an extreme example, Argentina has 
approximately the same number of farms as Guatemala, which has 
only 2 percent as much farmland (Institute Nacional de 
Estadistica y Censos 1980: 289, 311; Davis and Hodson 1982: 
45). 
—"Family farms" are common. In three provinces which 
account for most of the country's agricultural production, 
half of the farms are between 5.0 and 500 hectares in size 
(Martin 1981: 38). Most of the country's agricultural land is 
owned by those who farm it, and farmers and their families 
account for two-thirds of the agricultural labor force 
(Institute Nacional de Estadistica y Censos 1980: 333). 
—Agriculture is a relatively small part of the general 
economy. Although agricultural products dominate Argentine 
exports, agriculture accounted for just 12 percent of the 
country's gross domestic product in 1980, and employed just 10 
percent of the labor force (Elias 1985: 48). 
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In contrast to the United States and Western Europe, 
Argentina generally has taxed rather than subsidized the 
agricultural sector. Export taxes mean that farmers receive 
less for their grain than do producers in other countries, 
when prices are measured in the same currency. Making the 
situation worse, the Argentine currency has often been 
overvalued (Boletin Informative Technit 1986; Fulginiti 1986; 
Grigsby and Arnade 1985). An overvalued exchange rate reduces 
domestic prices of traded goods. Input prices remain high, 
however, as import taxes protect domestic industries that 
produce agricultural inputs. 
High rates of inflation, often exceeding 100 percent per 
year, also have a variety of negative effects on the 
agricultural sector. Savings and investment decisions are 
greatly complicated when future inflation, exchange and 
interest rates are unpredictable. In periods of extreme 
inflation, Argentine governments have often imposed various 
types of price controls, some of which have had extremely 
detrimental effects on the agricultural sector (Reca 1980). 
Public investment in agriculture is low in Argentina, 
even by Latin American standards. Government expenditures on 
agriculture in Argentina are far lower, per hectare of 
cropland, than in any other country in Latin America. On a 
per-agricultural-worker basis, Argentina ranks ahead of only 
Bolivia, Costa Rica and Peru among nine countries surveyed 
(Elias 1985: 28). Limited grain-handling facilities sometimes 
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result in severe bottlenecks, and mean that the country has 
little ability to store grain in times of world surpluses so 
that it can sell in times of shortages. As a result, 77 
percent of the variation in Argentine grain production between 
1971 and 1982 was reflected in the country's annual grain 
exports, and only 3 percent in stocks (Comité de Problemas de 
Productos Basicos 1985: 18). 
In spite of all the problems faced by Argentine farmers, 
they remain competitive in world commodity markets. Argentina 
trailed only the United States in 1986/87 exports of corn and 
sorghum. In the case of soybeans and soybean products, the 
country ranked third, behind the United States and Brazil. 
Argentina placed fifth in world wheat exports, behind the 
United States, Canada, Australia and the European Community 
(USDA 1988a, 1988b). Argentina has some of the best cropland 
and climate resources in the world, and can compete even in an 
adverse domestic and international policy environment. 
Policy Issues 
A number of studies have concluded that Argentine 
agricultural and trade policies have reduced agricultural 
production and income (e.g., Mielke 1984; Cavallo and Mundlak 
1982; Fulginiti 1986). The relative stagnation of Argentine 
agriculture between the 1930s and the 1970s is often 
attributed to policies designed to extract surplus from the 
agricultural sector for direct and indirect investment in 
other domestic sectors. A variety of explanations have been 
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given for the development and persistence of policies which 
are detrimental to Argentine agriculture: 
—Many analysts contend, with considerable empirical 
support, that policies in most developing countries favor 
urban consumers over agricultural producers (Bale and Lutz 
1985; Josling 1981; International Economics Division 1983). 
It is argued that urban consumers tend to have more political 
influence than food producers. This is particularly likely to 
be the case in a country like Argentina, which is highly 
urbanized and where urban labor unions are an important 
political force. Changes in the level of taxation or support 
for Argentine agriculture can therefore be expected to 
correspond to changes in the balance of political power in the 
country. This analysis would imply that "cheap-food" policies 
are most likely to be followed when Peronist or other parties 
with strong ties to urban labor unions are in power. 
—Influential theories of economic development contend 
that governments should take steps to channel surplus from 
agriculture to more "dynamic" sectors of the economy. Raul 
Prebisch, a native Argentine who headed the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) for many years, 
was famous for his hypothesis that primary product prices tend 
to fall over time relative to prices for industrial goods. As 
a result, he and others at ECLA recommended that countries 
establish trade barriers to encourage the development of 
domestic manufacturing industries. The existence of declining 
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terms of trade for primary products remains controversial 
(Sarkar 1986), and the desirability of import substitution 
policies is denied by most neoclassical economists (Bhagwati 
1985). Nevertheless, ECLA theories are well-known to Latin 
American economists, and have played an important role in the 
development of economic policy in Argentina and elsewhere. 
—Other analysts object to the implicit contention that 
the most important competition is between the agricultural and 
non-agricultural sectors. Marxists, dependency school 
theorists and others contend that the powerful interests being 
served by government policies are defined more by class than 
by sector. Capitalists may be the true beneficiaries of 
"cheap food" policies, since low food prices help suppress 
demands for higher wages. Within the agricultural sector, 
taxes usually have been lower for beef than for grains (Reca 
1980; 46), reflecting the wealth and political power of cattle 
ranchers, who tend to be much wealthier than grain farmers. 
Export taxes have been used as a substitute for land taxes, 
even though it is commonly agreed that land taxes would be 
more efficient (Diaz Alejandro 1970). Land taxes would 
penalize large farmers who underutilize potential cropland. 
ECLA now focuses more on the political causes and effects of 
income distribution than it does on sectoral arguments 
(Prebisch 1983; Joint ECLAC/FAO Agriculture Division 1985). 
While Argentine agricultural and trade policies have 
historically had adverse consequences for most Argentine 
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farmers, there have been several important shifts in policy 
during the last 20 years. Peronist regimes of the mid-1970s 
raised export taxes to very high levels, regulated prices in 
an effort to control inflation, and established the state as 
the only legal purchaser for wheat, corn, sorghum and 
sunflowers (Reca 1980: 10). Following the 1976 military coup, 
export taxes were reduced or eliminated, and other "free 
market" policies were instituted. Fiscal deficits and 
perceived failures of trade liberalization policies resulted 
in the reinstatement of export taxes in the early 1980s. 
Two major crises have encouraged agricultural policy 
reform in the last few years: 
1) The debt crisis. During the open economy experiment 
of the late 1970s, Argentina borrowed heavily in world 
financial markets. Much of the money borrowed was not used 
productively, and domestic industry was hurt by the relaxation 
of import restrictions. The country's debt burden grew at a 
rate much faster than the ability to repay, and capital flight 
intensified the problem (Frenkel 1987). According to ECLA, 
Argentina's external debt grew from $7.9 billion in 1975 to 
$46.0 billion in 1983, the year civilian Raul Alfonsin became 
president ("Encuadre General y Perspectivas" 1986). By 1985, 
the fiscal deficit reached 8 percent of gross domestic 
product, and the annual inflation rate exceeded 600 percent 
(Frenkel 1987). 
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2) The world agricultural crisis. After years of rapid 
growth, world demand for grains and oilseeds slackened in the 
1980s due to slower world economic growth and the debt crisis. 
Meanwhile, favorable growing conditions in major producing 
countries resulted in a series of good harvests, beginning in 
1984. Since demand growth slowed while supply increased, 
there was strong downward pressure on commodity prices in the 
mid 1980s. In previous years, U.S. agricultural programs 
acted to put a floor on world grain prices, but the Food 
Security Act of 1985 (FSA-85) resulted in a major shift in the 
U.S. position. Rather than support world prices by 
accumulating government stocks or further reducing planted 
area, the United States would attempt to dispose of surplus 
grain on the world market by reducing price supports and using 
export subsidies to undersell competitors (FAPRI 1986). 
Figure 2.3 illustrates some of the effects on Argentina 
of these twin crises. Exports of grains, oilseeds and 
products accounted for about one-half of all merchandise 
exports by Argentina, but the value of those exports fell in 
1985 and 1986. Approximately one-half of the foreign exchange 
earned from exports was used to purchase imports, and the 
other half was used to pay the interest on Argentina's 
international debt. Taking into account a negative balance of 
trade in services, not only was there no foreign exchange left 
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Figure 2.4. Argentine crop export indices (Cirio and Regunaga 
1987) 
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further borrowing was necessary (Wharton Econometric 
Forecasting Associates 1986). 
Unless the country could negotiate more favorable terms 
for financing the foreign debt, Argentina would have to export 
more or import less. As shown in Figure 2.4, the volume of 
Argentine crop exports did increase fairly dramatically 
between 1980 and 1985, before a slight decline in 1986. 
However, export prices fell sharply, especially in 1985 and 
1986. As a result, the value of agricultural exports was only 
slightly higher in 1986 than it was in 1980. Imports were 
already constrained, and there was fear that, demand-
restricting policies would likely throw the country into a 
severe recession. 
Bowing to internal and international pressures. President 
Alfonsin announced the "Plan Austral" in 1985. A new currency 
was introduced and tighter fiscal and monetary policies were 
pursued in order to reduce inflationary expectations. The 
plan was designed to reassure international lenders, and it 
did result in negotiations to provide the country with more 
favorable terms of financing its debt (Frenkel 1987). 
While the "Plan Austral" was viewed favorably by some 
lenders, others contended it did not go far enough. The World 
Bank made a $350 million loan conditional on agricultural 
policy reforms which would increase export earnings. The 
World Bank asked that export taxes be replaced with 
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production-neutral taxes on land, and that import restrictions 
on agricultural inputs be lifted ("Plan Austral..." 1986). 
The World Bank proposal met with considerable resistance 
on the part of agricultural input producers who feared 
competition from imported goods, large farmers who were 
opposed to land taxes and various other groups, so not all 
parts of the proposal were implemented. However, the call for 
lower export taxes was popular among Argentine farmers. Raul 
Romero Feris, president of the Confederaciones Rurales 
Argentinas, argued it was irrational to maintain high export 
taxes in the face of falling production from low world prices 
("Argentine Farmers..." 1986). Since export taxes were a 
major source of government revenue, there was considerable 
resistance to reducing tax rates, but sharp reductions were 
instituted in 1987. 
In addition to internal policy reform, Argentina also 
became a major advocate for a reduction in agricultural 
subsidies in the United States and the European Community. 
Agriculture Secretary Lucio Reca claimed that U.S. and E.G. 
subsidies were going to cost Argentina between $1.0 and $1.5 
billion in lost export earnings in 1986 ("Argentina—and its 
Creditors..." 1985; "U.S. Wheat..." 1986). Cirio and Regunaga 
(1987) reflect a common sentiment among Argentines when they 
say, "This world crisis, which Argentina did not cause and 
which it cannot resolve by decisions at its disposal, is 
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having stronger negative impacts on this country than on the 
the exporting countries which subsidize production and trade." 
Argentina became a member of the "Cairns Group" of 
countries, which includes other major exporters that do not 
heavily subsidize production and trade, such as Australia and 
Canada. The Cairns Group has argued that the current round of 
international trade negotiations should work toward reducing 
the distorting effects of agricultural subsidies, especially 
those of the United States, the European Community and Japan. 
A common argument made by Canadians, Argentines and others is 
that the current subsidy war not only harms exporting 
countries that do not subsidize, but it also does more harm 
than good to the United States. Reducing subsidies would 
increase world prices more than it would reduce the quantity 
exported, they argue, so the value of U.S. exports would 
actually increase (Oleson 1987; "Perspectivas Externas..." 
1986). 
Models and Modeling 
In developing a model, it is important to identify the 
set of problems to be addressed by the model. A number of 
questions are suggested by the proceeding discussion: 
1) What are the determinants of agricultural prices in 
Argentina? To what degree can changes in export taxes and 
other policies affecting domestic prices be explained by 
economic factors? 
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2) How do Argentine farmers make resource allocation 
decisions? How much do Argentine production and trade respond 
to changes in world prices for grains and oilseeds? 
3) What were the consequences of the FSA-85 for Argentine 
farmers and for the country as a whole? What effect did the 
U.S. legislation have on Argentine agricultural and trade 
policies? What effect did it have on the production, 
consumption and trade of major agricultural commodities? 
4) To what degree can Argentina act to offset the effects 
of the FSA-85 by reducing export taxes or devaluing the 
currency? What are the implications of such actions for 
Argentine farmers, consumers and taxpayers? What effects 
would they have on the country's international creditors and 
world commodity markets? 
Since other models of Argentina and its agriculture were 
designed to address other problems, they differ from the model 
developed for this study in a number of important respects. 
In spite of the differences, however, other researchers have 
had to deal with some of the same difficulties faced in 
develping this model. While models of Argentina and its 
agriculture are of particular interest, models of other 
countries can also be instructive. This section reviews past 
modeling efforts and other studies that examine key issues of 
relevance to this analysis. 
Argentina and its agriculture have been modeled in a 
variety of different ways. The FAPRI international trade 
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models (Devadoss et al. 1986, Bahrenian et al. 1986, and 
Meyers et al. 1986) treat Argentina as one component of world 
models for wheat, feed grains and soybeans. The FAPRI models 
are partial equilibrium models that have a strong commodity 
focus. A descriptive econometric approach is utilized, where 
few theoretical restrictions are imposed on the estimated 
coefficients of the model. For each commodity, estimated 
equations determine domestic prices, area harvested and one or 
more components of domestic demand. Production and net trade 
are determined by identities. 
One strength of the FAPRI models is that they provide 
considerable country- and commodity-specific detail without 
becoming unmanageable in size. The models were designed to 
develop projections of commodity prices, production, 
consumption and trade, and to consider the world-wide 
consequences of changes in agricultural policy, macroeconomic 
conditions, climate, and other assumptions which underly the 
projections. Since the models are developed and maintained by 
a small staff with modest resources, it is important that the 
models focus on a few variables of interest, and not be 
burdened with unnecessary detail. 
The danger of such an approach to modeling the Argentine 
agricultural sector is that simple representations are often 
misrepresentations. For example, the FAPRI models generally 
model area harvested for a particular commodity as a function 
of the price of that crop and the price of an important 
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competing crop. This can result in a number of implausible 
results. For example, changes in wheat and soybean prices 
have no effect in the model on corn and sorghum area, even 
though wheat and soybeans compete with feed grains for land 
resources in some parts of the country. Holding all else 
constant, an increase in the sorghum price would increase 
sorghum area in the model and reduce corn area, as expected. 
However, the estimated coefficients are such that the increase 
in sorghum area would be much less than the reduction in corn 
area (Bahrenian et al. 1986). That total harvested area would 
fall when the price of one commodity increases seems quite 
unlikely. 
A variety of other shortcomings of the FAPRI models can 
be attributed to the commodity, rather than country, focus of 
the models. Each of the commodity models was developed 
independently of the others, so there is more consistency in 
specification across countries for each commodity than there 
is across commodities for each country. The models do not 
include an explicit representation of export taxes or other 
Argentine policies, and the livestock sector is exogenous to 
the model. While the FAPRI models do allow exchange rates, 
inflation and national income to affect agricultural markets, 
there is no feedback from the agricultural sector to the 
general economy. By focusing on a country model for 
Argentina, more careful attention can be given to correcting 
these shortcomings. 
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Reca (1980) also uses a descriptive econometric approach 
to modeling the supply and demand of various crops in 
Argentina. He estimates that short-run supply elasticities 
range from 0.21 to 0.35, and that long-run elasticities are 
approximately twice as large. Since the technique used by 
Reca is similar to that used by FAPRI modelers, his model has 
many of the same advantages and disadvantages as the FAPRI 
model. 
Reca used results of his model to estimate deadweight 
losses to the Argentine society of policies pursued during the 
Peronist regime of the 1973-75 period. During that period, 
high export taxes and price controls resulted in producer 
prices far below world market prices for major crop and 
livestock products. The main effect of those policies was to 
redistribute income from Argentine farmers and ranchers to 
consumers and the federal treasury. Applying standard welfare 
theory (e.g.. Just et al. 1982), Reca finds, however, that the 
pricing policies were an inefficient means of transferring 
benefits from producers to consumers. He estimates a net loss 
to society of 4-6 percent of the value of production, 
depending on the commodity. The value of his estimates, of 
course, depends on the accuracy of the coefficients in his 
model, and the appropriateness of standard welfare analysis. 
Pineiro and McCalla (1971) develop a cost-minimizing 
programming model of the Argentine agricultural sector which 
utilizes engineering coefficients. The model is designed to 
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determine the product prices necessary to obtain given output 
levels, and it can derive labor use, consumer food 
expenditures and other indicators of interest. The model 
shares the advantages and disadvantages of all programming 
models that rely on engineering coefficients. Such a model 
can be quite useful when examining long-run resource 
allocation decisions, especially for new crops and techniques 
where there is little or no historical precedent. However, 
the normative behavior implied by programming models often 
differs substantially from observed producer behavior; 
dynamics generally are ignored by such models; and demand is 
usually exogenous. These problems mean the Pineiro and 
McCalla model is of limited usefulness to this study. 
A theoretical model developed by Grigsby and Arnade 
(1985) considers the effects of distorted exchange rates on 
Argentine agricultural markets. Much of the model is standard 
to the trade literature—an overvalued exchange rate results 
in increased domestic consumption and reduced production and 
exports of Argentine agricultural commodities. The innovative 
feature of the model is that it allows for multiple exchange 
rates, a common characteristic of Argentine trade policy. The 
manipulation of the exchange rates which apply to different 
types of exports and imports is shown to have a variety of 
important effects. Grigsby and Arnade do not present an 
empirical model, and the model developed for this study does 
not directly incorporate their approach. However, their paper 
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does draw attention to the need to use the correct exchange 
rate (that applying to agricultural exports) when estimating 
equations that link world and domestic prices. 
Feltenstein (1983) develops a computable general 
equilibrium model of the Argentine economy which does not 
treat the agricultural economy explicitly. The seven goods in 
the model are durables, non-durables, capital, labor, U.S. 
dollars, domestic currency, and non-domestically produced 
consumer goods. The model is used to examine the effects of a 
devaluation and import quotas on Argentine income growth and 
the balance of payments. Although the model does not focus on 
the agricultural sector, it does emphasize the importance of 
examining policy changes in a general equilibrium framework. 
Of greater relevance to this study is the general 
equilibrium model of the Argentine economy developed by 
Cavallo and Mundlak (1982). In their model, the economy 
consists of agricultural and non-agricultural sectors. 
Agricultural production can be used for consumption, 
investment or export. Non-agricultural goods can be produced 
domestically or imported, and can be used for consumption or 
investment. Output is predetermined in each period, based on 
land, labor and capital allocation decisions made at the end 
of the previous period. Factor prices need not be equal 
across sectors; indeed, it is the discrepancy in factor prices 
which drives factor mobility. 
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In the Cavallo and Mundlak model, total consumption 
depends on permanent income, which is also predetermined given 
output. Consumption of agricultural and non-agricultural 
goods depends on total consumption and relative prices, while 
investment depends on the rate of capital utilization and the 
growth of per-capita output. Since the model assumes an open 
economy, the market is cleared through trade rather than 
prices. The exchange rate is endogenous in the model, 
depending on foreign prices, tax rates, the current account 
surplus, and domestic credit creation. 
The model is estimated econometrically, and is able to 
simulate historical exchange rates, prices, production, 
consumption, investment and trade by sector. Cavallo and 
Mundlak use the model to examine the effects of trade 
liberalization. As expected, they find that removing export 
taxes and import restrictions would result in an increase in 
agricultural production. However, they also find that trade 
liberalization would reduce non-agricultural output enough to 
reduce total per-capita income, unless the exchange rate is 
kept from deteriorating by means of a reduction in net 
domestic credit creation (a tight-money policy). By managing 
the exchange rate and adding a food subsidy to maintain wages 
measured in terms of food, trade liberalization is found to be 
a Pareto superior move—no one loses and agricultural 
producers gain a lot. 
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The Cavallo and Mundlak approach has much to recommend 
it. Their model accounts for the many interrelationships 
between the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, 
endogenizes exchange rates and income, and generates 
interesting policy implications. It is far more ambitious 
than most partial equilibrium models, and it could be used to 
examine many of the questions of interest in the present 
study. However, while the Cavallo and Mundlak model is not as 
abstract and aggregated as the Feltenstein model, it does 
sacrifice commodity detail in order to achieve its level of 
generality. This study opts for a partial equilibrium but 
multi-commodity approach, not because a general equilibrium 
approach is undesirable, but because considerable commodity 
specificity is desired and resources are limited. 
Fulginiti (1986) develops a model of the Argentine 
agricultural sector which treats a large number of commodities 
very specifically. Her model considers both input and output 
markets, and it imposes a number of restrictions on the 
estimated parameters which are consistent with economic 
theory. A translog flexible form specification is used to 
estimate supply and demand elasticities. The estimation is 
carried out utilizing the Seemingly Unrelated Regression 
technique to correct for the expected contemporaneous 
correlation of residuals across equations, and to facilitate 
the imposition of within- and cross-equation restrictions. In 
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terms of economic and econometric theory, her approach would 
be considered more rigorous than that followed in this study. 
While the Fulginiti model has much to recommend it, the 
usefulness of the model for policy analysis is open to 
question. First, Fulginiti finds that the symmetry and 
homogeneity conditions that are imposed on the data are 
rejected when submitted to a statistical test. This is not 
unusual, nor is her decision to impose the restrictions 
anyway. It does, however, affect the plausibility of the 
estimated parameters of the model. 
As shown in Table 2.1, a number of the supply 
elasticities implied by the estimated coefficients of the 
restricted model are somewhat suspect. Perhaps the most 
surprising result is that beef production is found to be 
complementary with wheat, corn, soybean and sorghum 
production. -It seems more reasonable to expect an increase in 
crop prices to result in an expansion in crop area and a 
reduction in the amount of land devoted to forage production 
and pasture. The model developed for this study finds 
evidence supporting this hypothesis. 
Other surprising results are the complementarity of corn 
and sorghum production, and the complementarity of soybean 
production with production of all other major crops. Finally, 
the estimated own-price elasticities are very large compared 
to those estimated by FAPRI, Reca and Cavallo and Mundlak. 
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Table 2.1. Supply elasticities for major crop and livestock 
products in Argentina, as estimated by Fulginiti 
(1986; 80) 
Elasticity with respect to the price of: 
Wheat Corn Soybeans Sorghum Beef 
Wheat 1.55 -0.24 0.03 -0.13 0.25 
Corn -0.45 2.05 0.05 0.18 0.27 
Soybeans 0.96 0.86 0.92 0.47 0.99 
Sorghum -1.18 0.93 0.15 1.55 0.23 
Beef 0.18 0.10 0.02 0.02 1.21 
These large own-price elasticities are especially suspect when 
the unrestricted model found that higher wheat and corn prices 
actually reduced production of those commodities (Fulginiti 
1986: 71). 
When Fulginiti*s model is used to examine the likely 
effects of liberalizing Argentine trade and agricultural 
policy, the estimated effects on production are very large. 
Beef production increases 65 percent when the currency is 
devalued, export taxes are removed and other trade 
restrictions are eliminated. Wheat production increases 63 
percent, corn production 87 percent, and soybean production 
increases 199 percent. Use of capital, labor and other inputs 
by the agricultural sector approximately doubles (Fulginiti 
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1986: 113). Few would deny that Argentine agriculture would 
benefit greatly from a liberalization of government policies. 
These estimated effects strain credulity, however. Fulginiti 
concedes as much, but ascribes any problems to the assumption 
of perfectly elastic input supplies and product demands. 
A review of models developed for other countries raises a 
number of issues of relevance to this study. Roe and Senauer 
(1985) develop an agricultural policy model for the Dominican 
Republic. In their model, crop supplies are determined in 
part by current year prices. Actual prices are used because 
the government announces producer prices before planting. 
Where prices are not known in advance, modelers usually make 
supply a function of lagged prices, or some other proxy for 
expected prices. Tyers and Rachman (1982), for example, use a 
more traditional Nerlovian partial adjustment model to 
determine crop supplies in Indonesia. 
In Argentina, the government has sometimes announced 
support prices in advance of planting, but these prices rarely 
are reliable indicators of the prices farmers actually receive 
for their production. Part of the problem is that announced 
prices are expressed in nominal terms, and producers must 
anticipate how much inflation and currency devaluation will 
take place between planting and harvest. Due to the very 
uncertain macroeconomic and policy environment, the model 
developed for this study assumes that farmers look at the real 
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crop prices which prevail at planting time when making land 
allocation decisions. 
A model of the Philippines developed by Bautista (1986) 
looks at the implications of changing export tax rates in a 
country that produces some crops primarily for export and some 
for domestic consumption. Depending on cross-price 
elasticities, it is not known in advance whether a reduction 
in export taxes would increase total agricultural income in 
such a country. Export crop production is certain to 
increase, but domestic crop production is likely to fall 
(which may also have important implications for domestic 
consumers). Model results do indicate that liberalization 
would increase agricultural income. In Argentina, reducing 
export taxes would certainly benefit some crops more than 
others, but relatively few crops in Argentina are produced 
exclusively for domestic consumption. 
Narayana, Parikh and Srinivasan (1987) develop a general 
equilibrium model to examine agricultural and food policy 
issues for India. The model divides the Indian economy into 
nine agricultural sectors and one non-agricultural sector. 
Likewise, consumers are divided into ten expenditure groups to 
facilitate examination of income distribution questions. Crop 
supplies are determined using a Nerlovian specification, where 
the supply of each crop depends on expected revenues from that 
crop and from two competing crops. The model is used to 
examine the impacts of distributing free wheat to consumers. 
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In terms of national income and income distribution, the 
analysts find that such a policy would be beneficial if it 
were financed from taxes, but it would reduce investment 
otherwise. 
The Narayana, Parikh and Srinivasan model appears to be a 
very useful tool for looking at policy issues in the Indian 
context. The general equilibrium framework has the 
theoretical and practical advantages listed in the discussion • 
of the Cavallo and Mundlak model. The Indian model has the 
additional advantage of providing more commodity detail in the 
agricultural sector. Where sufficient resources are available 
to develop and maintain such a model, the Narayana, Parikh and 
Srinivasan approach is very promising. The model developed 
for this study is more modest in scope, as it is intended to 
be small enough that it can be developed, maintained and 
understood by a single analyst who also has other 
responsibilities. With some revisions, it could also be 
incorporated into a larger general equilibrium model. 
In order to examine the impacts of changes in U.S. 
commodity prices on Argentina, it is necessary to know how 
U.S. prices are related to the prices received by Argentine 
producers. Bredahl, Meyers and Collins (1979) introduced the 
concept of the price transmission elasticity—the percent 
change in the domestic price resulting from a one-percent 
change in the world price. At the extremes, the price 
transmission elasticity will be one when there are no barriers 
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to trade or constant ad-valorem tariffs, and zero when 
government policies isolate domestic markets completely from 
the rest of the world. The authors argue that it is just as 
important to know the price transmission elasticity as it is 
to know the supply and demand elasticities, if the issue is 
how a country will respond to a change in world prices. 
Meilke and Griffith (1983) develop a world oilseed model 
that endogenizes government policies by estimating producer 
price supports as a function of lagged product, input and 
support prices. International price linkages are also 
determined using estimated equations. Williams and Thompson 
(1984) endogenize Brazilian soybean policies, estimating the 
degree of intervention as a function of product prices, the 
inflation rate and the balance of payments. The authors find 
that Brazilian policies intended to stimulate soymeal exports 
in the 1970s actually were counterproductive. The policy 
resulted in lower soybean prices and production that limited 
the amount of soybeans available to the domestic crushing 
industry. The model developed for this study is inspired by 
the work of Meilke, Griffith, Williams and Thompson. However, 
it breaks the price transmission process into several steps, 
instead of estimating Argentine producer prices directly as a 
function of world prices. 
Sarris and Freebairn (1983) endogenize pricing policies 
in the international wheat market. They show that implicit 
welfare weights on producers and consumers do not have to be 
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very different for very large trade interventions to be 
optimal. For example, in a country like Argentina, high 
export taxes may result in higher "net social welfare" than a 
free trade policy if the welfare of consumers is weighted 
slightly more heavily than that of producers. Standard 
welfare theory (e.g.. Just et al. 1982) is predicated on the . 
assumption that different groups in society are weighted 
equally, or that those who gain from policy changes conpensate 
those who lose. Sarris and Freebairn show that relaxing that 
assumption means that free trade is not necessarily optimal. 
From an econometric perspective, the model developed for 
this study treats Argentina as a small country where world 
prices are exogenous. This is used as a justification for 
estimating the model using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) rather 
than a technique which corrects for the cross-equation 
correlation of error terms. Binkley (1985) argues that errors 
are likely to be correlated even in a small-country model, 
since disturbances in the country model are likely to mirror 
disturbances in the world market. OLS assumptions are 
particularly likely to be violated in Argentina, because the 
country is important enough in world trade that it is 
inappropriate to consider world prices exogenous. Binkley 
offers several options: the researcher can proceed as if the 
model is simultaneous and use appropriate estimation 
techniques; use instrumental variables; or, if OLS is used, 
consider the likely directions of biases in parameter 
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estimates. This study opts for OLS, for reasons explained in 
Chapter IV. 
A more serious objection to the whole enterprise of 
developing econometric models to examine the likely impacts of 
changes in policy is the "Lucas critique." According to Lucas 
(1981: 126), "...given that the structure of an econometric 
model consists of optimal decision rules of economic agents, 
and that optimal decision rules vary systematically with 
changes in the structure of series relevant to the decision 
maker, it follows that any change in policy will 
systematically alter the structure of econometric models." 
Thus, from a theoretical perspective, policy models based on 
observed historical relationships among different variables 
may be of little or no use in estimating the likely impacts of 
future policy changes. 
The Lucas critique is potentially devastating to the case 
for using econometric models to conduct policy analysis. Few 
economists have abandoned the use of econometric models in 
response to the Lucas critique, however. Instead, it has 
caused researchers to be more careful in how they specify 
econometric models, so that the modeled relationships are 
based on underlying market structures that do not change when 
policies are altered. French (1982), for example, recognizes 
that stock-holding behavior changes when a buffer-stock scheme 
is introduced. In his model, stock-holding behavior depends 
on actual and expected prices, but the way in which price 
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expectations are formed is different in the presence of a 
buffer-stock program than in its absence. 
Another response to the Lucas critique is to acknowledge 
that the results of econometric models must be treated with 
caution. In the past, economists have often acted as if they 
were neutral technicians who utilize models that determine the 
"true" impacts of policy changes. Confidence in the ability 
of econometric models to uncover "truth" is waning, but models 
are still seen as tools which can provide at least some useful 
information. As argued by Nelson (1987), for economists to be 
effective in the policy process, they need to place less 
emphasis on econometric models and more on communication 
skills. An economist who is able to tell a believable story 
is more likely to convince policy makers of the wisdom or 
folly of a particular policy than an economist who cites 
simulation statistics, t-values and the like to buttress his 
or her conclusions. 
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CHAPTER III. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The Agricultural Sector Model for Argentina (ASMA) is a 
tool which can be used to assess the impact on Argentina of 
alternative U.S. and Argentine trade and agricultural 
policies. ASMA is a partial equilibrium model focusing on 
Argentine agriculture. With some modifications, it could be 
incorporated into a larger world commodity trade model (like 
the FAPRI model) or a general equilibrium model for the 
Argentine economy as a whole. 
ASMA is an econometric model estimated using time series 
data. Some structure is imposed on the model, but the 
approach is generally descriptive. Exogenous to the model 
are U.S. commodity prices, Argentine macroeconomic conditions, 
weather, and patterns of technological change. The model 
determines Argentine prices, supply, domestic use and trade of 
wheat, corn, sorghum, soybeans, soybean meal and soybean oil, 
the most important products of Argentine crop agriculture. On 
the livestock side, the model estimates cattle inventories and 
the production of pork and poultry. 
Accounting identities are used to determine a number of 
aggregate indicators, including the value of production and 
exports, net returns to crop production, total area harvested 
and export tax revenue. Given a few simplifying assumptions, 
the model can be used to draw implications about the effects 
of policy changes on the balance of trade and Argentina's 
international debt situation. 
39 
The rest of this chapter lays out the theoretical 
framework underlying the Agricultural Sector Model for 
Argentina: 
1) The first section explains how the model determines 
domestic prices for the six crop commodities, 
2) The second section outlines the determination of crop 
supplies, 
3) The third section looks at domestic use, ending stocks 
and trade for the six commodities, 
4) The fourth section discusses the livestock portion of 
the model, and 
5) The fifth section explains how the model derives the 
various aggregate measures. 
Domestic Prices 
As a major exporter of grains and oilseeds, Argentina is 
directly affected by changes in world commodity markets. 
Weather in the Soviet Union and Brazil, export subsidies by 
the United States and the European Community, and the myriad 
of other factors that affect U.S. commodity prices also affect 
the prices received by Argentine exporters, farmers and 
processors. Many Argentine farmers follow activity on the 
Chicago Board of Trade as carefully as do U.S. farmers, 
because they know they are directly affected by changes in 
world market conditions. 
While the prices received by Argentine farmers are 
affected by changes in U.S. prices, however, producer prices 
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in Argentina and the United States do not always march in 
lockstep. This is illustrated in Figures 3.1 and 3.2. Marked 
differences appear when producer corn prices in both countries 
are measured in dollars per metric ton (the exchange rate used 
is that applied to Argentine agricultural exports). In some 
years, Argentine producer prices are well below those received 
by U.S. farmers. Part of the difference can be attributed to 
differences in transportation costs and to differences in the 
type and quality of corn produced in the two countries. 
However, most of the difference must be ascribed to export 
taxes and other policies that drive a wedge between U.S. and 
Argentine prices. 
Not only are Argentine producer prices usually lower than 
U.S. producer prices, but the two series do not always move 
together. One reason is that the Argentine price series is 
reported on a calendar year basis, while the U.S. prices are 
reported on a September-August crop year basis. More 
important, however, are the constant changes in Argentine 
export taxes and other policies. Not only is there a wedge 
between U.S. and Argentine prices, but the size of the wedge 
is not constant. 
Figure 3.2 shows that there is sometimes little 
correlation between producer prices in the United States and 
Argentina when both are expressed in terms of real domestic 
currency (for both countries, producer prices measured in 
terms of domestic currency were deflated by the country's 
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Wholesale price index, and converted to a common base year). 
In addition to the differences due to agricultural and trade 
policies, the effects of macroeconomic policy on exchange 
rates and inflation contribute to the lack of correlation 
between real prices in the two countries. Figure 3.2 is a 
strong argument against the common practice of using U.S. 
prices measured in dollars as a determinant of supply and 
demand in other countries, at least in Argentina. 
Rather than trying to link U.S. and Argentine producer 
prices directly, ASMA introduces a number of intermediate 
steps in the price transmission process, as shown in Figure 
3.3. The first step links U.S. commodity prices with 
Argentine export prices; the second estimates export tax 
rates; and the third determines the remaining difference 
between border prices and producer prices. By dividing the 
process into a number of steps, it is easier to trace the 
reasons why U.S. and Argentine producer prices differ. It is 
also easier to develop reliable estimates of price 
transmission elasticities when the sources of much of the 
"noise" apparent in Figure 3.1 are identified. 
Argentine export prices for wheat, corn, sorghum and 
soybeans are modeled as a function of U.S. farm prices. U.S. 
and Argentine commodities are assumed to be close substitutes 
in world markets. In most years, transportantion costs and 
slight differences in grade are the only major reasons why 
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Figure 3.3. Price determination in ASMA 
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prices are used instead of export prices because the FAPRI 
trade models did not generate U.S. export prices at the time 
this model was developed. The difference between U.S. farm 
and U.S. export prices is small and relatively stable over 
time, so linking Argentine export prices directly to U.S. farm 
prices should not introduce significant error. 
A more important problem concerns time. The FAPRI model 
generates U.S. farm prices on a crop year basis (September-
August for corn, sorghum and soybeans; June-May for wheat). 
Since Argentina is a southern hemisphere country, its crops 
are harvested about six months after (or before, depending on 
one's perspective) U.S. crops. Also, certain types of 
macroeconomic data for Argentina are hard to obtain on 
anything other than a calendar year basis. For purposes of 
this model, all Argentine prices are on a calendar year basis. 
Since a calendar year covers two U.S. crop years, 
Argentine export prices measured on a calendar year basis 
depend on U.S. prices in two different crop years. For 
example, 1988 Argentine export prices depend on U.S. prices 
for both the 1987/88 and the 1988/89 crop years. This creates 
a problem if ASMA is linked to the FAPRI trade model: the 
Argentine crop year beginning in December 1987 for wheat, 
March 1988 for corn and sorghum, and April 1988 for soybeans 
corresponds to the 1987/88 crop year for the U.S. in the FAPRI 
model. In ASMA, however, those Argentine crop years are 
referred to as 1988. Thus, if the Argentine crop years were 
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relabeled to correspond with the FAPRI convention, 1987/88 
Argentine prices would depend in part on 1988/89 U.S. prices. 
This cannot be done in a dynamic model that solves for U.S. 
prices. It is not a problem when ASMA is operated in 
isolation, but changes would have to be made if it were to be 
incorporated in the FAPRI model. 
Other arguments in the Argentine export price equation 
are intercept shifters for the Soviet grain embargo and the 
expansion of U.S. export credit programs. The grain embargo 
limited the amount of wheat and feed grains the Soviet Union 
could purchase from the United States in 1980 and 1981. The 
disruption in normal trade patterns meant that the Soviets and 
others had to seek alternative suppliers, such as Argentina. 
The embargo thus had the effect of making Argentine grain a 
differentiated product, which could therefore sell at a 
premium to U.S. grain. After the embargo was lifted, the 
normal relationship between U.S. and Argentine grain prices 
was restored. 
In the mid-1980s, the United States stepped up its use of 
subsidized credit to encourage grain sales at a time of 
depressed international markets. Since the availability and 
price of credit was important to many major importers, 
providing subsidized credit gave the United States a 
competitive advantage. Therefore, Argentina had to sell its 
grain and oilseeds at a discount to U.S. products in order to 
attract buyers. The United States appears determined to 
46 
continue the use of subsidized credit, so the effect is 
assumed to persist in the future. In fact, the U.S. Export 
Enhancement Program (EEP), which began in 1986, provides 
additional subsidies to importers, and is likely to force 
Argentina to sell its grain at an even larger discount. 
Equation 3.1 indicates how ASMA determines Argentine 
export prices for wheat, corn, sorghum and soybeans; 
(3.1) Argentine export price = f(Current and lagged U.S. 
farm price, Shifter for the Soviet grain embargo, 
Shifter for increased U.S. credit sales). 
Summing across the current and lagged values of the U.S. 
farm price, the price transmission elasticity is expected to 
be close to 1.0. The expected sign on the grain embargo 
shifter is positive, and the expected sign on the U.S. credit 
sales shifter is negative. Argentine prices for soybean meal 
and soybean oil are expected to depend on U.S. market prices 
for those commodities in a similar fashion. 
It is common to think of export tax rates as a policy 
tool which would be exogenous to a model of the Argentine 
agricultural sector. However, thero is considerable evidence 
that export taxes tend to be adjusted based, at least in part, 
on economic circumstances. ASMA includes export tax equations 
that can be used when the analyst is interested in knowing how 
Argentina might respond to a change in the economic 
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environment, or that can be excluded from the model if the 
analyst wishes to treat export taxes as an exogenous policy 
tool. 
Since wheat, corn and sorghum export taxes have generally 
been set at the same or similar levels, ASMA estimates an 
average export tax rate. Export tax rates for particular 
commodities are then estimated as a function of this average 
rate. ASMA identifies three principal determinants of the 
average export tax rate: 
1) Export prices. When world prices are high, the 
Argentine government can extract additional surplus and still 
let producers share part of the benefits by increasing export 
tax rates. When world prices are low, export tax rates can be 
reduced to help cushion the effect on producers. In the 
model, this is reflected by making the average tax rate a 
function of the average export price for corn, wheat and 
sorghum. Export prices are weighted by their respective 
historical shares of Argentine exports. Soybeans are excluded 
because they are generally treated differently than the 
grains, and because soybean price data are unavailable before 
the mid-1970s. 
2) Inflation rates. High inflation rates can be expected 
to result in high export tax rates for two reasons. First, 
higher tax rates reduce domestic prices for exported goods, 
and so act directly to help bring inflation under control. 
Second, inflation rates are often high because the Argentine 
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government is financing a large fiscal deficit by printing 
money. Export taxes are an important government revenue 
source in Argentina, so higher export taxes can help close 
fiscal deficits. The fiscal deficit might be included as a 
separate determinant of export tax rates, but data are hard to 
find and are inconsistent. In the model, the explanatory 
variable is the logarithm of current and lagged inflation 
rates. The logarithmic form is used to limit the effects of 
years when inflation rates are extremely high. 
3) Regime changes. The military coup of 1976 brought 
into power a military government committed to free market 
policies. Export taxes were quickly eliminated, and they were 
not reinstated until 1981, when the military government came 
under severe political and economic pressure. The model uses 
two shift variables, one beginning in 1977 and the other 
beginning in 1981, to represent these two major changes in the 
policy regime. The return of civilian rule in 1983 does not 
seem to have had an immediate impact on export tax policy. 
Since the model treats regime changes exogenously, the value 
of the model for making ex ante forecasts is limited. 
Equation 3.2 shows how the average export tax rate, 
measured as percent of export value, is determined in ASMA: 
(3.2) Average export tax rate = f(Average export price for 
wheat, corn and sorghum. Log of current and lagged 
inflation rates. Shifter for the military free 
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market policies-, Shifter for the reinstatement of 
export taxes in 1981). 
Increases in export prices and inflation rates are 
expected to have a positive effect on the average export tax 
rate. The expected sign of the coefficient on the free market 
policy shifter is negative, and the expected sign on the 
coefficient of the other shifter is positive. 
The export tax rate for individual commodities depends on 
the average tax rate, the export price of the commodity, and 
the export prices of other commodities. If the export price 
of corn, for example, is high relative to the export prices of 
wheat and sorghum, the Argentine government may raise the corn 
export tax relative to the wheat and sorghum export taxes. 
This would reduce the domestic price of corn relative to what 
it would have been if the corn export tax had not been 
adjusted. Thus, export taxes can serve not only to stabilize 
the levels of domestic prices, but they can also be used to 
stabilize the relative prices of the different grains. 
Soybeans only became an important crop in the mid-1970s, 
and export taxes on soybeans were only established in 1974. 
Soybean export taxes after 1974 are modeled much like the 
grains—the soybean export tax rate depends on the average 
export tax rate and the export price of soybeans. Rather than 
also depending on the export prices of wheat, corn and 
sorghum, the export price of soybean meal is the cross-price 
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term included in the equation. If the price of soybeans is 
high relative to the price of soybean meal, the soybean export 
tax is likely to be increased. This would reduce domestic 
soybean prices, and therefore increase the profitability of 
crushing soybeans in Argentina. Export taxes, therefore, can 
be used to stabilize crushing margins so as to protect the 
domestic crushing industry. 
Equation 3.3 indicates how the export tax rates for 
wheat, corn, sorghum and soybeans are determined in ASMA: 
(3.3) Export tax rate = f(Average export tax rate. 
Commodity export price. Export prices of other 
commodities), 
The elasticity of the export tax rate for each commodity 
with respect to the average export tax rate is expected to be 
approximately 1.0. The expected sign on the coefficient of 
the own-price term is positive, and the expected sign on the 
coefficient of the cross-price term is negative. 
To obtain domestic Argentine prices for each commodity, 
one might expect that it would only be necessary to convert 
the export prices measured in dollars into domestic currency 
and to subtract export taxes. Unfortunately, the resulting 
series do not match reported wholesale prices for Argentine 
commodities. Some of the difference, termed here the 
"marketing margin," can be explained by ordinary 
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transportation and handling charges. However, the measured 
marketing margin sometimes changes dramatically from one year 
to the next, and it seems unlikely that actual marketing costs 
would change nearly as much. 
A number of possible explanations for variations in the 
marketing margin are possible: 
1) Much of the problem may be related to the data. 
Export prices, exchange rates, export tax rates, and wholesale 
prices all change dramatically within some calendar years. I f  
the way in which some series move relative to each other 
changes within the course of a calendar year, the marketing 
margin calculated using annual averages for each of the 
component variables may be in error. High rates of inflation 
and currency depreciation, frequent changes in export tax 
rates, and the uncertain reliability of much of the data mean 
that the calculated marketing margins should only be seen as 
first approximations. 
2) Some policies of the Argentine government have obvious 
impacts on the marketing margin. For example, the price 
controls in effect during the 1974-76 period restrained 
wholesale prices, and therefore increased the marketing margin 
at a time of high world prices. Since the government has 
often been the only, or at least the primary, market available 
to Argentine crop producers, the government has often had 
direct control over marketing. Even when marketing has been 
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primarily in private hands, the government maintains 
considerable influence on pricing decisions. 
3) Finally, some of the observed changes in marketing 
margins may reflect ordinary market effects. Large crops may 
strain transportation and storage facilities, and result in 
larger margins and lower farm prices relative to export 
prices. Even private grain handlers may act so as to cushion 
price changes at the farm level, so that margins expand when 
world prices are high and shrink when world prices are low. 
Uncertainty concerning the data and the actual causes of 
variations in the marketing margin mean that flexibility and a 
willingness to experiment is necessary in specifying the 
margin equations in ASMA. There is less uniformity across 
commodities than there is in most other features of the model, 
and there is also a greater use of trends and shift variables 
which "explain" that which is not understood. 
One feature that is common to all the marketing margin 
equations is a term representing the export price minus export 
taxes, measured in terms of real domestic currency. Some 
marketing costs, such as interest payments and insurance, may 
be proportional to the value of the commodity being marketed. 
On the other hand, most transportation and handling costs 
would depend more on the volume of the marketed commodity than 
on its value. Across all commodities, a significant positive 
correlation is found between the marketing margin and the 
export price minus export taxes, and the result is robust with 
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respect to model specification. This is consistent with the 
hypothesis that public and private grain handlers absorb part 
of the variation in world market prices and Argentine export 
tax rates. 
Expressing the argument in terms of risk, ASMA assumes 
that world market price risk is borne by three different 
agents: the government treasury absorbs part of the risk by 
adjusting export tax rates to changing world market 
conditions; private and public grain handlers bear part of the 
risk by adjusting marketing margins; and producers must bear 
the remaining risk. The specification of ASMA makes it 
possible to estimate the average proportion of risk borne by 
each agent during the estimation, period. However, the 
specification does not lend itself to examining how risk-
sharing behavior has changed over time. For example, 
producers bore most of the market price risk during the free 
market experiment of the late 1970s, when export taxes were 
frozen at zero for several years. 
Anther variable common to the marketing margin equations 
is a shift variable for one or more of the years in the mid-
1970s when price controls and other policies of the Peronist 
administrations resulted in large marketing margins. A 
logarithmic trend is included in each equation to capture any 
secular changes over time in the marketing margin. In the 
corn and sorghum equations, the deviation from trend yield is 
included as an explanatory variable. Above-average yields may 
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result in strains on the transportation and storage system 
which would tend to increase margins. Margins shrank for all 
commodities in the early 1980s, perhaps due to the high demand 
for Argentine commodities during the Soviet grain embargo. 
Shift variables beginning in 1981 are used to represent this 
shrinkage in the margin. 
Equation 3.4 indicates how ASMA determines the real 
marketing margin for wheat, corn, sorghum and soybeans; 
(3.4) Real marketing margin = f(Real export price minus 
export taxes. Shift for Peronist price controls, 
Logarithmic trend. Deviation from trend yield. 
Shift for years beginning in 1981). 
The expected coefficient on the price term is between 
zero and one. If the coefficient is zero, producer prices 
respond fully to changes in world prices or export taxes. If 
the coefficient is one, producers are completely insulated 
from such changes. The expected signs of the coefficients on 
the Peronist price control shifter and the deviation from 
trend yield variable are positive, and the expected sign of 
the coefficient on the shifter for years beginning in 1981 is 
negative. The sign of the coefficient on the logarithmic 
trend is indeterminate. 
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Given export prices, export tax rates and the marketing 
margins, the real wholesale prices of wheat, corn, sorghum and 
soybeans are determined by Equation 3.5: 
(3.5) Wholesale price = Export price minus export taxes, 
expressed in real domestic currency, minus the 
Real marketing margin. 
Wholesale prices for soybean meal and soybean oil are 
determined by direct price linkage equations, with shift 
variables used to "explain" outliers. There are no known 
taxes on soybean product exports, and the data do not 
distinguish between export prices and wholesale prices. In 
the case of soybean meal however, meal intended for domestic 
use has a different, usually higher, price than meal intended 
for export. The price linkage equation estimates the price of 
meal intended for export. The price of meal for domestic use 
is defined as the export price multiplied by a conversion 
factor. Reasons for the difference in the export and domestic 
use prices are not understood, but may be policy induced. 
For the grains and soybeans, price transmission 
elasticities between U.S. producer prices and Argentine 
wholesale prices depend on the coefficients in the export 
price equations, the export tax rate equations, and the 
marketing margin equations. The price transmission elasticity 
56 
between U.S. producer and Argentine wholesale prices will be 
large if: 
1) The price transmission elasticity between U.S. 
producer and Argentine export prices is large, 
2) The coefficients on the export price terms in the 
export tax rate equations are small, and 
3) The coefficient on the price term in the marketing 
margin equation is small. 
The price transmission elasticity is not bounded by zero 
and one. For example, suppose that export taxes and marketing 
margins do not adjust to changes in world market conditions, 
so that a $1.00 per metric ton change in the U.S. price 
results in a $1.00 per metric ton change in Argentine 
wholesale prices. .If transportation costs mean that Argentine 
wholesale prices are lower than U.S. producer prices, a one-
percent change in U.S. producer prices will result in more 
than a one-percent change in Argentine producer prices (even 
though the absolute effect will be the same). It is less 
likely that the price transmission elasticity would be less 
than zero, since it would require the government or grain 
handlers to over-adjust to changes in world market, conditions 
(e.g., raise export taxes per metric ton by more than the 
increase in export prices). 
Crop Supplies 
The supply block of ASMA determines area harvested and 
production for wheat, corn, sorghum and soybeans. Some 
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structure is imposed on the area equations to overcome 
econometric problems and ensure that certain theoretical 
constraints are satisfied. The model considers more cross-
price effects and is more internally consistent than most ad 
hoc supply specifications. At the same time, it is more 
flexible than models that impose even more structure (e.g., 
Fulginiti 1986), so that it is easier to "correct" results 
that seem implausible. 
As shown in Figure 3.4, the model assumes that Argentine 
farmers use a two-step process to make planting decisions. In 
the first step, farmers decide the total amount of land to 
devote to the production of the four crops, considered as a 
group. In the second step, they decide how much land to plant 
in each of the crops. A similar procedure is used to estimate 
U.S. crop production in Gallagher and Green (1984). Total 
crop area is assumed to depend on the average level of prices 
and returns for the four crops, while the allocation among the 
four crops depends on relative prices and returns. In the 
model, area harvested is used instead of area planted, due to 
problems of data availability and consistency. 
The principal determinants of total crop area in the 
model are lagged crop area, the average real return per 
hectare in the previous year at normal yields, and lagged 
cattle inventories. The use of lagged area and returns is in 
the tradition of Nerlove (1956), who first proposed that 





























Figure 3.4. Determination of area harvested in ASMA 
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recent market prices. Forward-looking expectations are not 
used, in part to keep the model simple, and in part because 
the extreme uncertainty faced by Argentine farmers makes it 
very difficult for them to develop accurate expectations of 
future prices and returns. This specification is also 
consistent with the notion that Argentine farmers cannot 
immediately adjust total crop area to changes in market 
conditions, because it is difficult to shift resources between 
livestock and crop production. 
Average real returns are obtained as follows: 
1) For each crop, calculate normal-weather yields by 
fitting a trend yield equation. 
2) Multiply the real wholesale price of each commodity by 
the trend yield to get the real return per hectare under 
normal weather. 
3) Weight the real return for each commodity by the 
proportion of total area planted to that crop. 
Use of the average real returns variable imposes a number 
of restrictions on the model, some of which are more desirable 
than others. First, use of the variable ensures that 
increasing the price of any one commodity will result in an 
increase in the total area harvested. As discussed in Chapter 
II, ad hoc specifications do not ensure this result. 
Second, it forces total area harvested to respond to a 
one real peso per hectare change in gross returns of a 
particular crop according to the proportion of total area 
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planted to that crop. This is probably preferable to any 
other set of weights that could be, established in advance, but 
it may also result in some problems. For example, suppose 
that corn and soybeans are planted almost exclusively on land 
that is always planted to crops, while wheat is planted on 
land that often moves in and out of production. In such a 
case, an increase in wheat prices would be likely to have a 
larger impact on total planted area than would an increase in 
corn or soybean prices, even if wheat, corn and soybeans were 
each planted on the same number of hectares in the previous 
year. 
Third, the specification implicitly assumes that costs of 
production of the various commodities are proportional to 
their prices. That is, it is assumed that the gross returns 
which are measured are proportional to the net returns that 
would presumably be used to make planting decisions. Reliable 
and representative time series of production costs are 
difficult to locate for the United States, let alone 
Argentina. If production costs generally move with the 
wholesale price index (WPI), deflating gross returns by the 
WPI should provide an appropriate measure of how real returns 
per hectare change from year to year for each crop. 
Lagged cattle numbers are included in the equation 
because cattle production and crop production compete for land 
resources. Much of the land in the Pampas region which is now 
being used for livestock grazing or forage production could be 
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used for crop production, given the right incentives. Lagged 
cattle numbers are used because cattle inventories are 
reported as of July 1, just a few months before planting of 
the crop to be harvested in the next calendar year. Numbers 
are used instead of prices, in part because of problems with 
data availability, and in part because it takes years for a 
change in cattle prices to be fully reflected in the number of 
livestock grazing on potential cropland. 
Weather and other environmental conditions can have 
obvious effects on crop production. Although it is more 
common to associate weather effects with yields rather than 
area planted or harvested, drought and flooding may reduce the 
planting or harvesting of crops. Likewise, pest damage may 
result in the abandonment of fields before harvest. An index 
of the deviation from trend yields for the four crops is 
included in the total area equation to provide a crude proxy 
for these effects. Inclusion of the variable is appropriate 
if the same environmental conditions that affect yields also 
affect area harvested in the same way. 
Other variables included in the equation are a 
logarithmic trend, to represent any secular trend in crop 
area, and shift variables to account for outliers. 
Justification and implications of the shift variables are 
provided in Chapter IV. 
Equation 3.6 indicates how ASMA determines total area 
harvested for wheat, corn, sorghum and soybeans; 
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(3.6) Total area harvested = f(Lagged area harvested, 
Lagged average real returns at normal yields, 
Lagged cattle numbers. Index of deviations from 
trend yields. Logarithmic trend. Shift variables). 
The coefficient on lagged area is expected to be between 
zero and one, indicating that Argentine producers adjust 
planting decisions partially from one year to the next. The • 
expected sign of the coefficient on lagged real returns is 
positive, and the expected sign of the coefficient on lagged 
cattle numbers is negative. The index of deviations from 
trend yields is expected to have a positive coefficient. The 
signs of the coefficients on the trend and shift variables are 
indeterminate. 
Given the total area harvested, the area harvested for 
each crop is determined by share equations. Crop shares are 
estimated directly for corn, sorghum, and soybeans, while 
wheat is the residual. Since the residual will generally have 
the largest absolute errors in such a framework, and wheat 
area harvested has generally exceeded the area devoted to the 
other crops, wheat was selected to be the residual crop. The 
average percent error is likely to be smaller for wheat, given 
this specification, than the percent error would have been for 
one of the other crops if they had been selected to be the 
residual. 
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Each of the estimated crop share equations includes two 
major economic terms—the crop share in the previous year, and 
the ratio of lagged real returns for the crop in question to 
an average of lagged real returns for the other three crops. 
As with total area, the shares are assumed to adjust only 
partially in any one year to changes in the economic 
environment. Such "stickiness" could be attributed to a 
reluctance or inability to change established crop rotation 
patterns, or to Nerlovian price expectations. 
The numerator of the real returns ratio is equal to the 
real wholesale crop price in the previous year multiplied by 
the trend yield. The denominator is equal to the average real 
return in the previous year for the three competing crops, 
also Calculated assuming trend yields. The denominator, then, 
is identical to the average real returns variable used to 
estimate total area harvested, except it excludes the crop 
whose share is being determined. 
This specification has a number of advantages and 
disadvantages. The primary advantage is that it allows the 
incorporation of more cross-price effects than can usually be 
included in more ad-hoc specifications, due to problems with 
multicollinearity of prices. The share of total area planted 
to any particular crop will increase with the price of that 
crop, and decrease as the price of any competing crop 
increases. The specification also allows cross-price effects 
to change over time. For example, as soybean area increases. 
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the contribution of the soybean price to the computation of 
the average real returns for crops competing with corn and 
sorghum will increase. Thus, the cross-price effect of 
soybeans on corn and sorghum shares will increase with the 
soybean share. 
One problem with the specification is that it imposes a 
number of restrictions on cross-price effects that may not be 
desirable. For example, suppose that sorghum and wheat are 
competitive crops in drier regions of Argentina, but that 
farmers rarely substitute sorghum and soybeans. In the model, 
the relative cross-price effects of soybeans and wheat on 
sorghum production would be fixed by the real returns and crop 
shares for each. The model would be likely to overestimate 
the amount of substitution between sorghum and soybeans and 
underestimate the amount of substitution between sorghum and 
wheat. 
As is discussed in Chapter IV, another problem with the 
specification is that the economic variables (lagged shares 
and the lagged real returns ratio) only explain a relatively 
small part of the variation in crop shares over time. Whether 
this is a problem of omitted variables in the equations, of 
data, or of the general specification is not clear. In each 
of the estimated equations, trends and shift variables are 
introduced, primarily to ensure "reasonable" elasticities, but 
also to improve the fit of some equations. This, of course. 
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is hard to defend on theoretical grounds, but it seems to be 
necessary to make the model behavior plausible. 
Equation 3.7 indicates how crop shares of total area 
harvested are determined for corn, sorghum and soybeans: 
(3.7) Crop share = f(Lagged crop share. Lagged ratio of 
real crop returns at normal yields to the average 
real returns for the other three crops. Shift and 
trend variables). 
The coefficient on the lagged crop share is expected to 
take a value between zero and one. The expected sign of the 
coefficient on the real returns ratio is positive. Expected 
signs of coefficients on other variables are indeterminate. 
The wheat crop share is determined by Equation 3.8: 
(3.8) Wheat crop share = 1 - Area shares for the other 
three crops. 
Given the crop shares and total area harvested, the area 
harvested for each crop is determined by Equation 3.9: 
(3.9) Area harvested = Total area harvested times Crop 
share. 
66 
If all coefficients in the total area and crop share 
equations have the expected signs, an increase in the price of 
any one crop will increase the area harvested for that crop, 
but will have ambiguous effects on the area harvested for 
other crops. The own-price effect must be positive, because 
both total area and the crop share increase. Cross-price 
effects are ambiguous, because total area increases, but the 
share for each of the other crops falls. If the effect on 
total area dominates, the crops are net complements, and if 
the effect on crop shares dominates, the crops are net 
substitutes. 
One would expect wheat, corn and sorghum to be net 
substitutes, since they generally compete for scarce cropland. 
However, soybeans may actually be complementary to some or all 
of the other crops. Soybeans can be double-cropped with 
wheat, and soybeans are an important part of crop rotations, 
due to their nitrogen-fixing ability in a country where 
fertilizer prices are relatively high. 
Crop yields are exogenous to ASMA. Most of the variation 
in yields is due to weather and environmental conditions, not 
to crop and input prices. Without sufficient data concerning 
weather, corp diseases, insect infestations, etc., attempts to 
estimate yield equations as a function of economic variables 
proved impossible. This does not mean that farmers fail to 
adjust fertilizer usage and other cropping techniques to 
changes in economic incentives. Indeed, the relatively low 
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rate of fertilizer usage in Argentina is often ascribed to 
policies that reduce crop prices and increase input prices. 
It does, however, mean that it is very difficult to measure 
the effects of output and input prices on yields using 
econometric techniques with time series data. 
Given exogenous yields, crop production in ASMA is 
determined by Equation 3.10; 
(3.10) Production = Area harvested times Yield. 
If yields do respond to crop prices, it is likely that 
ASMA underestimates own-price supply elasticities. In ASMA, 
an increase in the price of a particular crop increases area 
harvested, but it has no effect on yield. If the estimated 
effect on area is unbiased, the estimated effect on production 
will be biased if yields do respond to crop prices. 
Domestic Demand, Stocks and Trade 
The demand block in ASMA consists of equations which 
determine domestic demand, ending stocks and trade for wheat, 
corn, sorghum, soybeans, soybean meal and soybean oil. 
Domestic demand and trade are determined by estimated 
equations, while net trade is the residual of domestic supply, 
demand and stocks. 
Except in the case of soybeans (where crush is 
distinguished from other uses), the model estimates total 
domestic demand, rather than feed, food, and other use 
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categories. This is done to keep the model simple, and 
because reliable data concerning the distribution of domestic 
disappearance among various uses is unavailable. The USDA 
data used in this study distinguish feed and non-feed uses, 
but the data are suspect. For example, USDA reports that non-
feed uses of corn more than doubled in 1973, remained high in 
1974 and 1975, and then fell by almost 80 percent in 1976 
(CTAP 1985a: 23). Such an occurrence seems very unlikely, and 
no possible explanations surfaced during a review of the 
literature. 
Since corn and sorghum are substitutable in many 
livestock rations, total domestic demand for the combined feed 
grains is estimated, and share equations are used to determine 
the domestic use of each. Total feed grain demand is 
determined in the model primarily by four economic factors: 
1) The average real price of corn and sorghum. Higher 
feed grain prices cause livestock producers to reduce the 
amount of grain included in livestock rations. Higher prices 
also discourage food and industrial uses of corn and sorghum. 
The price of each commodity is weighted by its share in total 
feed grain consumption in the previous year. 
2) Pork and poultry production. Although Argentina 
produces much more beef and mutton than pork and poultry, beef 
cattle and sheep are primarily grass-fed. Thus, a high 
proportion of domestic feed grain consumption can be 
attributed to the pork and poultry sectors. Dairy rations 
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often include grain, but reliable information about dairy cow 
numbers is unavailable. Hog and chicken numbers might be a 
more appropriate indicator of feed demand than pork and 
poultry production. However, reliable inventory estimates are 
hard to find, and production is probably a good proxy for 
numbers in the case of animals which are slaughtered at a 
young age. Summing pork and poultry production implies that 
it takes as much corn and sorghum to produce a pound of pork 
as it does a pound of chicken. This is inconsistent with data 
indicating that chickens are more efficient converters of 
grain into meat, but it may be a good approximation in a 
country where producers are more likely to include corn and 
sorghum in poultry rations than in pork rations. 
3) Corn and sorghum production. Generally, one would 
expect that consumption levels would be independent of 
production levels, given commodity prices. However, in 
Argentina and other countries with inadequate grain marketing 
and storage facilities and considerable on-farm use of grain, 
consumption may be determined in part by production. When 
production is high, farmers may be unable to market all their 
grain, or they may choose to market at least some of it in the 
form of livestock. Also, the prices used in this study are 
wholesale prices, which may overstate prices received by 
farmers, especially when large harvests overburden the 
marketing system. Finally, it should be noted that the data 
used in this model are USDA estimates. Since trade and stocks 
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are known with relative certainty, mistakes that are made in 
estimating production will be reflected primarily in estimates 
of domestic consumption. Thus, observed correlations between 
production and consumption may be partly or wholly spurious. 
4) Domestic use of wheat. Wheat is an imperfect 
substitute for corn and sorghum in livestock rations, in human 
diets, and in various industrial uses. Therefore, if wheat 
use increases by one ton, domestic use of corn and sorghum is 
likely to fall, but by less than one ton. 
A logarithmic trend is included in the equation to 
represent any secular trends in feed grain consumption. As .in 
other equations, shift variables are used to account for 
outliers, and ensure reasonable elasticity estimates. 
Equation 3.11 indicates how total domestic demand for 
corn and sorghum is estimated in ASMA: 
(3.11) Feed grain demand = f(Average real price of corn and 
sorghum. Pork and poultry production. Corn and 
sorghum production. Wheat domestic use. 
Logarithmic trend. Shift variables). 
The expected sign of the coefficient on the average real 
price is negative. The coefficients on both of the production 
variables are expected to have positive signs. The expected 
sign of the coefficient on wheat domestic use is negative. 
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The signs of the coefficients on the trend and shift variables 
are indeterminate. 
Given total feed grain demand, domestic use for sorghum 
is determined by a share equation. A key determinant of the 
sorghum share of total feed grain demand is the sorghum-corn 
price ratio. To the degree that sorghum and corn are good 
substitutes in livestock rations, one would expect that 
relative prices would be the major factor affecting use 
shares. Other variables may also play a part, however. A 
lagged dependent variable is included in the equation to 
represent rigidities in the mix of grains in livestock 
rations. The ratio of sorghum production to corn production 
is included for the same reason feed grain production is 
included in the total use equation—demand may be determined 
in part by supply for a variety of reasons. A shift variable 
is included for a single major outlier that cannot otherwise 
be explained. 
Equation 3.12 shows how ASMA determines the sorghum share 
of total feed grain consumption: 
(3.12) Sorghum use share = f(Lagged sorghum use share. 
Sorghum/corn price ratio. Sorghum/corn production 
ratio, Shift variable). 
The coefficient on the lagged use share is expected to be 
between zero and one, to reflect the partial adjustment 
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process. The expected sign of the coefficient on the 
sorghum/corn price ration is negative, and the coefficient on 
the sorghum/corn production ratio is expected to have a 
positive sign. The sign of the coefficient on the shift 
variable is indeterminate. 
Corn use is modeled as the residual for the same reason 
that wheat was modeled as the residual in the supply block— 
corn accounts for most of Argentine domestic feed grain use. 
Given total feed grain use and the sorghum share, the corn 
share of feed grain use is determined by Equation 3.13; 
(3.13) Corn use share = 1 minus Sorghum use share. 
Equation 3.14 determines corn use and sorghum use: 
(3.14) Use = Total feed grain use times Use share. 
Domestic use for wheat is estimated directly, since it is 
not a good substitute for the other commodities included in 
the model. In Argentina, feed use generally accounts for less 
than 5 percent of total domestic demand for wheat (CTAP 1985f: 
23). Therefore, no livestock variables are included as 
determinants of wheat demand. One might expect that demand 
would depend in part on population and income changes, but 
attempts to include population and income in the equation 
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yielded unlikely results. Instead, domestic wheat demand 
depends primarily on three variables; 
1) The real price of wheat. Higher wheat prices, of 
course, are expected to reduce wheat demand. 
2) The average real price of corn and sorghum. Corn and 
sorghum are imperfect substitutes for wheat in feed rations 
and in human diets. Corn and sorghum prices are weighted by 
lagged use shares. 
3) Wheat production. Although there is less on-farm use 
of wheat than feed grains, domestic use of wheat may depend in 
part on available supplies. 
Three shift variables are included in the equation to 
account for outliers. At least one of those outliers appears 
likely to represent a data problem, as is discussed in Chapter 
IV. 
Equation 3.15 indicates how ASMA determines the domestic 
use of wheat: 
(3.15) Wheat domestic use = f(Real wheat price, Average real 
price of corn and sorghum. Wheat production. Shift 
variables). 
The expected sign of the coefficient on the wheat price 
is negative, while the coefficient on the feed grain price is 
expected to have a positive sign. The own-price elasticity is 
expected to be larger, in absolute terms, than the cross-price 
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elasticity. The expected sign of the coefficient on wheat 
production is positive. Signs of the coefficients on the 
shift variables are indeterminate. 
Soybean utilization is divided into crush and other uses. 
Demand by crushers for soybeans is expected to increase with 
the crushing margin—the difference between the value of the 
meal and oil produced from a ton of beans, and the cost to the 
crusher of a ton of soybeans. The value of soybean products 
depends on the price of soybean meal and soybean oil, and on 
the milling rates that determine how much meal and how much 
oil can be extracted from a ton of soybeans. 
The amount of crush in any given year depends on more 
than the crushing margin. Various Argentine government 
policies have encouraged the development of the domestic 
crushing industry. The policies appear intended to ensure 
that Argentina exports increasing amounts of the value-added 
products (soymeal and soyoil) rather than just the raw product 
(soybeans). Including soybean production in the equation can 
be seen as a way to model this implicit government policy. An 
increase in soybean production would result in an increase in 
meal and oil production, so that soybean, soybean meal and 
soybean oil exports would all increase, provided the 
coefficient on soybean production is between zero and one. A 
logarithmic trend is included as a proxy for crushing capacity 
(since data on crushing capacity are unavailable). The use of 
the logarithmic trend implies that capacity would increase at 
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a decreasing rate if the crushing margin and Argentine soybean 
production were held constant. 
Equation 3.16 indicates how soybean crush demand is 
determined in ASMA: 
(3.16) Crush demand = f(Crushing margin, Soybean production, 
Logarithmic trend). 
The expected signs of the coefficients on all three 
variables are positive. The coefficient on soybean production 
is expected to be between zero and one. If the coefficient 
were one, it would imply that every marginal unit of soybean 
production is crushed. If it were zero, it would imply that 
crush is independent of production, given the crushing margin. 
Given crush demand, soybean meal and soybean oil 
production are determined by the technical relationship 
expressed in Equation 3.17; 
(3.17) Soybean product output = Crush demand times 
Milling rate. 
Milling rates do change slightly from one year to the 
next, but the changes are due primarily to changes in the 
average quality of the soybeans crushed, rather than on 
economic factors. 
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Most of the soybeans in Argentina that are not crushed or 
exported are used as seed. Therefore, non-crush domestic use 
of soybeans is modeled as a function of the area harvested. 
Ideally, the independent variable should be area planted in 
the next year. However, this would require a restructuring of 
the model so that next year's area planted is generated by the 
model in the present year. Since area depends only on 
exogenous and lagged endogenous variables, this could be done, 
but the net benefit would be small, since seed use of soybeans 
is small relative to crush. A shift variable is included in 
the equation to account for the period of greatest growth in 
soybean production, when using current rather than future area 
does introduce a bias. 
Non-crush domestic demand for soybeans is determined in 
ASMA by Equation 3.18; 
(3.18) Non-crush demand = f(Soybean area harvested. Shift 
variable). 
The expected signs of the coefficients on both variables 
are positive. The elasticity of non-crush demand with respect 
to area harvested is expected to be close to one, since seed 
use per hectare should be relatively constant. 
Very little soybean meal is used domestically in 
Argentina. Higher real domestic prices of soybean meal would 
be expected to reduce demand. Like corn and sorghum, a high 
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proportion of soybean meal is used in pork and poultry 
production. Shift variables are included in the equation to 
account for the increase in soymeal use that resulted when 
soymeal production increased in the mid-1970s. There is 
little evidence that domestic use has been related to 
production since that time. 
Equation 3.19 indicates how domestic demand for soybean 
meal is determined in ASMA: 
(3.19) Soybean meal demand = f(Real price of soybean meal, 
Pork and poultry production, Shift variables). 
The expected sign of the coefficient on the soymeal price 
variable is negative. The livestock production variable is 
expected to have a positive coefficient. Signs of the 
coefficients on the shift variables are indeterminate. 
Soybean oil demand in Argentina is also very low, and 
available data indicate that domestic use has changed 
dramatically from one year to the next, for reasons that are 
hard to explain. An increase in soybean oil prices is 
expected to reduce demand. Before 1981, there is some 
evidence that soybean oil demand tended to depend in part on 
available supplies. Shift variables are included to ensure a 
reasonable price elasticity and to remove outliers. The 
equation is far from ideal, but soybean oil demand is small 
and the data are far from reliable. 
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Equation 3.20 shows how ASMA determines soybean oil 
domestic demand: 
(3.20) Soybean oil demand = f(Real price of soybean oil, 
Soyoil production in years before 1981, Shift 
variables). 
The expected sign of the coefficient on the soyoil price 
is negative. The soybean oil production variable is expected 
to have a positive coefficient. Signs of the coefficients on 
the shift variables are indeterminate. 
Argentina does not maintain large carryover stocks of any 
of the six commodities included in ASMA. The country does not 
have extensive storage facilities, so much of its production 
must move directly into export markets immediately after 
harvest. While Argentina is a major exporter, it is not large 
enough to exert much market power. The lack of storage 
facilities means that the country cannot exert even the 
limited market power that it does have, or take full advantage 
of seasonal price variability or speculative stock holding. 
The general approach to modeling ending stocks is the 
same across all six commodities. Carryover stocks are 
expected to fall as real prices increase, since higher prices 
increase the opportunity cost of holding stocks. Stock levels 
are likely to increase as production increases, for three 
reasons: 
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1) Increasing stocks when production is high and reducing 
stocks when production is low stabilizes domestic use and 
exports. 
2) To some degree stock-holding may be involuntary—high 
production levels may overwhelm marketing channels, so that it 
is not possible to use or export surplus production. 
3) Secular increases in stocks could occur if stocks are 
held for pipeline or transitory needs. 
A variety of other factors may also affect stock-holding 
behavior. Private stock-holders may be influenced by changes 
in interest rates and expectations of market prices. In a 
country like Argentina, where varying proportions of grain 
stocks have been controlled by the government, political and 
administrative factors are likely to be important. In 
addition, it is often as difficult to determine what stock 
levels really were as it is to discover what determines stock 
levels. As is discussed in Chapter V, radical revisions are 
often made in stock data. 
Since stocks are small and of less interest to this study 
than prices, production, use and trade, shortcuts are taken in 
estimating carryover stocks. Shift variables are used 
liberally to ensure that the price and production terms in the 
stock equations have the expected signs, and that the fit of 
the equation is reasonably good. Much could be done to 
improve the stock equations in ASMA, but other issues are of 
greater importance. 
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Equation 3.21 indicates how ASMA determines carryover 
stocks of wheat, corn, sorghum, soybeans, soybean meal and 
soybean oil; 
(3.21) Carryover stocks = f(Real wholesale price, 
Production, Shift variables). 
The expected sign of the coefficient on the price term is 
negative. The coefficient on production is expected to have a 
positive sign. The signs of the coefficients on the shift 
variables are indeterminate. 
Figure 3.5 shows how the different parts of the model fit 
together for a representative commodity. Argentine prices are 
determined by the price linkage equations, and do not respond 
to domestic supply and demand conditions. In the current 
year, beginning stocks are predetermined, and production does 
not respond to changes in current prices. Thus, total supply 
is also unaffected by current prices. Domestic use and stocks 
are inversely related to domestic prices. Net exports, then, 
equal the difference between total domestic supply (production 
and beginning stocks) and total domestic demand (domestic use 
and ending stocks). In any given year, net exports are 
directly related to domestic prices. Production in the 








Ending Supply & Net Prod, in 
Stocks Demand Exports Next Yr. 
Figure 3.5. Determination of net exports in ASMA 
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Given production, stocks and domestic use, net exports of 
each of the commodities are determined by Equation 3.22; 
(3.22) Net exports = Production plus Beginning stocks minus 
Domestic use minus Ending stocks. 
Making net trade the model closing identity in a model 
where world prices are exogenous implies that Argentina is a 
"small country." That is, it is assumed that Argentina can 
export all it wants without affecting world prices. Since 
Argentina is an important grain and soybean exporter, this may 
seem an inappropriate assumption. Indeed, a simulation 
reported in Chapter VI relaxes the small-country assumption by 
assuming a response of world prices to changes in Argentine 
exports. However, Argentina's share of world grain and 
soybean exports is small enough that the export demand curve 
facing Argentina is likely to be very elastic. Thus, world 
prices are not likely to be affected very much by changes in 
Argentine exports, so the assumption that world prices are 
exogenous is unlikely to cause major problems. 
Livestock Sector 
Since the primary focus of this study is Argentine crop 
agriculture, the livestock sector is not treated in great 
detail. Livestock equations are included in the model so that 
the three livestock variables included in the crop model are 
endogenous to the system. This is important, because not only 
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do the livestock variables have important effects on the crop 
sector, but a number of crop variables have important impacts 
on the livestock sector. 
Cattle numbers appear in the total area harvested 
equation to represent the assumed trade-off between livestock 
grazing and crop production. Consistent with this assumption, 
one determinant of cattle numbers in ASMA is the average real 
return to crop production. Higher crop returns are likely to 
result in a reduction in beef numbers, as farmers convert 
grazing land to crop production. Due to biological lags, it 
takes time to change the size of the beef herd. Thus, a 
lagged dependent variable is included in the equation to 
reflect the adjustment process, and the real crop return 
variable is lagged one year. 
Since Argentina is a beef exporter, demand for Argentine 
beef is driven by both domestic and foreign demand conditions. 
Real gross domestic product is used in the equation to 
represent shifts in demand caused by changes in consumer 
income (It is recognized that real GDP is, at best, a rough 
proxy for personal income). No variables representing foreign 
demand for Argentine beef are included in the equation, unless 
a shift variable for 1980 and 1981 can be seen as a proxy for 
a reduction in Argentine beef exports in the early 1980s. 
Increases in demand can be expected to increase domestic 
prices for beef, which should eventually translate into an 
increase in cattle numbers and beef production. 
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Equation 3.23 indicates how ASMA determines cattle 
numbers: 
(3.23) Cattle numbers = f(Lagged cattle numbers. Lagged real 
returns to crop production. Real GDP, Shift 
variable). 
The coefficient on lagged cattle numbers is expected to 
be between zero and one. The expected sign of the coefficient 
on crop returns is negative. The coefficient on real GDP is 
expected to have a positive sign. The sign of the coefficient 
on the shift variable is indeterminate. 
Pork production can be expected to respond to changes in 
feed prices. Higher corn and sorghum prices encourage 
producers to reduce breeding herds, which will eventually 
reduce pork production. This is represented in the model by 
having pork production depend on the average real price of 
corn and sorghum in the previous year, with weights dependent 
on use shares. 
Two important determinants of the demand for pork are 
consumer income and beef prices. As in the cattle number 
equation, real GDP is used as a proxy for consumer income. 
Higher cattle numbers in one year are likely to result in 
increased beef production in the next year, and higher beef 
production generally will lead to lower beef prices. Thus, 
lagged cattle numbers are included in the model as a proxy for 
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current beef prices. As with beef, increased pork demand is 
assumed to result in higher prices, that in turn induce 
increased pork production. Trend and shift variables are 
included in the equation to improve the fit of the equation 
and ensure reasonable elasticities. 
Equation 3.24 indicates how pork production is determined 
in ASMA: 
(3.24) Pork production = f(Lagged Average real price of corn 
and sorghum, Real GDP, Lagged cattle numbers. 
Shift and trend variables). 
The expected sign of the coefficient on the feed grain 
price variable is negative. The coefficient on real GDP is 
expected to have a positive sign. The expected sign of the 
coefficient on lagged cattle numbers is negative. The signs 
of the coefficients on the shift and trend variables are 
indeterminate. 
Poultry production can also be expected to respond to 
changes in feed prices, real GDP and cattle numbers. No lag 
is included in the feed price variable, since the poultry 
production cycle is shorter than that for hogs. A lagged 
dependent variable is included in the poultry production 
equation to represent a partial adjustment process. Pork 
production is also included, to represent the substitutability 
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of pork and poultry in consumer diets. Two shift variables 
account for outliers and ensure reasonable elasticities. 
Equation 3.25 indicates how poultry production is 
determined in ASMA: 
(3.25) Poultry production = f(Lagged poultry production, 
Average real price of corn and sorghum, Real GDP, 
Lagged cattle numbers. Pork production. Shift 
variables). 
The coefficient on lagged poultry production is expected 
to be between zero and one. The expected sign of the 
coefficient on the feed grain price is negative. The 
coefficient on real GDP is expected to have a positive sign. 
The coefficients on both cattle numbers and pork production 
are expected to have negative signs. The signs of the 
coefficients on the shift variables are indeterminate. 
There is an inconsistency in including pork and beef as 
determinants of poultry production, but not including poultry 
as a determinant of pork production, or poultry and pork as 
determinants of beef production. The specification used can 
be justified on two grounds: 
1) Per-capita beef consumption in Argentina far exceeds 
per-capita pork and poultry consumption. Thus, while beef 
supplies and prices may be important determinants of pork and 
poultry demand, the effects of pork and poultry supplies and 
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prices on beef demand are likely to be small. Excluding 
poultry from the pork equation is less justified on 
theoretical grounds, since pork and poultry are approximately 
of equal importance. 
2) The specification used results in a dynamically 
recursive model, which is much easier to solve than a 
simultaneous model. 
Figure 3.6 illustrates this point as it shows how the 
livestock sector is related to the rest of the model. Real 
returns to crop production in year 1 determine cattle numbers 
in year 2. Cattle numbers in year 2 affect pork and poultry 
production and crop production (through the total area 
equation) in. year 3. Feed grain prices in year 2 affect pork 
production in year 3, and feed grain prices in year 3 affect 
poultry production in year 3. Pork production affects poultry 
production in the same year. Pork and poultry production 
together determine feed use for corn, sorghum and soybean 
meal. 
The representation of the livestock sector in ASMA is 
intended to be simple without being simplistic. The model 
considers a number of important relationships between the crop 
and livestock sectors, and even attempts to incorporate 
rudimentary dynamics into the system. A more complete 
representation of the livestock sector would model supply, 
demand, trade and prices, rather than rely on a few reduced-
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The information generated by ASMA can be used to estimate 
various aggregate indicators for the Argentine agricultural 
sector and for the Argentine economy as a whole. Some of the 
measures, like the value of crop production, are simple 
accounting identities given other outputs of the model, other 
measures, like net returns to crop production, require only 
limited information not generated by the model. Still other 
indicators, like outstanding foreign debt, can only be 
estimated by making a series of simplifying assumptions. 
Beginning with the simple accounting identities, Equation 
3.26 is used to determine the value of production for wheat, 
corn, sorghum and soybeans; 
(3.26) Value of production = Sum across commodities of the 
Real wholesale price times Production. 
Equation 3.27 determines the value of exports, measured 
in dollars, for wheat, corn, sorghum, soybeans, soybean meal 
and soybean oil: 
(3.27) Value of exports = Sum across commodities of the 
Dollar export price times Exports. 
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Equation 3.28 indicates how ASMA determines export taxes, 
measured in dollar terms, for wheat, corn, sorghum and 
soybeans: 
(3.28) Export tax revenue = Sum across commodities of the 
Export tax rate times the Dollar export price times 
Exports. 
The value of production can be seen as an indicator of 
the total amount of economic activity generated by Argentine 
crop agriculture, while the value of exports is a determinant 
of the country's balance of payments. Export taxes are of 
obvious interest to the federal treasury. To avoid double 
counting, the total value of soybean meal and soybean oil 
production should not simply be added to the value of 
production for the four crops (since that would mean soybeans 
which are crushed would be counted twice—once as soybeans, 
and once as products). Estimating the value added by crushing 
soybeans avoids double counting, and provides an estimate of 
crusher profits. 
Equation 3.29 determines value added in the soybean 
crushing industry; 
(3.29) Crush value added = (Real soymeal price times Soymeal 
production) plus (Real soyoil price times Soyoil 
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production) minus (Real wholesale price of soybeans 
times Soybean crush). 
An increase in the value of production does not 
necessarily imply an increase in farmer profits. If more is 
produced at a lower price so that production costs increase 
more than the increase in the value of production, net returns 
to crop production fall. To estimate net returns, one needs 
to know what the cost of production is. Time series data on 
costs of production are unavailable. However, Estudio 
Cazenave y Asociados (1987) do provide recent estimates of 
farmer costs. 
By making the heroic assumption that per-hectare 
production costs remain constant, it is possible to make 
projections of net returns. This simplifying assumption would 
obviously be inappropriate in certain circumstances. For 
example, a trade liberalization policy that included trade in 
i 
agricultural inputs would tend to reduce production costs. 
Conversely, economists generally believe that marginal 
production costs increase with production, so that assuming 
constant production costs is likely to overstate the benefits 
to producers of higher prices that induce increased 
production. 
Equation 3.30 indicates how ASMA determines net returns 
to crop production: 
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(3.30) Crop net returns = Sum across commodities of (Real 
wholesale price times Production) minus (Area 
harvested times Production costs per hectare). 
Argentina's ability to repay its foreign debt is 
determined in part by the country's balance of trade. An 
increase in exports improves the trade balance and provides 
foreign exchange which may be used to reduce the foreign debt. 
Although this model is not equipped to estimate what the net 
effect of a change in agricultural exports is on Argentina's 
debt situation, it is possible to set some likely bounds on 
the impacts. 
At one extreme, it is possible that all of any increase 
in agricultural exports would be offset by a decline in other 
exports or by an increase in imports. Thus the net effect on 
Argentina's foreign debt would be zero. On the other hand, if 
other exports and imports did not change in response to an 
increase in agricultural exports, all of the increase in 
foreign exchange earnings could be applied to the foreign 
debt. ASMA calculates the foreign debt using the assumption 
that any increase in agricultural exports is used to pay 
interest or principal on the debt. This is not the most 
likely scenario, but it does provide an upper bound on likely 
effects on the foreign debt. 
For the baseline, the outstanding debt and the interest 
on that debt are set at levels projected by Wharton 
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Econometric Forecasting Associates (1986). Equation 3.31 is 
used to determine the outstanding debt when alternative 
scenarios are examined: 
(3.31) Foreign debt = Debt in the previous year plus 
(baseline Debt in the current year minus baseline 
Debt in the previous year) minus (Value of exports 
minus baseline Value of Exports). 
Interest payments on the debt are assumed to equal levels 
projected by Wharton in the baseline. Equation 3.32 is used 
to determine the outstanding debt under alternative scenarios: 
(3.32) Interest payments = Foreign debt times the baseline 
ratio of Interest payments to Foreign debt. 
In essence, Equation 3.32 assumes that the same interest 
rate is paid on all debt, and that the interest rate does not 
change when the debt level changes. These are, of course, 
simplifying assumptions that are unlikely to hold precisely. 
ASMA is not a macroeconomic model, and the measures of foreign 
debt and interest payments are intended only to provide 
information about likely directions and possible orders of 
magnitude of the effects of policy changes. 
This chapter has outlined the theoretical framework 
underlying ASMA and described the model in considerable 
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detail. The remaining chapters present the results of 
estimating and simulating the model, and using it for policy 
analysis. 
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CHAPTER IV. MODEL ESTIMATION 
The Agricultural Sector Model for Argentina (ASMA) 
consists of 35 estimated equations and 36 identities. 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) is used to estimate the 
parameters of the stochastic equations. The model is fitted 
over annual time series data, and the period of estimation for 
most equations is 1966-85. The model is estimated on a 
microcomputer using AREMOS, an econometrics software package 
developed by Wharton Econometrics Forecasting Associates. 
The appropriateness of using OLS to estimate the 
parameters of the model is debatable, especially from a 
theoretical perspective. One possible justification is that 
the model is recursive in structure. In any given period, it 
is possible to arrange the equations of the model in a causal 
chain. Each of the endogenous variables in the model depends 
only on exogenous variables and endogenous variables located 
earlier in the chain. 
If the error terms of the various equations are not 
contemporaneously correlated and a number of other conditions 
are satisfied, "...the OLS estimators of the structural 
equations will have the desirable properties of consistency, 
asymptotic normality, and efficiency. They will also have the 
usual small sample properties (Johnston 1984: 469)." 
Unfortunately, it is likely that the disturbances are 
contemporaneously correlated, for some of the reasons pointed 
out by Binkley (1985). For example, a change in the price of 
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petroleum would be likely to affect everything from marketing 
margins to the relative shares of different crops in total 
area. Since petroleum prices are not included in the model 
(except as a component in the wholesale price index used to 
deflate nominal prices), changing oil prices result in 
contemporaneous correlation of error terms. The use of the 
Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) technique would help 
correct for this correlation. 
Like OLS, SUR is appropriate only if the model is not a 
simultaneous equation system. Although the model appears to 
be a recursive system of equations, it might be better to 
think of ASMA as a part of larger simultaneous models not 
considered here (e.g., a general equilibrium model for the 
Argentine economy as a whole, or world commodity trade 
models). For example, since Argentina is a major grain 
exporter, a large change in Argentine grain exports is likely 
to result in a change in world prices, so that the U.S. price 
is not truly exogenous. From this perspective, simultaneous 
model estimation techniques would be appropriate, if the 
equations in ASMA were estimated as part of the complete 
model. 
The large number of predetermined variables relative to 
data observations makes direct application of techniques like 
three-stage least squares (3SLS) impossible. However, 
principal components of the predetermined variables could be 
used to apply the two-stage least squares (2SLS) technique. 
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The results of applying 2SLS could then be used to obtain 3SLS 
estimates that would correct for the contemporaneous 
correlation of error terms in the various equations. 
Unfortunately, the theoretical properties of 2SLS estimates 
obtained using principal components are not well established 
(Judge et al. 1980: 471). For 3SLS to be demonstrably more 
efficient than 2SLS, the specification of the complete model 
must be correct (Johnston 1984; 489), a requirement almost 
certainly not met in the case of this model. Moreover, 
specification error in any equation can lead to estimation 
bias in other equations under 3SLS. 
Other estimation problems include the presence of lagged 
dependent variables in many of the equations, and the 
likelihood that many of the independent variables are measured 
with error. From a theoretical perspective, then, there are a 
number of reasons to believe OLS is inappropriate, but the 
conditions to ensure that any alternative technique would 
yield superior results also are not met. 
In the absence of compelling theoretical justifications 
for using one estimation technique over another, there are a 
number of practical justifications for using OLS to estimate 
the parameters of the model. First, OLS estimation can be 
done directly on the microcomputer using AREMOS, while other 
estimation techniques would require tedious programming in 
AREMOS or the use of another econometrics package. Since ASMA 
is intended to be a policy model that can be built, maintained 
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and used easily, there are many advantages to doing both 
estimation and simulation on the microcomputer using available 
software. 
A second practical justification for OLS is that the 
final specifications of most equations in the model were 
determined only after considerable experimentation. 
Regardless of the estimation technique, the properties of 
parameters derived in such a manner are unknown. As pointed 
out by Leamer (1983) and others, experimentation with model 
specification is common, but it implies that parameter 
estimates must be viewed with much caution. 
The rest of this chapter is divided into three sections: 
1) The first section reports the results of estimating 
the equations in ASMA. Coefficient estimates and key 
statistics are presented for each of the estimated equations. 
Model identities, variable definitions and data sources are 
also reported. 
2) The second section presents a summary of key model 
elasticities. In cases where relationships of interest cannot 
be determined simply by looking at the elasticities in a 
particular equation (e.g., the effect of crop prices on crop 
supplies), semi-reduced form elasticities are reported. 
3) The third section presents alternative specifications 
for some of the important equations in the model. Leamer 
(1983) has recommended publishing results obtained under 
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rejected specifications in order to indicate how sensitive 
parameter estimates are to changes in model specification. 
Equations in ASMA 
Tables 4.1-4.15 document the 71 equations in ASMA. The 
equations of the model are presented in the same order that 
they are discussed in Chapter III. For each estimated 
equation, t-statistics are found in parentheses below the 
estimated coefficients. Where appropriate, elasticities 
calculated at mean values are presented in brackets below the 
t-statistics. The estimation period, R-squared, adjusted R-
squared, Durbin-Watson statistic, standard error of the 
equation, and mean of the dependent variable are also 
presented for each estimated equation. 
Variable definitions and data sources are listed at the 
end of each table. In general, all U.S. data and all quantity 
data for Argentina originate with the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture (USDA). Publications of the Center for Trade and 
Agricultural Policy (CTAP) are cited as a source for some of 
the quantity data for Argentina, but the data in those 
publications are based upon data tapes supplied by USDA. 
Macroeconomic data are taken from publications of Wharton 
Econometric Forecasting Associates (WEFA). Information 
concerning prices, tax rates, and livestock are obtained from 
USDA, the World Bank, and various Argentine sources. 
The export price equations in ASMA are documented in 
Table 4.1. As expected, U.S. prices and Argentine export 
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Table 4.1. Export price equations in ASMA 
Equation 4.1. Corn export price 
COPXEARD = 1.187 * ((.5*C0PFMUS+.5*Lag(C0PFMUS))*2204.6/56) 
(38.16) 
[0.99] 
+ 29.04 * DM180 + 4.51 * DM181 - 12.45 * DM182 
(7.80) (1.21) (3.41) 
- 6.54 * DM1S85 + 0.40 
(1.80) (0.16) 
Fit over: 1966-85 Durbin-Watson; 2.51 
R-squared: .9931 Standard Error; 3.45 
Adj. R-squared; .9906 LHS Mean: 98.00 
Equation 4.2. Wheat export price 
WHPXEARD = 1.190 * ((.5*WHPFMUS+.5*Lag(WHPFMUS))*2204.6/60) 
(17.97) 
[1.02] 
+ 40.76 * DM180 + 27.60 * DM181 - 24.65 * DM1S84 - 2.82 
(3.81) (2.59) (3.20) (0.44) 
Fit over: 1966-85 Durbin-Watson: 1.89 
R-squared; .9700 Standard Error: 9.85 
Adj. R-squared; .9620 LHS Mean; 115.35 
Equation 4.3. Sorghum export price 
SGPXEARD = 0.916 * ((.5*C0PFMUS+.5*Lag(C0PFMUS))*2204.6/56) 
(22.44) 
[0.91] 
+ 43.35 * DM180 + 17.71 * DM181 - 7.75 * DM1S85 +5.14 
(8.72) (3.56) (1.60) (1.53) 
Fit over: 1966-85 Durbin-Watson: 2.30 
R-squared; .9822 Standard Error; 4.65 
Adj. R-squared; .9775 LHS Mean: 82.55 
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Table 4.1. (continued) 
Equation 4.4. Soybean export price 
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Fit over; 1966-85 Durbin-Watson: 2.74 
R-squared: .9986 Standard Error: 5.05 
Adj. R-squared: .9984 LHS Mean: 110.00 
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Argentine corn export price, 
and Index Estadistico (1986) 
Dummy variable; 1 in 1980; 0 
Dummy variable; 1 
Dummy variable; 1 
Dummy variable; 1 
Dummy variable: 1 
Dummy variable; 1 
USDA (1986). 
$/m.t., Hazera (1985) 
in 1981; 0 
in 1982; 0 
beginning in 1977 ; 






beginning in 1985; 0 otherwise. 
U.S. soybean farm price, $/bu., USDA (1986). 
Argentine soybean export price, $/m.t., Hazera 
(1985) and Index Estadistico (1986) (Note: values 
available from 1977-85; set to 0 before 1977). 
Argentine sorghum export price, $/m.t., Hazera 
(1985) and Index Estadistico (1986). 
U.S. wheat farm price, $/bu., USDA (1986). 
Argentine wheat export price, $/m.t., Hazera 
(1985) and Index Estadistico (1986). 
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prices are strongly correlated. Price transmission 
elasticities range from 0.88 in the case of soybeans to 1.02 
in the case of wheat. Argentine sorghum prices are linked to 
U.S. corn prices to facilitate links with the CARD trade 
modeling system—at the time the model was being developed, 
CARD did not generate U.S. sorghum prices. Since corn and 
sorghum are close substitutes in international trade, world 
corn and sorghum prices tend to move in tandem. The 
calculated elasticity of 0.91 confirms that Argentine sorghum 
prices do tend to move with U.S. corn prices. 
Model results confirm the hypothesis that the Soviet 
grain embargo did allow Argentina to sell its grain at a 
premium in world markets. For corn, wheat and sorghum, a 
sizable and statistically significant premium is estimated for 
calendar year 1980, ranging from $29 per metric ton for corn 
to $43 per metric ton for sorghum. Smaller and less 
significant premiums are estimated for 1981. After the 
emabargo was lifted, model results indicate that Argentine 
corn actually sold at a small ($12 per metric ton) discount to 
U.S. corn in 1982. 
Model results are also consistent with the hypothesis 
that U.S. credit and food aid programs forced Argentina to 
sell its grain and soybeans at a discount during the global 
surpluses of the mid-1980s. Coefficients on shift variables 
for 1985 (corn and sorghum) or 1984 and 1985 (wheat and 
soybeans) have the expected negative sign, but only the shift 
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variable in the wheat equation is statistically significant at 
standard confidence levels. 
Soybean export prices are available only for years after 
1977 (Argentina produced and sold few soybeans before the mid-
1970s) . The price linkage equation effectively estimates the 
relationship between U.S. and Argentine prices only after 
1977, even though the equation is fit over the period 1966-85. 
As compared to estimating the equation only over the 1977-85 
period, the coefficients are not biased, but the t-statistics 
are exaggerated. The shorter period is not used because model 
simulation is easier when all equations are estimated over a 
comparable time period. No shift variables are included in 
the soybean equation to represent the grain embargo, because 
soybeans were not affected in any major way by the embargo. 
Table 4.2 documents the export tax rate equations in 
ASMA. The average tax rate is defined as a simple average of 
wheat, corn, and sorghum tax rates. Soybeans are excluded 
because soybean tax rates are unavailable before 1974. As 
expected, higher grain export prices result in significantly 
higher export tax rates (the weights on the export prices of 
the various grains are based on historical shares of export 
values). Higher inflation rates also result in significantly 
higher tax rates, consistent with the hypothesis presented in 
Chapter III. Model results provide evidence that significant 
shifts in policy occurred at the beginning of the military 
regime (DM1S77) and in 1981 (DM1S81). 
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Table 4.2. Export tax rate equations in ASMA 
Equation 4.5. Average export tax rate 
CRTAXAR = 0.0627 * (.38*COPXEARD+.39*WHPXEARD+.23*SGPXEARD) 
(2.93) 
[0.36] 
+ 7.866 * Log(WPINFAR+Lag(WPINFAR)) - 38.96 * DM1S77 
(10.60) (19.56) 
[0.44] 
+ 15.20 * DM1S81 - 14.42 
(8.33) (4.50) 
Fit over: 1967-85 Durbin-Watson; 1.83 
R-squared: .9657 Standard Error; 2.67 
Adj. R-squared; .9559 LHS Mean; 18.06 
Equation 4.6. Corn export tax rate 
COTAXAR = 1.020 * CRTAXAR + 0.0403 * COPXEARD 
(46.12) (1.38) 
[0.98] [0.21] 
- 0.0560 * (.39*WHPXEARD+.23*SGPXEARD) +0.09 
(1.43) (0.10) 
[-0.19] 
Fit over: 1967-85 Durbin-Watson: 1.96 
R-squared: .9937 Standard Error: 1.14 
Adj. R-squared: .9924 LHS Mean; 18.88 
Equation 4.7. Wheat export tax rate 
WHTAXAR = 0.962 * CRTAXAR + 0.0549 * WHPXEARD 
(19.92) (1.41) 
[1.05] [0.40] 
- 0.0965 * (.38*COPXEARD+.23*SGPXEARD) - 1.82 
(1.02) (0.89) 
[-0.34] 
Fit over: 1967-85 Durbin-Watson: 2.29 
R-squared; .9645 Standard Error: 2.54 
Adj. R-squared: .9574 LHS Mean: 16.51 
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Table 4.2. (continued) 
Equation 4.8. Sorghum export tax rate 
SGTAXAR = 1.023 * CRTAXAR + 0.1230 * SGPXEARD 
(28.93) (1.97) 
[0.98] [0.55] 
- 0.1365 * (.38*COPXEARD+.39*WHPXEARD) + 1.47 
(2.29) (0.98) 
[-0.61] 
Fit over: 1967-85 Durbin-Watson: 2.49 
R-squared; .9826 Standard Error; 1.91 
Adj. R-squared: .9792 LHS Mean: 18.80 
Equation 4.9. Soybean export tax rate 
SBTAXAR = 1.011 * (DM1S74*CRTAXAR) + 0.0219 * SBPXEARD 
(59.13) (3.63) 
[1.28] [0.31] 
- 0.0291 * SMPXEARR*WPI8OAR/NIMECAR/10000 
(3.87) 
[-0.30] 
- 17.91 * DM174 + 10.92 * DM175 - 33.26 * DM176 +0.00 
(26.79) (14.95) (39.27) (0.01) 
Fit over: 1967-84 Durbin-Watson: 1.78 
R-squared: .9993 Standard Error: 0.42 
Adj. R-squared: .9989 LHS Mean: 7.97 
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Table 4.2. (continued) 

























Argentine corn export price, $/m.t., Hazera (1985) 
and Index Estadistico (1986). 
Corn export tax rate, percent, Mielke (1984) and 
Latin America Commodities Report, various issues. 
Average export tax rate, percent, equals (COTAXAR 
+ SGTAXAR + WHTAXAR)/3. 
Dummy variable: 1 in 1974; 0 otherwise. 
1 in 1975; 0 otherwise. 
1 in 1976; 0 otherwise. 
1 beginning in 1974; 0 otherwise. 
1 beginning in 1977; 0 otherwise. 
1 beginning in 1981; 0 otherwise. 
Commercial exchange rate. Pesos (of 1983)/$ 
(equals 10000 Pesos of 1980/$), Boletin 
Informative Technit (1986) and WEFA (1986). 
Argentine soybean export price, $/m.t., Hazera 
(1985) and Index Estadistico (1986) (Note: values 
available from 1977-85; set to 0 before 1977). 
Soybean export tax rate, percent, Mielke (1984), 
Latin America Commodities Report, various issues. 
Argentine sorghum export price, $/m.t., Hazera 
(1985) and Index Estadistico (1986). 
Sorghum export tax rate, percent, Mielke (1984), 
Latin America Commodities Report, various issues. 
Real soymeal export price, 1000 1980 pesos/m.t., 
Bolsa de Cereales (1985). 
Argentine wheat export price, $/m.t., Hazera 
(1985) and Index Estadistico (1986). 
Wheat export tax rate, percent, Mielke (1984) and 
Latin America Commodities Report, various issues. 
Wholesale price index, 1980=1000, WEFA (1986). 
Wholesale price inflation rate, percent, WEFA 
(1986). 
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The tax rate equations for the individual crops also 
yield results consistent with expectations. In all cases, a 
one-percent change in the average tax rate results in 
approximately a one-percent change in the tax rate for the 
commodity in question. If the export price of the commodity 
increases relative to the export prices of competing 
commodities, the export tax for that commodity increases. 
In the case of soybeans, the coefficients on the prices 
of soybeans (positive) and soymeal (negative) are consistent 
with the hypothesis that policy is intended to maintain 
profitability in the crushing industry. That is, soybean 
export taxes are adjusted to stabilize the crushing margin. 
If the world price of soybeans is high relative to the price 
of soymeal, soybean export taxes are increased so as to reduce 
domestic soybean prices. This would increase the 
profitability of crushing soybeans in Argentina. Shift 
variables are included for 1974-76 because export prices are 
unavailable for that period. 
Marketing margin equations are documented in Table 4.3. 
For all crops, a significant positive correlation is found 
between the marketing margin and the export price minus export 
taxes. Coefficients on the price term range from 0.30 in the 
case of corn to 0.58 in the case of sorghum. This implies 
that private and public grain handlers absorb between 30 and 
58 percent of any change in export prices minus export taxes. 
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Table 4.3. Marketing margin equations in ASMA 
Equation 4.10. Corn marketing margin 
COPDFARR = 0.3045 * (COPXEARD*NIMECAR/WPI80AR*10000* 
(2.90) (1-COTAXAR/lOO) 
+ 14.78 * COYHHARD + 80.74 * Log(TREND-1959) 
(1.34) (5.75) 
+ 136.23 * DM175 - 57.23 * DM1S81 - 289.93 
(7.58) (4.55) (4.92) 
Fit over: 1966-85 Durbin-Watson: 2.29 
R-squared: .9034 Standard Error: 17.04 
Adj. R-squared: .8689 LHS Mean; 23.38 
Equation 4.11. Wheat marketing margin 
WHPDFARR = 0.3846 * (WHPXEARD*NIMECAR/WPI80AR*10000* 
(5.29) (1-WHTAXAR/lOO)) 
+ 49.57 * Log(TREND-1959) + 96.11 * DM17376 
(4.46) (9.31) 
- 79.22 * DM18182 - 252.80 
(5.82) (5.33) 
Fit over: 1966-85 
R-squared; .9397 
Adj. R-squared; .9237 
Durbin-Watson: 2.44 
Standard Error: 16.88 
LHS Mean; 43.03 
Equation 4.12. Sorghum marketing margin 
SGPDFARR = 0.5849 * (SGPXEARD*NIMECAR/WPI8OAR*10000* 
(5.50) (1-SGTAXAR/lOO)) 
+ 22.65 * SGYHHARD + 54.44 * Log(TREND-1959) 
(2.04) (4.79) 
+ 93.50 * DM175 - 25.83 * DM18183 - 281.38 
(6.03) (2.33) (5.35) 
Fit over; 1966-85 Durbin-Watson; 2.56 
R-squared; .8606 Standard Error; 15.00 
Adj. R-squared: .8108 LHS Mean: 30.48 
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Table 4.3. (continued) 
Equation 4.13. Soybean marketing margin 
SBPDFARR = 0.3308 * (DM1S77*SBPXEARD*NIMECAR/WPI80AR* 
(9.29) 10000*(1-SBTAXAR/lOO)) 
- 143.77 * (DMlS77*Log(TREND-1959)) - 337.51 * DM1B77 
(2.27) (1.57) 
- 1.000 * (DM1B77*SBPFMARX) - 65.47 * DM18183 + 337.51 
(22.22) (5.83) (1.59) 
Fit over: 1966-85 Durbin-Watson: 2.56 
R-squared; .9991 Standard Error: 14.91 
Adj. R-squared: .9988 LHS Mean: -358.70 
















Real corn marketing margin, 1000 1980 pesos/m.t., 
equals COPXEARD*NIMECAR/WPI80AR*10000*(1-COTAXAR/ 
100)-COPFMARR. 
Argentine corn export price, $/m.t., Hazera (1985) 
and Index Estadistico (19.86). 
Corn export tax rate, percent, Mielke (1984) and 
Latin America Commodities Report, various issues. 
Deviation from trend corn yield, m.t./ha. 
Dummy variable: 1 from 1973-76; 0 otherwise. 
1 in 1975; 0 otherwise. 
1 from 1981-82; 0 otherwise. 
1 from 1981-83; 0 otherwise. 
1 from 1966-1976; 0 otherwise. 
1 beginning in 1977; 0 otherwise. 
1 beginning in 1981; 0 otherwise. 
Commercial exchange rate. Pesos (of 1983)/$ 
(equals 10000 Pesos of 1980/$), Boletin 
Informative Technit (1986) and WEFA (1986). 
Real soybean marketing margin, 1000 1980 pesos/ 
m.t., equals SBPXEARD*NIMECAR/WPI8OAR*10000* 
(1-SBTAXAR/lOO)-SBPFMARR. 
Real soybean wholesale price, 1000 1980 pesos/ 
m.t., equals SBPFMARR, but is exogenous. 
Argentine soybean export price, $/m.t., Hazera 
(1985) and Index Estadistico (1986) (Note: values 








Table 4.3. (continued) 
SBTAXAR: Soybean export tax rate, percent, Mielke (1984), 
Latin America Commodities Report, various issues. 
SGPDFARR; Real sorghum marketing margin, 1000 1980 pesos/ 
m.t., equals SGPXEARD*NIMECAR/WPI80AR*10000* 
(1-SGTAXAR/lOO)-SGPFMARR. 
SGPXEARD: Argentine sorghum export price, $/m.t., Hazera 
(1985) and Index Estadistico (1986). 
SGTAXAR: Sorghum export tax rate, percent, Mielke (1984), 
Latin America Commodities Report, various issues. 
SGYHHARD: Deviation from trend sorghum yield, m.t./ha. 
SMPXEARR: Real soymeal export price, 1000 1980 pesos/m.t., 
Bolsa de Cereales (1985). 
TREND; Calendar year. 
WHPDFARR; Real wheat marketing margin, 1000 1980 pesos/m.t., 
equals WHPXEARD*NIMECAR/WPI80AR*10000*(1-WHTAXAR/ 
100)-WHPFMARR. 
WHPXEARD; Argentine wheat export price, $/m.t., Hazera 
(1985) and Index Estadistico (1986). 
WHTAXAR; Wheat export tax rate, percent, Mielke (1984) and 
Latin America Commodities Report, various issues. 
WPI80AR: Wholesale price index, 1980=1000, WEFA (1986). 
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The positive coefficients on the yield variables 
(COYHHARD and SGYHHARD) indicate that higher-than-average 
yields may overburden the country's marketing system, and thus 
result in higher marketing margins. However, the effect on 
corn and sorghum marketing margins is not statistically 
significant at standard confidence levels. The yield 
variables are excluded from the wheat and soybean equations, 
because no relationship was found between the yield variables 
and marketing margins for those crops. 
As expected, model results indicate that marketing 
margins were abnormally large during the Peronist regime of 
the mid-1970s. For corn and sorghum, marketing margins were 
significantly larger in 1975 than in other years, presumably 
due to domestic price controls. For wheat, margins were 
significantly larger during the entire 1973-76 period. Price 
controls were instituted earlier for wheat than for other 
grains. 
Marketing margins were significantly lower for all 
commodities in 1981 and 1982. Margins remained low in 1983 
for sorghum and soybeans, and through 1985 for corn. The 
grain embargo may have had something to do with lower margins 
in 1981, but it is unclear why margins remained low in later 
years. Positive coefficients on logarithmic trend variables 
in the corn, wheat and sorghum equations indicate that margins 
generally tended to increase over time, holding all else 
equal. This implies that marketing costs increased more 
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rapidly than the rate of general wholesale price inflation. 
Care should be taken, however, in interpreting the 
coefficients on the dummy and trend variables. They may 
simply "explain" errors in the data or misspecifications of 
the equations. 
Soybeans, again, require special treatment due to data 
limitations. Since export prices are unavailable before 1977, 
the marketing margin is, effectively, estimated only for the 
1977-85 period. The variable SBPFMARX is simply equal to the 
real wholesale price, and the coefficent on DM1B77*SBPFMARX is 
-1.0 because the marketing margin is equal to the wholesale 
price when the export price is assumed to be zero. 
By construction, wholesale prices for wheat, corn, 
sorghum and soybeans simply equal the export price minus 
ex p o r t  t a x e s  a n d  t h e  m a r k e t i n g  m a r g i n ,  a s  s h o w n  i n  T a b l e  4 . 4 .  
Table 4.5 documents the price linkage equations for soybean 
meal and soybean oil. Argentine soybean product prices are 
only available for the 1977-85 period. As expected, the price 
transmission elasticities between U.S. and Argentine prices 
are near 1.0. This occurs, even though U.S. prices are linked 
to an export price in real pesos for soymeal, and a wholesale 
price in real pesos for soyoil, due to data limitations. 
Shift variables for the 1984-85 period correspond to 
those included in the export price equations for the major 
crops. For both soymeal and soyoil, Argentine prices were 
significantly lower after 1984 than the normal price linkage 
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Table 4.4. Real wholesale price identities in ASMA 
Equation 4. 14. Corn real wholesale price 
COPFMARR (COPXEARD * NIMECAR/WPI80AR * 10000 
(1-COTAXAR/100)) - COPDFARR 
* 
Equation 4. 15. Wheat real wholesale price 
WHPFMARR — (WHPXEARD * NIMECAR/WPI80AR * 10000 
(1-WHTAXAR/lOO)) - WHPDFARR 
* 
Equation 4. 16. Sorghum real wholesale price 
SGPFMARR = (SGPXEARD * NIMECAR/WPI80AR * 10000 
(1-SGTAXAR/lOO)) - SGPDFARR 
* 
Equation 4. 17." Soybean real wholesale price 
SBPFMARR — (SBPXEARD * NIMECAR/WPI80AR * 10000 
(1-SBTAXAR/lOO)) - SBPDFARR 
* 
Variable definitions and data sources; 
COPDFARR: Real corn marketing margin, 1000 1980 pesos/m.t., 
equals COPXEARD*NIMECAR/WPI8OAR*10000*(1-COTAXAR/ 
100)-COPFMARR. 
COPFMARR; Real wholesale corn price, 1000 1980 pesos/m.t., 
Bolsa de Cereales (1985) and Index Estadistico 
(1986). 
COPXEARD; Argentine corn export price, $/m.t., Hazera (1985) 
and Index Estadistico (1986). 
COTAXAR: Corn export tax rate, percent, Mielke (1984) and 
Latin America Commodities Report, various issues. 
NIMECAR; Commercial exchange rate. Pesos (of 1983)/$ 
(equals 10000 Pesos of 1980/$), Boletin 
Informative Technit (1986) and WEFA (1986). 
SBPDFARR: Real soybean marketing margin, 1000 1980 pesos/ 
m.t., equals SBPXEARD*NIMECAR/WPI80AR*10000* 
(1-SBTAXAR/lOO)-SBPFMARR. 
SBPFMARR: Real wholesale soybean price, 1000 1980 pesos/ 
m.t., Bolsa de Cereales (1985) and Index 
Estadistico (1986). 
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Table 4.4. (continued) 
SBPXEARD: Argentine soybean export price, $/m.t., Hazera 
(1985) and Index Estadistico (1986) (Note: values 
available from 1977-85; set to 0 before 1977). 
SBTAXAR; Soybean export tax rate, percent, Mielke (1984), 
Latin America Commodities Report, various issues. 
SGPDFARR; Real sorghum marketing margin, 1000 1980 pesos/ 
m.t., equals SGPXEARD*NIMECAR/WPI8OAR*10000* 
(1-SGTAXAR/lOO)-SGPFMARR. 
SGPFMARR: Real wholesale sorghum price, 1000 1980 pesos/ 
m.t., Bolsa de Cereales (1985) and Index 
Estadistico (1986). 
SGPXEARD: Argentine sorghum export price, $/m.t., Hazera 
(1985) and Index Estadistico (1986). 
SGTAXAR; Sorghum export tax rate, percent, Mielke (1984), 
Latin America Commodities Report, various issues. 
WHPDFARR: Real wheat marketing margin, 1000 1980 pesos/m.t., 
equals WHPXEARD*NIMECAR/WPI8OAR*10000*(1-WHTAXAR/ 
100)-WHPFMARR. 
WHPFMARR: Real wholesale wheat price, 1000 1980 pesos/m.t., 
Bolsa de Cereales (1985) and Index Estadistico 
(1986). 
WHPXEARD; Argentine wheat export price, $/m.t., Hazera 
(1985) and Index Estadistico (1986). 
WHTAXAR: Wheat export tax rate, percent, Mielke (1984) and 
Latin America Commodities Report, various issues. 
WPI80AR: Wholesale price index, 1980=1000, WEFA (1986). 
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Table 4.5. Soybean product price equations in ASMA 
Equation 4.18. Real price of soybean meal for export 
SMPXEARR = 0.9656 * (DM1S77*(.5*SMPFMUS+.5*Lag(SMPFMUS))* 
(30.68) 2204.6/2000*NIMECAR/WPI80AR*10000) 
[1.05] 
- 6.33 * DM1S77 - 37.25 * DM1S82 - 62.68 * DM18485 
(0.32) (3.41) (3.84) 
+  0 . 0 0  
(0 .00 )  
Fit over; 1967-84 Durbin-Watson: 2.80 
R-squared: .9985 Standard Error: 13.03 
Adj. R-squared: .9980 LHS Mean: 238.59 
Equation 4.19. Real price of soybean meal for domestic use 
SMPCOARR = SMPXEARR * SMPDXAR 
Equation 4.20. Soybean oil real wholesale price 
SOPWHARR = 0.9130 * (DM1S77*(.5*S0PFMUS+.5*Lag(SOPFMUS))* 
(23.67) 2204.6/100*NIMECAR/WPI80AR*10000) 
[0.80] 
+ 506.82 * DM1S77 - 263.22 * DM1S82 - 345.48 * DM18485 
(7.70) (6.05) (5.25) 
+  0 . 0 0  
(0 .00 )  
Fit over; 1967-84 Durbin-Watson: 3.08 
R-squared; .9978 Standard Error: 51.93 
Adj. R-squared: .9972 LHS Mean: 802.72 
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Table 4.5. (continued) 












Dummy variable: 1 from 1984-85; 0 otherwise. 
Dummy variable: 1 beginning in 1977; 0 otherwise. 
Dummy variable: 1 beginning in 1982; 0 otherwise. 
Commercial exchange rate. Pesos (of 1983)/$ 
(equals 10000 Pesos of 1980/$), Boletin 
Informative Technit (1986) and WEFA (1986). 
Real soymeal domestic use price, 1000 1980 pesos/ 
m.t., Bolsa de Cereales (1985) (Note: values 
available from 1977-84; set to 0 before 1977). 
Ratio of the domestic soymeal price to the price 
of exported soymeal, equals SMPCOARR/SMPXEARR. 
U.S. soybean meal price, Decatur, $/short ton, 
USDA (1986). 
Real soymeal export price, 1000 1980 pesos/m.t., 
Bolsa de Cereales (1985) (Note: values available 
from 1977-84; set to 0 before 1977). 
U.S. soybean oil price, Decatur, $/cwt., USDA 
(1986). 
Real soyoil wholesale price, 1000 1980 pesos/m.t., 
Bolsa de Cereales (1985) (Note: values available 
from 1977-84; set to 0 before 1977). 
Wholesale price index, 1980=1000, WEFA (1986). 
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relationship would have indicated. As in the grains and 
soybeans, this is consistent with the hypothesis that U.S. 
credit and food aid programs forced Argentina to sell soymeal 
and soyoil at a discount. The negative coefficient on a shift 
variable for the period after 1982 is more difficult to 
explain. The final part of this chapter examines the 
consequences of excluding from the model variables like DM1S82 
that lack convincing justification. 
Table 4.6 documents the total area harvested equations in 
ASMA. Average real returns depend on prices, area shares, and 
trend yields. Total crop area increases with lagged crop 
returns, and the calculated short-run elasticity is 0.47. The 
coefficient of 0.22 on the lagged dependent variable implies 
that the long-run supply elasticity is 0.47/(1-0.22), or 0.60. 
The results of estimating Equation 4.22 support the 
hypothesis that cattle and crops compete for land resources in 
Argentina. The relationship is statistically significant and 
the calculated elasticity is -2.02. The size of the 
elasticity may appear troublesome, but a large elasticity 
should be expected. Much more land is used for cattle grazing 
than for crop production in Argentina. If additions to the 
cattle herd required proportional increases in land used for 
grazing and forage production, and if such land could be 
expanded only by reducing cropland, one would actually expect 
the elasticity of crop area with respect to cattle numbers to 
be larger than -2.0 in absolute terms. The estimated 
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Table 4.6. Total area harvested equations in ASMA 
Equation 4.21. Average real returns to crop production 
CRGRTARR = (COPFMARR*COYTRAR*COAHHAR + SGPFMARR*SGYTRAR* 
SGAHHAR + WHPFMARR*WHYTRAR*WHAHHAR + SBPFMARR* 
SBYTRAR*SBAHHAR)/CRAHHAR 
Equation 4.22. Total area harvested for four crops 
CRAHHAR = 0.2172 * Lag(CRAHHAR) + 8.120 * Lag(CRGRTARR) 
(1.97) (3.58) 
[0.47] 
- 429.0 * Lag(CASNAAR) + 206.3 * CRYHHARD 
(7.57) (1.00) 
[ - 2 . 0 2 ]  
+ 3988 * Log(TREND-1959) - 2321 * DM17172 
(5.46) (6.08) 
+ 2658 * DM17677 - 1029 * DM186 + 15655 
(4.52) (1.89) (6.55) 
Fit over: 1967-86 Durbin-Watson; 2.03 
R-squared: .9690 Standard Error: 446 
Adj. R-squared: .9464 LHS Mean: 11477 
Variable definitions and data sources: 
CASNAAR: Cattle numbers, mid-year, mil. head. World Bank 
(1985). 
COAHHAR: Corn area harvested, 1000 ha., CTAP (1985a) and 
USDA (1987a). 
COPFMARR: Real wholesale corn price, 1000 1980 pesos/m.t., 
Bolsa de Cereales (1985) and Index Estadistico 
(1986). 
COYTRAR: Trend yield for corn, m.t./ha., obtained by 
regressing corn yields on a linear trend. 
CRAHHAR: Total area harvested for corn, wheat, sorghum 
and soybeans, 1000 ha., equals COAHHAR + WHAHHAR 
+ SGAHHAR + SBAHHAR. 
CRGRTARR: Average real returns to crop production, 1000 
1980 pesos/m.t., calculated as indicated in 
equation 4.21. 
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Table 4.6. (continued) 
CRYHHARD: Average deviation from trend yield for 4 major 
crops, equals weighted sum of deviations from 
trend for each crop divided by standard error of 
the trend yield equation for that crop. 
DM17172: Dummy variable: 1 from 1971-72; 0 otherwise. 
DM17677: Dummy variable; 1 from 1976-77; 0 otherwise. 
DM186; Dummy variable: 1 in 1986; 0 otherwise. 
SBAHHAR: Soybean area harvested, 1000 ha., CTAP (1985c) and 
USDA (1987b). 
SBPFMARR: Real wholesale soybean price, 1000 1980 pesos/ 
m.t., Bolsa de Cereales (1985) and Index 
Estadistico (1986). 
SBYTRAR: Trend yield for soybeans, m.t./ha., obtained by 
regressing sorghum yields on a linear trend. 
SGAHHAR: Sorghum area harvested, 1000 ha., CTAP (1985b) and 
USDA (1987a). 
SGPFMARR; Real wholesale sorghum price, 1000 1980 pesos/ 
m.t., Bolsa de Cereales (1985) and Index 
Estadistico (1986). 
SGYTRAR: Trend yield for sorghum, m.t./ha., obtained by 
regressing sorghum yields on a linear trend. 
TREND; Calendar year. 
WHAHHAR: Wheat area harvested, 1000 ha., CTAP (1985f) and 
USDA (1987a). 
WHPFMARR; Real wholesale wheat price, 1000 1980 pesos/m.t., 
Bolsa de Cereales (1985) and Index Estadistico 
(1986). 
WHYTRAR: Trend yield for wheat, m.t./ha., obtained by 
regressing wheat yields on a linear trend. 
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elasticity is consistent with the existence of alternative 
means to feed more cattle. 
The estimated coefficient on the yield variable has the 
expected positive sign, but it is not significantly different 
than zero. On the other hand, the positive coefficient on the 
logarithmic trend variable is significant. This implies that 
the increasing trend in crop area cannot be explained only by 
crop prices and livestock numbers. Two of the three 
coefficients on the dummy variables are significantly 
different than zero. Consequences of dropping the three shift 
variables from the equation are examined in the last section 
of this chapter. 
The area share equations are documented in Table 4.7. 
Share elasticities with respect to the ratio of own-crop 
returns to other-crop returns range from 0.31 in the case of 
soybeans to 0.65 in the case of sorghum. Coefficents on 
lagged dependent variables imply that long-run share 
elasticities range from 0.60 in the case of soybeans to 0.90 
in the case of sorghum. Considered together with the total 
area equation, the results indicate that Argentine farmers are 
fairly responsive to price incentives in making land 
allocation decisions. 
Trend variables appear in all three estimated share 
equations, and two of them have statistically significant 
coefficients. Sorghum area shares more than tripled between 
1966 and 1971 as the crop became established in Argentina. 
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Table 4.7. Area share equations in ASMA 
Equation 4.23. Corn area share 
COAHHARP = 0.4301 * COAHHARP.l 
(2.99) 
+ 0.0920 * Lag((COPFMARR*COYTRAR)/((WHPFMARR*WHYTRAR* 
(3.74) WHAHHAR+SGPFMARR*SGYTRAR*SGAHHAR+SBPFMARR* 
[0.44] SBYTRAR*SBAHHAR)/(WHAHHAR+SGAHHAR+SBAHHAR))) 
+ 0.0174 * ((COYHHARD/.377)-CRYHHARD) - 0.0819 * DM177 
(3.29) (4.96) 
- 0.00386 * TRND7284 + 0.0605 
(1.94) (0.86) 
Fit over; 1967-86 Durbin-Watson: 1.90 
R-squared: .9524 Standard Error: 0.016 
Adj. R-squared: .9355 LHS Mean: 0.288 
Equation 4.24. Sorghum area share 
SGAHHARP = 0.2762 * Lag(SGAHHARP) 
(1.85) 
+ 0.1156 * Lag((SGPFMARR*SGYTRAR)/((COPFMARR*COYTRAR* 
(2.40) COAHHAR+WHPFMARR*WHYTRAR*WHAHHAR+SBPFMARR* 
[0.65] SBYTRAR*SBAHHAR)/(COAHHAR+WHAHHAR+SBAHHAR))) 
+ 0.0230 * TRND6671 - 0.0593 * DM172&80 
(4.23) (4.49) 
- 0.0430 * DM1S84 - 0.0278 * DM1S86 - 0.0767 
(3.29) (1.33) (1.55) 
Fit over: 1967-86 Durbin-Watson: 2.00 
R-squared; .8972 Standard Error; 0.017 
Adj. R-squared; .8497 LHS Mean; 0.166 
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Table 4.7. (continued) 
Equation 4.25. Soybean area share 
SBAHHARP = 0.4824 * Lag(SBAHHARP) 
(4.55) . 
+ 0.0160 * Lag((SBPFMARR*SBYTRAR)/((COPFMARR*COYTRAR* 
(3.64) COAHHAR+WHPFMARR*WHYTRAR*WHAHHAR+SGPFMARR* 
[0.31] SGYTRAR*SGAHHAR)/(COAHHAR+WHAHHAR+SGAHHAR))) 
- 0.3633 * DM1S78 + 0.1497 * (DMlS78*Log(TREND-1959)) 
(2.72) (3.24) 
- 0.0411 * DM18183 - 0.0170 
(5.78) (2.08) 
Fit over: 1967-86 
R-squared: .9907 
Adj. R-squared: .9873 
Durbin-Watson: 3.01 
Standard Error: O.OlO 
LHS Mean: 0.088 
Equation 4.26. Wheat area share 
WHAHHARP = 1 - COAHHARP - SGAHHARP - SBAHHARP 










Corn area harvested, 1000 ha., CTAP (1985a) and 
USDA (1987a). 
Corn area share, equals COAHHAR/CRAHHAR. 
Real wholesale corn price, 1000 1980 pesos/m.t., 
Bolsa de Cereales (1985) and Index Estadistico 
(1986). 
Deviation from trend corn yield, m.t./ha. 
Trend yield for corn, m.t./ha., obtained by 
regressing corn yields on a linear trend. 
Average deviation from trend yield for 4 major 
crops, equals weighted sum of deviations from 
trend for each crop divided by standard error of 
the trend yield equation for that crop. 
Dummy variable: 1 in 1972 and 1980; 0 otherwise. 
Dummy variable: 1 in 1977; 0 otherwise. 
Dummy variable: 1 from 1981-83; 0 otherwise. 
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Dummy variable: 1 beginning in 1978; 0 otherwise. 
Dummy variable: 1 beginning in 1984; 0 otherwise. 
Dummy variable: 1 beginning in 1986; 0 otherwise. 
Soybean area harvested, 1000 ha., CTAP (1985c) and 
USDA (1987b). 
Soybean area share, equals SBAHHAR/CRAHHAR. 
Real wholesale soybean price, 1000 1980 pesos/ 
m.t., Bolsa de Cereales (1985) and Index 
Estadistico (1986). 
Trend yield for soybeans, m.t./ha., obtained by 
regressing sorghum yields on a linear trend. 
Sorghum area harvested, 1000 ha., CTAP (1985b) and 
USDA (1987a). 
Sorghum area share, equals SGAHHAR/CRAHHAR. 
Real wholesale sorghum price, 1000 1980 pesos/ 
m.t., Bolsa de Cereales (1985) and Index 
Estadistico (1986). 
Trend yield for sorghum, m.t./ha., obtained by 
regressing sorghum yields on a linear trend. 
Calendar year. 
Trend from 1966-71: 0 until 1965, 1 in 1966, 2 in 
1967...6 in 1971 and thereafter. 
Trend from 1972-84: 0 until 1971, 1 in 1972, 2 in 
1973...13 in 1984 and thereafter. 
Wheat area harvested, 1000 ha., CTAP (1985f) and 
USDA (1987a). 
Wheat area share, equals WHAHHAR/CRAHHAR. 
Real wholesale wheat price, 1000 1980 pesos/m.t., 
Bolsa de Cereales (1985) and Index Estadistico 
(1986). 
Trend yield for wheat, m.t./ha., obtained by 
regressing wheat yields on a linear trend. 
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Soybean shares have increased even more dramatically since the 
mid-1970s. During the phase of adoption, area shares could 
not be explained solely by relative returns for either crop. 
In the corn equation, a trend variable extending from 
1972 to 1984 has a negative coefficient that just misses 
significance at standard confidence levels. The corn equation 
also includes a term ((COYHHARD/.377)-CRYHHARD) that is 
intended to represent the relative effects of weather on corn 
and other crops. The significant positive coefficient 
indicates that the corn area share will be higher when corn 
yields are higher relative to trend than are yields for the 
other commodities. 
Each of the share equations includes one or more shift 
variables which improve the fit of the equation and ensure 
that elasticities fall within desired ranges. The consequence 
of dropping these variables is shown in the final section of 
this chapter. 
The wheat area share is equal to one minus the shares for 
the other crops. As shown in Table 4.8, area harvested for 
each crop is equal to the crop share multipled by the total 
area harvested. Production is simply area harvested time 
yield, as indicated in Table 4.9. 
The domestic use equations for corn and sorghum are 
documented in Table 4.10. Total feed grain use is not found 
to be very responsive to corn and soybean prices. The 
estimated coefficient on the price variable is not 
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Table 4.8. Area harvested identities in ASMA 
Equation 4.27. Corn area harvested 
COAHHAR = COAHHARP * CRAHHAR 
Equation 4.28. Wheat area harvested 
WHAHHAR = WHAHHARP * CRAHHAR 
Equation 4.29. Sorghum area harvested 
SGAHHAR = SGAHHARP * CRAHHAR 
Equation 4.30. Soybean area harvested 
SBAHHAR = SBAHHARP * CRAHHAR 
Variable definitions and data sources; 
COAHHAR: Corn area harvested, 1000 ha., CTAP (1985a) and 
USDA (1987a). 
COAHHARP; Corn'area share, equals COAHHAR/CRAHHAR. 
CRAHHAR; Total area harvested for corn, wheat, sorghum 
and soybeans, 1000 ha., equals COAHHAR + WHAHHAR 
+ SGAHHAR + SBAHHAR. 
SBAHHAR; Soybean area harvested, 1000 ha., CTAP (1985c) and 
USDA (1987b). 
SBAHHARP; Soybean area share, equals SBAHHAR/CRAHHAR. 
SGAHHAR; Sorghum area harvested, 1000 ha., CTAP (1985b) and 
USDA (1987a). 
SGAHHARP; Sorghum area share, equals SGAHHAR/CRAHHAR. 
WHAHHAR: Wheat area harvested, 1000 ha., CTAP (1985f) and 
USDA (1987a). 
WHAHHARP: Wheat area share, equals WHAHHAR/CRAHHAR. 
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Table 4.9. Production identities in ASMA 
Equation 4.31. Corn production 
COSPRAR = COAHHAR * COYHHAR 
Equation 4.32. Wheat production 
WHSPRAR = WHAHHAR * WHYHHAR 
Equation 4.33. Sorghum production 
SGSPRAR = SGAHHAR * SGYHHAR 
Equation 4.34. Soybean production 
SBSPRAR = SBAHHAR * SBYHHAR 
Variable definitions and data sources; 
COAHHAR: Corn area harvested, 1000 ha., CTAP (1985a) and 
USDA (1987a). 
COSPRAR; Corn production, 1000 m.t., CTAP (1985a) and 
USDA (1987a). 
COYHHAR; Corn yield, m.t./ha., CTAP (1985a) and USDA (1987a) 
SBAHHAR; Soybean area harvested, 1000 ha., CTAP (1985c) and 
USDA (1987b). 
SBSPRAR; Soybean production, 1000 m.t., CTAP (1985c) and 
USDA (1987b). 
SBYHHAR; Soybean yield, m.t./ha., CTAP (1985c) and USDA 
(1987b). 
SGAHHAR: Sorghum area harvested, 1000 ha., CTAP (1985b) and 
USDA (1987a). 
SGSPRAR: Sorghum production, 1000 m.t., CTAP (1985b) and 
USDA (1987a). 
SGYHHAR: Sorghum yield, m.t./ha., CTAP (1985b) and USDA 
(1987a). 
WHAHHAR; Wheat area harvested, 1000 ha., CTAP (1985f) and 
USDA (1987a). 
WHSPRAR; Wheat production, 1000 m.t., CTAP (1985f) and 
USDA (1987a). 
WHYHHAR; Wheat yield, m.t./ha., CTAP (1985f) and USDA 
(1987a). 
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Table 4.10. Domestic use equations for feed grains in ASMA 
Equation 4.35. Total corn and sorghum domestic use 
CSUDTAR = - 2.041 * (COPFMARR*Lag(COUDTARP)+SGPFMARR*Lag 
(0.87) (SGUDTARP)) 
[-0.10] 
+ 5.825 * (POSPRAR+PYSPRAR) + 0.243 * (COSPRAR+SGSPRAR) 
(3.28) (6.17) 
[0.47] [0.59] 
- 0.177 * WHUDTAR - 794.3 * Log(TREND-1959) 
(0.78) (1.89) 
[-0.14] 
- 1372 * DMILCSU + 956 *.DM1HCSU + 3345 
(4.79) (3.51) (1.62) 
Fit over: 1967-85 Durbin-Watson: 2.33 
R-squared: .9160 Standard Error; 324 
Adj. R-squared: .8625 LHS Mean: 5689 
Equation 4.36. Sorghum share of corn and sorghum use 
SGUDTARP = 0.2329 * Lag(SGUDTARP) 
(1.79) 
- 0.1593 * SGPFMARR/COPFMARR + 0.2440 * SGSPRAR/COSPRAR 
(1.27) (5.12) 
[-0.35] [0.38] 
+ 0.1066 * DM171 + 0.2686 
(3.01) (2.40) 
Fit over: 1967-85 Durbin-Watson: 2.43 
R-squared: .8204 Standard Error: 0.033 
Adj. R-squared: .7690 LHS Mean: 0.369 
Equation 4.37. Corn share of corn and sorghum use 
COUDTARP = 1 - SGUDTARP 
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Table 4.10. (continued) 
Equation 4.38. Corn domestic use 
COUDTAR = CSUDTAR * COUDTARP 
Equation 4.39. Sorghum domestic use 
SGUDTAR = CSUDTAR * SGUDTARP 
Variable definitions and data sources: 
COPFMARR; Real wholesale corn price, 1000 1980 pesos/m.t., 
Bolsa de Cereales (1985) and Index Estadistico 
(1986). 
COSPRAR: Corn production, 1000 m.t., CTAP (1985a) and 
USDA (1987a). 
COUDTAR: Corn domestic use, 1000 m.t., CTAP (1985a) and 
USDA (1987a). 
COUDTARP: Corn use share of domestic corn and sorghum use, 
equals COUDTAR/CSUDTAR. 
CSUDTAR: Total corn and sorghum domestic use, equals 
COUDTAR + SGUDTAR. 
DM171: Dummy variable: 1 in 1971; 0 otherwise. 
DMIHCSU: Dummy variable: 1 in 1974 and beginning in 1984; 0 
otherwise. 
DMILCSU: Dummy variable: 1 in 1971, 1981 and 1982; 0 
otherwise. 
POSPRAR: Pork production, 1000 m.t., USDA FAS tape (1986). 
PYSRPAR: Poultry production, 1000 m.t., USDA FAS tape (1986) 
SGPFMARR: Real wholesale sorghum price, 1000 1980 pesos/ 
m.t., Bolsa de Cereales (1985) and Index 
Estadistico (1986). 
SGSPRAR: Sorghum production, 1000 m.t., CTAP (1985b) and 
USDA (1987a). 
SGUDTAR: Sorghum domestic use, 1000 m.t., CTAP (1985b) and 
USDA (1987a). 
SGUDTARP: Sorghum use share of domestic corn and sorghum 
use, equals SGUDTAR/CSUDTAR. 
TREND: Calendar year. 
WHUDTAR: Wheat domestic use, 1000 m.t., CTAP (1985f) and 
USDA (1987a). 
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statistically significant, and the calculated elasticity is 
-0.10. Pork and poultry production have the expected positive 
effect on feed grain demand. Feed grain production has a 
statistically significant positive effect on demand, perhaps 
for some of the reasons discussed in Chapter III. The 
coefficient on wheat use has the expected negative sign, but 
it is not statistically significant. A logarithmic trend and 
two statistically signficant shift variables are also included 
in the equation to ensure reasonable elasticities. 
The sorghum-corn price ratio does not have a significant 
effect on the sorghum share of feed grain use, but the 
coefficient does have the expected negative sign. The 
sorghum-corn production ratio, on the other hand, does have a 
significant positive effect on the sorghum use share. A small 
coefficient on the lagged dependent variable indicates some 
persistence in ration mixes. The only shift variable is 
statistically significant. The corn use share is just one 
minus the sorghum share. The level of use for each crop is 
equal to the use share multiplied by total feed grain use. 
Table 4.11 documents the other domestic use equations in 
ASMA. In the case of wheat, the negative own-price elasticity 
is larger in absolute terms than the positive cross-price 
elasticity with corn and sorghum. Neither of the coefficients 
on the price terms are significantly different than zero, 
however. As in the case of corn and sorghum, wheat production 
is a significant determinant of domestic wheat demand, but the 
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Table 4.11. Other domestic use equations in ASMA 
Equation 4.40. Wheat domestic use 
WHUDTAR = - 2.354 * WHPFMARR + 0.0423 * WHSPRAR 
(2.10) (2.54) 
[-0.19] [0.08] 
+ 1.209 * (COPFMARR*Lag(COUDTARP)+SGPFMARR*Lag(SGUDTARP)) 
(0.95) 
[ 0 . 0 8 ]  
- 379 * DM169 + 479 * DM170 + 816 * DM176 + 4440 
• (1.70) (2.31) (3.78) (11.66) 
Fit over: 1967-85 Durbin-Watson: 2.16 
R-squared: .8460 Standard Error; 180.0 
Adj. R-squared: .7690 LHS Mean: 4365.7 
Equation 4.41. Soybean crush 
SBUFEAR = 11.427 * (DM1S77*(SMPXEARR*SMMILAR+SOPWHARR* 
(7.73) SOMILAR-SBPFMARR)) 
[1.05] 
+ 0.4929 * SBSPRAR - 25134 * DM1S77 
(7.02) (7.75) 
[1.20] 
+ 7491 * (DMlS77*Log(TREND-1959)) +50.3 
(6.97) (1.07) 
Fit over: 1966-84 Durbin-Watson: 1.86 
R-squared: .9814 Standard Error: 149.2 
Adj. R-squared: .9761 LHS Mean: 698.8 
Equation 4.42. Soybean other domestic use 
SBUHTAR = 0.1017 * SBAHHAR + 44.19 * DM17679 +4.74 
(35.99) (5.96) (1.11) 
[ 0 . 8 8 ]  
Fit over: 1966-85 Durbin-Watson: 2.21 
R-squared: .9874 Standard Error: 13.25 
Adj. R-squared: .9860 LHS Mean: 111.40 
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Table 4.11. (continued) 
Equation 4.43. Soybean meal production 
SMSPRAR = SBUFEAR * SMMILAR 
Equation 4.44. Soybean oil production 
SOSPRAR = SBUFEAR * SOMILAR 
Equation 4.45. Soybean meal domestic use 
SMUDTAR = - 0.2646 * SMPCOARR + 0.1990 * (POSPRAR+PYSPRAR) 
(3.64) (1.51) 
[-0.51] [0.70] 
+ 121.7 * DM1S73 + 115.2 * DM175 + 223.6 * DM1S77 
(5.71) (3.42) (4.78) 
- 72.2 
(1.23) 
Fit over: 1966-84 Durbin-Watson; 1.91 
R-squared; .9404 Standard Error: 29.10 
Adj. R-squared; .9175 LHS Mean: 129.10 
Equation 4.46. Soybean oil domestic use 
SOUDTAR = - 0.0348 * SOPWHARR + 0.4745 * (DM1B81*S0SPRAR) 
(1.56) (4.76) 
[-0.87] [0.58] 
+ 12.87 * DM1S77 + 69.12 * DM17778 + 127.57 * DM1S81 
(0.36) (2.68) (8.72) 
- 0.18 
(0.04) 
Fit over: 1966-84 Durbin-Watson: 2.94 
R-squared: .9292 Standard Error: 10.70 
Adj. R-squared: .9020 LHS Mean: 30.58 
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Table 4.11. (continued) 



























Real wholesale corn price, 1000 1980 pesos/m.t., 
Bolsa de Cereales (1985) and Index Estadistico 
(1986). 
Corn use share of domestic corn and sorghum use, 
equals COUDTAR/CSUDTAR. 
Dummy variable: 1 in 1969; 
Dummy variable: 1 
Dummy variable: l 
Dummy variable: 1 
Dummy variable: 1 
Dummy variable: 1 
Dummy variable: 1 
Dummy variable: l 
Dummy variable: 1 
















until 1980; 0 beginning in 1981. 
beginning in 1973; 0 otherwise, 
beginning in 1977; 0 otherwise, 
beginning in 1981; 0 otherwise. 
Pork production, 1000 m.t., USDA FAS tape (1986). 
Poultry production, 1000 m.t., USDA FAS tape (1986) 
Soybean area harvested, 1000 ha., CTAP (1985c) and 
USDA (1987b). 
Real wholesale soybean price, 1000 1980 pesos/ 
m.t., Bolsa de Cereales (1985) and Index 
Estadistico (1986). 
Soybean production, 1000 m.t., CTAP (1985c) and 
USDA (1987b). 
Soybean crush, 1000 m.t., CTAP (1985c) and USDA 
(1987b). 
Soybean non-crush domestic use, 1000 m.t., CTAP 
(1985c) and USDA (1987b). 
Real wholesale sorghum price, 1000 1980 pesos/ 
m.t., Bolsa de Cereales (1985) and Index 
Estadistico (1986). 
Sorghum use share of domestic corn and sorghum 
use, equals SGUDTAR/CSUDTAR. 
Soybean meal milling rate, equals SMSPRAR/SBUFEAR. 
Real soymeal domestic use price, 1000 1980 pesos/ 
m.t., Bolsa de Cereales (1985) (Note: values 
available from 1977-84; set to 0 before 1977). 
Real soymeal export price, 1000 1980 pesos/m.t., 
Bolsa de Cereales (1985) (Note: values available 
from 1977-84; set to 0 before 1977). 
Soymeal production, 1000 m.t., CTAP (1985d) and 
USDA (1987b). 
Soymeal domestic use, 1000 m.t., CTAP (1985d) and 
USDA (1987b). 
133 
Table 4.11. (continued) 
SOMILAR; Soybean oil milling rate, equals SOSPRAR/SBUFEAR. 
SOPWHARR: Real soyoil wholesale price, 1000 1980 pesos/m.t., 
Bolsa de Cereales (1985) (Note; values available 
from 1977-84; set to 0 before 1977). 
SOSPRAR: Soyoil production, 1000 m.t., CTAP (1985e) and USDA 
(1987b). 
SOUDTAR: Soyoil domestic use, 1000 m.t., CTAP (1985e) and 
USDA (1987b). 
TREND; Calendar year. 
WHPFMARR; Real wholesale wheat price, 1000 1980 pesos/m.t., 
Bolsa de Cereales (1985) and Index Estadistico 
(1986). 
WHSPRAR; Wheat production, 1000 m.t., CTAP (1985f) and 
USDA (1987a). 
WHUDTAR; Wheat domestic use, 1000 m.t., CTAP (1985f) and 
USDA (1987a). 
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elasticity is smaller. Three shift variables are included in 
the equation to account for outliers. 
The crushing margin is a significant determinant of 
soybean crush, as indicated in Equation 4.41. The elasticity 
of crush with respect to the crushing margin is 1.05. This 
implies an even larger elasticity with respect to the soybean 
price (since a one-percent change in the soybean price results 
in an even larger change in the crushing margin). The 
coefficient of 0.49 on soybean production implies that nearly 
half of each marginal unit of soybean production will be 
crushed domestically, all else equal. The significant 
positive coefficient on the logarithmic trend variable means 
that part of the increase in soybean crush since 1977 cannot 
be explained simply by changes in the crushing margin and 
soybean production. The shift variable is necessary because 
soybean product prices are set to zero before 1977. 
Since seed use is the only other important use of 
soybeans in Argentina, other domestic use is modeled as a 
function of soybean area. As expected, the estimated 
elasticity is close to one. The shift period for the 1976-79 
period is included to represent the period when soybean area 
was expanding most rapidly; i.e., when area planted in the 
next year generally exceeded area harvested in the current 
year by a wide margin. Thus, the positive coefficient is 
expected. 
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Soybean meal and oil production are determined by 
identities, given the level of soybean crush. An increase in 
soymeal prices has a significant negative impact on soymeal 
domestic use. The coefficient on pork and poultry production 
is not statistically significant, but the positive sign and 
elasticity of 0.70 are consistent with expectations. DM1S77 
is included in the equation because soymeal prices are 
unavailable before 1977. DM1S73 represents a sharp, sustained 
increase in soymeal use in 1973, and DM175 accounts for an 
outlier in the data. 
The estimated own-price elasticity of demand for soyoil 
is relatively large (-0.87), but is statistically 
insignificant. Oil use generally increased with production 
before the 1980s, as indicated by the significant positive 
coefficient on the production term in Equation 4.46. DM1S77 
is included because of missing price data before 1977, and 
DM1S81 is included because the production term is set to zero 
after 1981 (production and use appear to be uncorrelated in 
the 1980s). The other shift variable accounts for outliers. 
Ending stocks equations in ASMA are documented in Table 
4.12. For corn, wheat, sorghum and soybeans, carryover stocks 
are negatively related to prices and positively related to 
production. Own-price elasticities range from a low of -0.02 
in the case of soybeans to -3.72 in the case of corn. 
Production elasticities range from 0.34 for soybeans and 
sorghum to 0.85 for corn. Soybean meal and oil stocks are 
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Table 4.12. Ending stocks equations in ASMA 
Equation 4.47. Corn ending stocks 
COCOTAR = - 3.628 * COPFMARR + 0.0290 * COSPRAR 
(6.60) (2.00) 
[-3.72] [0.85] 
- 225.5 * Log(TREND-1959) - 249.0 * DM172A74 
(2.42) (3.24) 
- 328.5 * DMILCS + 1843 
(4.77) (5.23) 
Fit over: 1967-85 Durbin-Watson: 3.13 
R-squared; .8276 Standard Error: 100 
Adj. R-squared: .7613 LHS Mean: 294 
Equation 4.48. Wheat ending stocks 
WHCOTAR = - 2.029 * WHPFMARR + 0.0482 * WHSPRAR 
(2.03) (2.24) 
[-0.88] [0.50] 
+ 389.6 * DM16869 - 363.3 * DM17273 + 735.2 * DM17778 
(2.20) (2.16) (4.26) 
- 634.2 * DM1S85 + 1044 
(2.61) (2.46) 
Fit over: 1967-85 Durbin-Watson: 2.52 
R-squared: .7786 Standard Error: 212 
Adj. R-squared: .6678 LHS Mean: 787 
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Table 4.12. (continued) 
Equation 4.49. Sorghum ending stocks 
SGCOTAR = - 1.032 * SGPFMARR + 0.0110 * SGSPRAR 
(3.12) (1.69) 
[-1.57] [0.34] 
- 99.6 * DM17981 + 278.0 * DM182 - 160.8 * DM1S84 
(3.21) (5.50) (3.23) 
+ 275.0 * DM185 + 362.2 
(4.33) (3.52) 
Fit over; 1967-85 
R-squared; .8975 
Adj. R-squared: .8463 
Durbin-Watson: 2.44 
Standard Error; 44.6 
LHS Mean; 161.1 
Equation 4.50. Soybean ending stocks 
SBCOTAR = - 0.0053 * SBPFMARR + 0.0291 * SBSPRAR 
(0.07) (5.86) 
[-0.02] [0.34] 
+ 144.3 * DM17477 + 17.2 * TRND6671 + 113.7 * DM183 
(7.25) (2.41) 
- 110.3 * DMILBS +13.2 
(3.63) (0.24) 
Fit over; 1967-85 
R-squared; .9455 
Adj. R-squared; .9182 
(3.68) 
Durbin-Watson; 1.96 
Standard Error; 28.5 
LHS Mean: 177.4 
Equation 4.51. Soybean meal ending stocks 
SMCOTAR = 0.0425 * SMSPRAR + 22.8 * DM174 - 8.8 * DM17881 
(20.96) (3.36) (2.36) 
[1.30] 
- 80.6 * DM185 - 1.9 
(10.06) (0.86) 
Fit over; 1967-85 
R-squared; .9698 
Adj. R-squared: .9611 
Durbin-Watson; 2.59 
Standard Error; 6.49 
LHS Mean: 22.79 
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Table 4.12. (continued) 
Equation 4.52. Soybean oil ending stocks 
SOCOTAR = 0.0768 * SOSPRAR - 0.93 
(17.76) (0.92) 
[1.09] 
Fit over; 1967-85 
R-squared: .9488 
Adj. R-squared: .9458 
Durbin-Watson: 1.87 
Standard Error; 3.45 
LHS Mean; 10.26 





















Corn ending stocks, 1000 m.t., CTAP (1985a) and 
USDA (1987a). 
Real wholesale corn price, 1000 1980 pesos/m.t., 
Bolsa de Cereales (1985) and Index Estadistico 
(1986). 



















1 from 1968-69; 0 otherwise. 
1 from 1972-73; 0 otherwise. 
1 in 1972 and 1974; 0 otherwise. 
1 in 1974; 0 otherwise. 
1 from 1974-77; 0 otherwise. 
1 from 1977-78; 0 otherwise. 
1 from 1978-81; 0 otherwise. 
1 from 1979-81; 0 otherwise. 
1 in 1982; 0 otherwise. 
1 in 1983; 0 otherwise. 
1 in 1985; 0 otherwise. 
1 in 1982 and after 1986; 0 
1 from 1979-81 and after 1986; 0 
1 beginning in 1984; 0 otherwise. 
1 beginning in 1985; 0 otherwise. 
Soybean ending stocks, 1000 m.t., CTAP (1985c) and 
USDA (1987b). 
Real wholesale soybean price, 1000 1980 pesos/ 
m.t., Bolsa de Cereales (1985) and Index 
Estadistico (1986). 
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Table 4.12. (continued) 
SBSPRAR: Soybean production, 1000 m.t., CTAP (1985c) and 
USDA (1987b). 
SGCOTAR: Sorghum ending stocks, 1000 m.t., CTAP (1985b) and 
USDA (1987a). 
SGPFMARR: Real wholesale sorghum price, 1000. 1980 pesos/ 
m.t., Bolsa de Cereales (1985) and Index 
Estadistico (1986). 
SGSPRAR: Sorghum production, 1000 m.t., CTAP (1985b) and 
USDA (1987a). 
SMCOTAR: Soymeal ending stocks, 1000 m.t., CTAP (1985d) and 
USDA (1987b). 
SMSPRAR: Soymeal production, 1000 m.t., CTAP (1985d) and 
USDA (1987b). 
SOCOTAR: Soyoil ending stocks, 1000 m.t., CTAP (1985e) and 
USDA (1987b). 
SOSPRAR: Soyoil production, 1000 m.t., CTAP (1985e) and USDA 
(1987b). 
TREND: Calendar year. 
TRND6671: Trend from 1966-71: 0 until 1965, 1 in 1966, 2 in 
1967...6 in 1971 and thereafter. 
WHCOTAR: Wheat ending stocks, 1000 m.t., CTAP (1985f) and 
USDA (1987a). 
WHPFMARR: Real wholesale wheat price, 1000 1980 pesos/m.t., 
Bolsa de Cereales (1985) and Index Estadistico 
(1986). 
WHSPRAR: Wheat production, 1000 m.t., CTAP (1985f) and 
USDA (1987a). 
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very small, and do not appear to be related to prices. Both 
are modeled as a function of production, reflecting only 
transactions demand. In both cases, the estimated production 
elasticities are slightly greater than one. 
As discussed in Chaper III, shift variables are used 
liberally in the stocks equations in order to ensure 
reasonable price and production responses, and because the 
data are suspect. The very high Durbin-Watson statistic 
(3.13) for Equation 4.47 may indicate a problem with negative 
autocorrelation, but the statistic is primarily an artifact of 
including the shift variables in the equation. Without the 
shift variables and the logarithmic trend, the Durbin-Watson 
statistic is 2.45, but the R-squared is just 0.34 and the t-
statistic on the production term is only 0.41. 
Table 4.13 documents the net export equations in ASMA. 
For each commodity, net exports equal production plus 
beginning stocks minus domestic use and ending stocks. 
Livestock equations in ASMA are documented in Table 4.14. 
Cattle numbers are determined by lagged crop returns and real 
income. The short-run elasticity with respect to crop returns 
is -0.14, and the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable 
implies that the long-run elasticity is -0.30. The model 
appears to be internally consistent, as both the total area 
harvested equation and the cattle numbers equation indicate 
that cattle production and crop production compete for land 
resources. The short-run income elasticity is 0.36, and the 
141 
Table 4.13. Net export equations in ASMA 
Equation 4.53. Corn net exports 
COUXNAR = COSPRAR + Lag(COCOTAR) - COUDTAR - COCOTAR 
Equation 4.54. Wheat net exports 
WHUXNAR = WHSPRAR + Lag(WHCOTAR) - WHUDTAR - WHCOTAR 
Equation 4.55. Sorghum net exports 
SGUXNAR = SGSPRAR + Lag(SGCOTAR) - SGUDTAR - SGCOTAR 
Equation 4.56. Soybean net exports 
SBUXNAR = SBSPRAR + Lag(SBCOTAR) - SBUFEAR - SBUHTAR - SBCOTAR 
Equation 4.57. Soybean meal net exports 
SMUXNAR = SMSPRAR + Lag(SMCOTAR) - SMUDTAR - SMCOTAR 
Equation 4.58. Soybean oil net exports 
SOUXNAR = SOSPRAR + Lag(SOCOTAR) - SOUDTAR - SOCOTAR 
Variable definitions and data sources: 
COCOTAR: Corn ending stocks, 1000 m.t., CTAP (1985a) and 
USDA (1987a). 
COSPRAR: Corn production, 1000 m.t., CTAP (1985a) and USDA 
(1987a). 
COUDTAR: Corn domestic use, 1000 m.t., CTAP (1985a) and USDA 
(1987a). 
COUXNAR: Corn net exports, 1000 m.t., CTAP (1985a) and USDA 
(1987a). 
SBCOTAR: Soybean ending stocks, 1000 m.t., CTAP (1985c) and 
USDA (1987b). 
SBSPRAR: Soybean production, 1000 m.t., CTAP (1985c) and 
USDA (1987b). 
SBUFEAR: Soybean crush, 1000 m.t., CTAP (1985c) and USDA 
(1987b). 
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Table 4.13. (continued) 
SBUHTAR: Soybean non-crush domestic use, 1000 m.t., CTAP 
(1985c) and USDA (1987b). 
SBUXNAR: Soybean net exports, 1000 m.t., CTAP (1985c) and 
USDA (1987b). 
SGCOTAR: Sorghum ending stocks, 1000 m.t., CTAP (1985b) and 
USDA (1987a). 
SGSPRAR: Sorghum production, 1000 m.t., CTAP (1985b) and 
USDA (1987a). 
SGUDTAR: Sorghum domestic use, 1000 m.t., CTAP (1985b) and 
USDA (1987a). 
SGUXNAR: Sorghum net exports, 1000 m.t., CTAP (1985b) and 
USDA (1987a). 
SMCOTAR: Soymeal ending stocks, 1000 m.t., CTAP (1985d) and 
USDA (1987b). 
SMSPRAR: Soymeal production, 1000 m.t., CTAP (1985d) and 
USDA (1987b). 
SMUDTAR: Soymeal domestic use, 1000 m.t., CTAP (1985d) and 
USDA (1987b). 
SMUXNAR: Soymeal net exports, 1000 m.t., CTAP (1985d) and 
USDA (1987b). 
SOCOTAR: Soyoil ending stocks, 1000 m.t., CTAP (1985e) and 
USDA (1987b). 
SOSPRAR; Soyoil production, 1000 m.t., CTAP (1985e) and USDA 
(1987b). 
SOUDTAR; Soyoil domestic use, 1000 m.t., CTAP (1985e) and 
USDA (1987b). 
SOUXNAR; Soyoil net exports, 1000 m.t., CTAP (1985e) and 
USDA (1987b). 
WHCOTAR: Wheat ending stocks, 1000 m.t., CTAP (1985f) and 
USDA (1987a). 
WHSPRAR; Wheat production, 1000 m.t., CTAP (1985f) and 
USDA (1987a). 
WHUDTAR: Wheat domestic use, 1000 m.t., CTAP (1985f) and 
USDA (1987a). 
WHUXNAR: Wheat net exports, 1000 m.t., CTAP (1985f) and USDA 
(1987a). 
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Table 4.14. Livestock equations in ASMA 
Equation 4.59. Cattle numbers 
CASNAAR = 0.5358 * Lag(CASNAAR) - 0.0121 * Lag(CRGRTARR) 
(4.62) (4.82) 
[-0.14] 
+ 0.000794 * NARPDAR - 2.561 * DM18081 + 13.674 
(3.89) (3.31) (3.84) 
[0.36] 
Fit over: 1967-85 Durbin-Watson; 2.39 
R-squared: .9424 Standard Error; 0.94. 
Adj. R-squared; .9260 LHS Mean: 54.08 
Equation 4.60. Pork production 
POSPRAR = - 0.2427 * Lag(COPFMARR*COUDTARP+SGPFMARR*SGUDTARP) 
(3.03) 
[-0.30] 
+ 0.0172 * NARPDAR - 5.988 * Lag(CASNAAR) 
(4.97) (3.61) 
[1.84] [-1.39] 
- 35.92 * DM172 - 42.31 * DM183 - 26.08 * DM184 
(2.71) (3.00) (1.87) 
- 46.09 * Log(TREND-1959) + 329.99 
(2.49) (4.36) 
Fit over; 1967-85 Durbin-Watson: 2.27 
R-squared: .8496 Standard Error: 11.57 
Adj. R-squared: .7539 LHS Mean; 232.37 
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Table 4.14. (continued) 
Equation 4.61. Poultry production 
PYSPRAR = 0.4686 * Lag(PYSPRAR) + 0.0147 * NARPDAR 
(5.99) (4.10) 
[1.61] 
- 0.1473 * (COPFMARR*Lag(COUDTARP)+SGPFMARR*Lag 
(1.58) (SGUDTARP)) 
[-0.18] 
- 7.874 * Lag(CASNAAR) - 0.4473 * POSPRAR 
(3.95) (2.19) 
[-1.87] [-0.46] 
+ 60.10 * DM17072 - 35.38 * DM183 + 318.59 
(5.87) (2.18) (3.37) 
Fit over; 1967-85 Durbin-Watson: 2.75 
R-squared: .9494 Standard Error: 13.06 
Adj. R-squared: .9173 LHS Mean: 227.21 















Cattle numbers, mid-year, mil. head, World Bank 
(1985). 
Real wholesale corn price, 1000 1980 pesos/m.t., 
Bolsa de Cereales (1985) and Index Estadistico 
(1986). 
Corn use share of domestic corn and sorghum use, 
equals COUDTAR/CSUDTAR. 
Average real returns to crop production, 1000 
1980 pesos/m.t., calculated as indicated in equation 
equation 4.21. 
1 from 1970-72; 0 otherwise. 
1 in 1972; 0 otherwise. 
1 from 1980-81; 0 otherwise. 
1 in 1983; 0 otherwise. 
1 in 1984; 0 otherwise. 
Real GDP, WEFA (1986). 
Pork production, 1000 m.t., USDA FAS tape (1986). 
Poultry production, 1000 m.t., USDA FAS tape (1986) 
Real wholesale sorghum price, 1000 1980 pesos/ 
m.t., Bolsa de Cereales (1985) and Index 
Estadistico (1986). 
Sorghum use share of domestic corn and sorghum 







long-run elasticity is 0.77. Higher incomes can be expected 
to result in higher beef demand and prices, which should 
eventually translate into higher cattle numbers. The 
significant negative coefficient on DM18081 may indicate that 
declining export demand induced a reduction in cattle herds in 
the early 1980s. 
In the pork production equation, the coefficients on feed 
prices, income and cattle numbers all have the expected signs 
and are statistically significant. The elasticity with 
respect to cattle numbers (-1.39) may appear large, but it is 
important to remember that Argentines consume much more beef 
than pork. Therefore, a one-percent change in beef production 
represents a much larger absolute change than a one-percent 
change in pork production. The shift and trend variables are 
included in the equation to ensure a good fit and reasonable 
elasticities. 
Poultry production responds in the expected way to 
changes in feed prices, income, cattle numbers and pork 
production. Results indicate that both beef and pork are 
substitutes for poultry, that the income elasticity of demand 
for poultry is positive, and that higher production costs 
reduce poultry production. Two shift variables account for 
outliers. 
Table 4.15 documents the identities which determine a 
variety of aggregate measures in ASMA. Most require no 
explanation. Chapter III discusses the assumptions made which 
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Table 4.15. Aggregate measure identities in ASMA 
Equation 4.62. Real value of crop production 
C4FVPARR = (COSPRAR*COPFMARR + WHSPRAR*WHPFMARR + SGSPRAR* 
SGPFMARR + SBSPRAR*SBPFMARR)/1000 
Equation 4.63. Dollar value of exports 
C6VXTARD = (COUXNAR*COPXEARD + WHUXNAR*WHPXEARD + SGUXNAR* 
SGPXEARD + SBUXNAR*SBPXEARD + (SMUXNAR*SMPXEARR* 
WPI80AR/NIMECAR)/10000 + (SOUXNAR*SOPWHARR*WPI80AR/ 
NIMECAR)/lOOOO)/lOOO 
Equation 4.64. Dollar value of export taxes 
C4TAXARD = (COUXNAR*COPXEARD*COTAXAR/100 + WHUXNAR*WHPXEARD * 
WHTAXAR/100 + SGUXNAR*SGPXEARD*SGTAXAR/100 + SBUXNAR* 
SBPXEARD*SBTAXAR/100)/1000 
Equation 4.65. Real value added in crushing industry 
SBVACARR = (SMPXEARR*SMSPRAR + SOPWHARR*SOSPRAR - SBPFMARR* 
SBUFEAR)/1000 
Equation 4.66. Real net returns to corn production 
CONRTARR = (COSPRAR*COPFMARR - COAHHAR*COVCPARR)/10 0 0 
Equation 4.67. Real net returns to wheat production 
WHNRTARR = (WHSPRAR*WHPFMARR - WHAHHAR*WHVCPARR)/lOOO 
Equation 4.68. Real net returns to sorghum production 
SGNRTARR = (SGSPRAR*SGPFMARR - SGAHHAR*SGVCPARR)/1000 
Equation 4.69. Real net returns to soybean production 
SBNRTARR = (SBSPRAR*SBPFMARR - SBAHHAR*SBVCPARR)/lOOO 
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Table 4.15. (continued) 
Equation 4.70. Dollar value of foreign debt 
NAFDTARD = Lag(NAFDTARD) + Baseline NAFDTARD - Baseline 
Lag(NAFDTARD) + Baseline C6VXTARD - C6VXTARD 
Equation 4.71. Dollar value of interest payments on debt 
NAIPDARD = NAFDTARD * Baseline NAIPDARD / Baseline NAFDTARD 
Variable definitions and data sources; 
C4FVPARR; Real value of crop production for corn, wheat, 
sorghum and soybeans, billion 1980 pesos, 
computed as in Equation 4.62. 
C4TAXARD: Dollar value of export taxes on corn, wheat, 
sorghum and soybeans, million dollars, computed as 
in Equation 4.64. 
C6VXTARD: Dollar value of exports of corn, wheat, sorghum, 
soybeans, soymeal and soyoil, million dollars, 
computed as in Equation 4.63. 
CONRTARR; Real net returns to corn production, billion 1980 
pesos, computed as in Equation 4.66. 
COAHHAR; Corn area harvested, 1000 ha., CTAP (1985a) and 
USDA (1987a). 
COPFMARR; Real wholesale corn price, 1000 1980 pesos/m.t., 
Bolsa de Cereales (1985) and Index Estadistico 
(1986). 
COPXEARD: Argentine corn export price, $/m.t., Hazera (1985) 
and Index Estadistico (1986). 
COSPRAR: Corn production, 1000 m.t., CTAP (1985a) and USDA 
. (1987a). 
COTAXAR; Corn export tax rate, percent, Mielke (1984) and 
Latin America Commodities Report, various issues. 
COUXNAR; Corn net exports, 1000 m.t., CTAP (1985a) and USDA 
(1987a). 
COVCPARR; Corn variable production costs, 1000 1980 
pesos/ha., computed from data in Estudio Cazenave 
y Asociados (1987). 
NAFDTARD: Foreign debt, million dollars, WEFA (1986). 
NAIPDARD: Interest payments on foreign debt, million dollars, 
WEFA (1986). 
NIMECAR: Commercial exchange rate. Pesos (of 1983)/$ 
(equals 10000 Pesos of 1980/$), Boletin 
Informative Technit (1986) and WEFA (1986). 
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Table 4.15. (continued) 
SBAHHAR: Soybean area harvested, 1000 ha., CTAP (1985c) and 
USDA (1987b). 
SBNRTARR: Real net returns to soybean production, billion 
1980 pesos, computed as in Equation 4.69. 
SBPFMARR: Real wholesale soybean price, 1000 1980 pesos/ 
m.t., Bolsa de Cereales (1985) and Index 
Estadistico (1986). 
SBPXEARD: Argentine soybean export price, $/m.t., Hazera 
(1985) and Index Estadistico (1986) (Note: values 
available from 1977-85; set to 0 before 1977). 
SBSPRAR; Soybean production, 1000 m.t., CTAP (1985c) and 
USDA (1987b). 
SBTAXAR: Soybean export tax rate, percent, Mielke (1984), 
Latin America Commodities Report, various issues. 
SBUFEAR; Soybean crush, 1000 m.t., CTAP (1985c) and USDA 
(1987b). 
SBUXNAR: Soybean net exports, 1000 m.t., CTAP (1985c) and 
USDA (1987b). 
SBVACARR: Real value added in the crushing industry, billion 
1980 pesos, computed as in Equation 4.65. 
SBVCPARR: Soybean variable production costs, 1000 1980 
pesos/ha., computed from data in Estudio Cazenave 
y Asociados (1987). 
SGAHHAR: Sorghum area harvested, 1000 ha., CTAP (1985b) and 
USDA (1987a). 
SGNRTARR: Real net returns to sorghum production, billion 
1980 pesos, computed as in Equation 4.68. 
SGPFMARR: Real wholesale sorghum price, 1000 1980 pesos/ 
m.t., Bolsa de Cereales (1985) and Index 
Estadistico (1986). 
SGPXEARD: Argentine sorghum export price, $/m.t., Hazera 
(1985) and Index Estadistico (1986). 
SGSPRAR: Sorghum production, 1000 m.t., CTAP (1985b) and 
USDA (1987a). 
SGTAXAR: Sorghum export tax rate, percent, Mielke (1984), 
Latin America Commodities Report, various issues. 
SGUXNAR: Sorghum net exports, 1000 m.t., CTAP (1985b) and 
USDA (1987a). 
SGVCPARR: Sorghum variable production costs, 1000 1980 
pesos/ha., computed from data in Estudio Cazenave 
y Asociados (1987). 
SMPXEARR: Real soymeal export price, 1000 1980 pesos/m.t., 
Bolsa de Cereales (1985). 
SMSPRAR: Soymeal production, 1000 m.t., CTAP (1985d) and 
USDA (1987b). 
SMUXNAR: Soymeal net exports, 1000 m.t., CTAP (1985d) and 
USDA (1987b). 
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Table 4.15. (continued) 
SOPWHARR: Real soyoil wholesale price, 1000 1980 pesos/m.t., 
Bolsa de Cereales (1985) (Note: values available 
from 1977-84 ; set to 0 before 1977). 
SOSPRAR: Soyoil production, 1000 m.t., CTAP (1985e) and USDA 
(1987b). 
SOUXNAR: Soyoil net exports, 1000 m.t., CTAP (1985e) and 
USDA (1987b). 
WHAHHAR: Wheat area harvested, 1000 ha., CTAP (1985f) and 
USDA (1987a). 
WHNRTARR: Real net returns to wheat production, billion 1980 
pesos, computed as in Equation 4.67. 
WHPFMARR: Real wholesale wheat price, 1000 1980 pesos/m.t., 
Bolsa de Cereales (1985) and Index Estadistico 
(1986). 
WHPXEARD: Argentine wheat export price, $/m.t., Hazera 
(1985) and Index Estadistico (1986). 
WHSPRAR: Wheat production, 1000 m.t., CTAP (1985f) and 
USDA (1987a). 
WHTAXAR: Wheat export tax rate, percent, Mielke (1984) and 
Latin America Commodities Report, various issues. 
WHUXNAR: Wheat net exports, 1000 m.t., CTAP (1985f) and USDA 
(1987a). 
WHVCPARR: Wheat variable production costs, 1000 1980 
pesos/ha., computed from data in Estudio Cazenave 
y Asociados (1987). 
WPI80AR: Wholesale price index, 1980=1000, WEFA (1986). 
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allow calculation of real net returns to crop production, the 
dollar value of foreign debt and interest payments on that 
debt. 
Model Elasticities 
In ASMA, a number of important relationships are modeled 
by an interrelated series of equations, rather than single 
equations. For example, Argentine wholesale prices are not 
estimated directly as a function of U.S. prices. Instead, 
U.S. prices determine Argentine export prices, which in turn 
determine export taxes, marketing margins, and, finally, 
wholesale prices. To determine the effect of U.S. prices on 
Argentine wholesale prices, it is necessary to consider all 
the price transmission equations. Likewise, the change in 
supply or demand which results from changing the wholesale 
price of a particular commodity often requires the 
consideration of a variety of interrelated effects. 
To understand how the model works, it may be more useful 
to examine what happens to the model as a whole when one 
variable is changed, than to focus only on structural 
elasticities of particular equations. Tables 4.16 shows what 
happens to Argentine export prices, export taxes, marketing 
margins and wholesale prices when U.S. prices, the exchange 
rate or the inflation rate are changed. The following 
procedure is used to obtain the reduced-form elasticities 
reported in the table: 
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Table 4.16. Reduced-form elasticities for price linkage equations 
Elasticity with Respect to: 
U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. U.S. 
Corn Wheat Soybean Soymeal SoyoiI Exchange Inflation 
Price Price Price Price Price Rate Rate 
COPXEARD Corn Export Price 0.99 
WHPXEARD Wheat Export Price 1.02 
SGPXEARD Sorghum Export Price 0.91 
SBPXEARD Soybean Export Price 0.88 
CRTAXAR Average Export Tax 0.19 0.16 0.43 
COTAXAR Corn Tax Rate 0.34 0.02 0.42 
WHTAXAR Wheat Tax Rate •0.12 0.56 0.46 
SGTAXAR Sorghum Tax Rate 0.41 -0.18 0.43 
SBTAXAR Soybean Tax Rate 0.26 0.22 0.36 -0.31 -0.02 0.61 
COPDFARR Corn Hkt. Margin 3.89 -0.02 4.28 -0.42 
WHPDFARR Wheat Hkt. Margin 0.08 3.22 3,56 -0.32 
SGPDFARR Sorghum Mkt. Margin 4.31 0.22 5.31 -0.52 
SBPDFARR Soybean Mkt. Margin -0.31 -0.26 6.47 0.36 7.81 -0,71 
SHPXEARR Soymeal Export Price 1.05 1.05 
SOPUHARR Soyoil W'sale Price 0.80 0.80 
COPFMARR Corn W'sale Price 0.68 -0.00 0.75 -0.07 
UHPFMARR Wheat W'sale Price 0.02 0.62 0.69 -0.06 
SGPFNARR Sorghum W'sale Price 0.38 0.02 0.47 -0.05 
SBPFMARR Soybean W'sale Price -0.03 -0.02 0.58 0.03 0.70 -0.06 
' Elasticities are evaluated at the means of all variables. 
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1) All variables are set at their mean values over the 
estimation period. 
2) The model is solved and the values of variables of 
interest are recorded, for what is termed the baseline 
solution. 
3) One exogenous variable (e.g., the U.S. corn price) is 
changed by one percent. 
4) The model is solved again, and the resulting 
differences from the baseline solution are recorded. 
5) The percent change in variables of interest resulting 
from a one-percent change in the exogenous variable is 
recorded in Table 4.16 as the reduced form elasticity. 
6) The process is repeated for changes in other exogenous 
variables. 
Table 4.16 can be used to tell a number of interesting 
stories. For example, consider the effect of changing U.S. 
corn prices by one percent, holding all other exogenous 
variables constant, but allowing all endogenous variables to 
adjust. Argentine corn and sorghum export prices increase by 
almost one percent, consistent with the notion that U.S. and 
Argentine feed grains are close substitutes in world markets. 
However, just because the price transmission elasticity 
between U.S. prices and Argentine export prices is close to 
one, it does not imply that Argentine farm prices are equally 
responsive. 
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Higher export prices for corn and sorhgum result in a 
higher average export tax rate, as the government attempts to 
moderate domestic price increases and to reap part of the 
benefit of higher world prices. Corn and sorghum tax rates 
increase the most, since those are the crops benefitting from 
the price increase. Soybean tax rates also increase, since 
soybean tax rates have tended to follow rates for the other 
commodities in recent years, all else equal. Wheat tax rates, 
on the other hand, are actually reduced slightly. This makes 
sense if the government wants to moderate changes in the 
relative prices of wheat and feed grains. 
Marketing margins for both corn and sorghum increase 
dramatically in percent terms (less dramatically in absolute 
terms) as private and public grain handlers absorb some of the 
benefits of higher world grain prices. The wheat margin 
increases slightly in response to lower wheat export taxes, 
while the soybean margin falls slightly due to higher soybean 
export taxes. The net effect on wholesale prices is a 0.68 
percent increase in corn prices, a 0.38 percent increase in 
sorghum prices, and very little change in wheat and soybean 
prices. 
Putting things in absolute terms, a one-percent increase 
in the U.S. corn price results in a 40,020 real peso per 
metric ton increase in the Argentine export price. Export 
taxes increase by 10,400 real pesos per metric ton, and the 
marketing margin increases by 9,020 real pesos. The net 
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effect on wholesale prices is an increase of 20,600 real pesos 
per metric ton. Thus, about one-half of the variation in 
world prices is absorbed by producers, one-fourth by the 
treasury, and one-fourth by public and private grain handlers. 
Model results indicate that sorghum producers receive an even 
smaller share of any increase in world prices. 
A similar story can be told for changes in U.S. wheat 
prices. By assumption, soybean price changes do not affect 
the average export tax rate, so changes in U.S. soybean prices 
have no effect on Argentine wheat and feed grains. An 
increase in U.S. soybean meal prices affects both Argentine 
soybeans and soymeal, as the government reduces soybean export 
taxes to moderate effects on soybean crushing margins. 
Since export prices are measured in dollar terms, a 
change in the exchange rate has no effect on export prices or 
export taxes in the model (soybean export taxes are a minor 
exception—a devaluation results in a very modest increase in 
the soymeal price converted into dollar terms, which in turn 
reduces the soybean export tax very slightly). Marketing 
margins, however, increase, as the devaluation increases the 
domestic price when measured in terms of domestic currency. 
Thus, a one-percent change in the real exchange rate (which 
equals a one-percent change in the nominal exchange rate if, 
and only if, the price index is unaffected) results in less 
than a one-percent change in wholesale prices for the grains 
and soybeans. 
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In the model, higher inflation rates result in increases 
in the export tax rate to raise revenue and moderate domestic 
prices. Higher export taxes do result in slight declines in 
the marketing margin, but the net effect on wholesale prices 
is still modestly negative. 
Table 4.17 presents short- and long-run supply 
elasticities for crops and livestock, calculated with respect 
to changes in wholesale prices. Combining these results with 
those in Table 4.16 provides responses of domestic supplies to 
U.S. price changes. Short-run effects are defined as those 
that result in the year after prices are first changed, while 
long-run effects are those that result after ten years of a 
sustained change in prices. 
Focusing first on short-run effects, an increase in the 
price of any crop results in an increase in total area 
harvested. If all prices were increased by one percent, total 
area harvested would increase by 0.48 percent. When evaluated 
at the means of all variables, a one-percent change in wheat 
or corn prices has a larger impact on total area than would a 
similar change in sorghum or soybean prices. As the soybean 
share of total area increases, however, the model allows the 
effect of soybeans on total area to increase. Point 
elasticities in 1985 would therefore appear considerably 
different than those presented in Table 4.17. 
In general, an increase in the price of any one crop 
increases that crop's share in total area harvested and 
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Table 4.17. Reduced-form supply elasticities for crops and livestock^  
Short-run Elasticity with Respect to: 
Corn Wheat Sorghum Soybean 
U'sale U'sale U'sale U'sale 
Price Price Price Price 
Long-Run Elasticity with Respect to: 
Corn Wheat Sorghum Soybean 
W'sale U'sale W'sale U'sale 
Price Price Price Price 
CRGRTARR Avg. Real Returns 0.35 0.37 0.16 0.14 0.35 0.37 0.16 0.14 
CRAHHAR Total Area Harv. 0.17 0.17 0.07 0.07 0.50 0.52 0.22 0.20 
COAHHARP Corn Area Share 0.43 -0.23 -0.10 -0.09 0.75 -0.37 -0.18 •0.20 
UHAHHARP Wheat Area Share -0.15 0.27 -0.16 0.03 -0.26 0.38 -0.18 0.06 
SGAHHARP Sorghum Area Share -0.26 -0.27 0.64 -0.10 -0.42 -0.30 0.88 -0.16 
SBAHHARP Soybean Area Share -0.13 -0.13 -0.06 0.32 -0.30 -0.22 -0.11 0.63 
COAHHAR Corn Area Harv. 0.59 -0.06 -0.03 -0.02 1.26 0.15 0.04 0.00 
UHAHHAR Wheat Area Harv. 0.02 0.44 -0.08 0.10 0.24 0.90 0.04 0.26 
SGAHHAR Sorghum Area Harv. -0.09 -0.10 0.71 -0.04 0.08 0.22 1.10 0.04 
SBAHHAR Soybean Area Harv. 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.39 0.20 0.31 0.12 0.83 
CASNAAR Cattle Numbers -0.05 -0.05 -0.02 -0.02 -0.11 -0.12 •0.05 -0.04 
POSPRAR Pork Production -0.20 -0.09 -0.05 0.16 -0.03 0.06 
PYSPRAR Poultry Production -0.09 -0.04 0.19 0.26 0.08 0.10 
Elasticities are evaluated at the means of all variables. 
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reduces the shares for other crops. The one exception is 
soybeans, where a price increase results in higher shares for 
both wheat and soybeans. Since wheat and soybeans are often 
double-cropped, this is a plausible result. 
Considering both the total area and share equations, 
short-run own-price supply elasticities range from 0.39 for 
soybeans to 0.71 for sorghum. These elasticities are 
generally larger than those estimated by Reca (1980), but much 
smaller than those estimated by Fulginiti (1986). All cross-
price elasticities are negative for both corn and sorghum, 
although they are generally small. Due to double-cropping, it 
is not surprising that the model results indicate that wheat 
and soybean production are complementary. 
More surprising, however, are the positive cross-price 
elasticities of corn in wheat production, and of 
both corn and sorghum in soybean production. In the model, 
soybean shares are not sufficiently price-responsive so that 
the negative effect on the soybean share of higher prices for 
competing crops can offset the positive effect on total area. 
The problem in wheat may have more to do with it being the 
residual crop in the system. Also, it should be stressed that 
the reported elasticities are evaluated at variable means. 
Due to the model's structure, even the signs of cross-price 
elasticities may be different at different points. 
Cattle numbers fall when the price of any crop increases, 
as higher crop returns encourage a shift from livestock to 
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crop production. Pork and poultry production fall when corn 
and sorghum prices increase, as higher feed costs reduce 
profit margins. In the short run, pork and poultry production 
do not respond to changes in wheat and soybean prices. 
Some long-run effects differ not only in magnitude but in 
direction. A number of factors come into play, but the 
primary reason for major differences is the interaction of the 
crop and livestock sectors. Long-run effects on total area 
are approximately three times as large as short-run effects. 
A lagged dependent variable in the total area equation 
accounts for only a small part of the difference. Much more 
important is the reduction in cattle numbers which results 
when crop prices increase. In the model, lower cattle numbers 
allow an increase in harvested area. The effect takes time to 
build, since the adjustment of cattle herds is not 
instantaneous. 
Due to the larger increase in total area, the long-run 
effect of increasing the price of any one crop is an increase 
in the area harvested for all crops; i.e., all cross-price 
elasticities of supply are positive in the long run. Long-run 
own-price elasticities range from 0.83 for soybeans to 1.26 
for corn. If all crop prices were increased by one percent, 
area harvested for each crop would increase by about 1.45 
percent in the long run. Long-run own-price elasticities are 
lower than those reported by Fulginiti (who did not 
distinguish short- and long-run effects). The principal 
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difference between these results and those of Fulginiti is 
that this model implies that cattle and crop production are 
competitive, not complementary activities. 
The long-run effect of higher corn and sorghum prices on 
pork production is negative, as the effect of higher feed 
prices dominates the effect of reduced competition from beef, 
which would tend to result in higher pork prices. When only 
wheat or soybean prices increase, pork production increases, 
since feed prices are unaffected. Poultry production 
increases when any crop price increases. This occurs even 
when corn and sorghum prices increase, as the effect of 
reduced competition from beef and pork dominates the effect of 
higher feed prices. Since chickens are more efficient than 
hogs at converting grain to meat, it is not surprising that 
the poultry industry benefits relative to the pork industry 
when feed prices increase. 
Demand and export elasticities are reported in Table 
4.18. All variables are allowed to adjust in response to 
changes in wholesale prices; i.e., all the supply and demand 
equations of the model are utilized. Short-run effects are 
those that occur in the same year that the price is first 
changed (as opposed to the following year in Table 4.17), 
while long-run effects are those that occur after ten years. 
To obtain elasticities with respect to U.S. prices, the price 
transmission elasticities reported in Table 4.15 would also 
have to be taken into account. 
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a 
Table 4.18. Reduced-form demand and export elasticities 
Short-Run Elasticity with Respect to: 
Corn Wheat Sorghum Soybean Soymeal SoyoiI 
Wholesale Wholesale Wholesale Wholesale Exp., Dom. Wholesale 
Price Price Price Price Prices Price 
CSUDTAR Corn & Sorghum Use -0.11 0.03 -0.05 
COUOTARP Corn Use Share -0.20 0.20 
SGUDTARP Sorghun Use Share 0.35 -0.35 
COUDTAR Corn Domestic Use -0.31 0.03 0.15 
SGUDTAR Sorghum Domestic Use 0.24 0.03 -0.40 
UHUDTAR Wheat Domestic Use 0.05 -0.19 0.03 
SBUFEAR Soybean Crush -3.64 2.68 2.01 
SBUHTAR Soybean Other Use 
SMUOTAR Soymeal Domestic Use -0.04 -0.02 -0.51 
SOUDTAR Soyoil Domestic Use -0.87 
COCOTAR Corn Ending Stocks -3.72 
WHCOTAR Wheat Ending Stocks -0.88 
SGCOTAR Sorghum Ending Stocks -1.57 
SBCOTAR Soybean Ending Stocks -0.02 
SNCOTAR Soymeal Ending Stocks -4.72 3.47 2.60 
SOCOTAR Soyoil Ending Stocks -3.97 2.92 2.19 
COUXNAR Corn Net Exports 0.44 -0.02 -0.11 
UHUXNAR Wheat Net Exports -0.06 0.40 -0.03 
SGUXNAR Sorghum Net Exports -0.17 -0.02 0.37 
SBUXNAR Soybean Net Exports 2.03 -1.49 -1.12 
SMJXNAR Soymeal Net Exports 0.01 0.00 -4.28 3.26 2.36 
SOUXNAR Soyoil Net Exports -4.25 3.13 2.58 
a 
Elasticities are evaluated at the means of all variables. 
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Table 4.18. (continued) 
Long-Run Elasticity with Respect to: 
Corn Wheat Sorghum Soybean Soymeal Soyoil 
Wholesale Wholesale Wholesale Wholesale Exp., Dom. Wholesale 
Price Price Price Price Prices Price 
CSUDTAR Corn & Sorghum Use 0.44 0.22 0.23 0.05 
COUOTARP Corn Use Share 0.08 -0.02 -0.05 -0.01 
SGUDTARP Sorghum Use Share -0.13 0.04 0.08 0.02 
COUDTAR Corn Domestic Use 0.51 0.20 0.18 0.03 
SGUDTAR Sorghum Domestic Use 0.30 0.25 0.31 0.06 
WHUDTAR Wheat Domestic Use 0.07 -0.11 0.03 0.02 
SBUFEAR Soybean Crush 0.25 0.38 0.14 •2.61 2.68 2.01 
SBUHTAR Soybean Other Use 0.18 0.27 0.10 0.73 
SMUDTAR Soymeal Domestic Use 0.05 0.15 0.02 0.06 -0.51 
SOUDTAR Soyoil Domestic Use -0.87 
COCOTAR Corn Ending Stocks 
-2.69 0.13 0.03 0.00 
WHCOTAR Wheat Ending Stocks 0.12 -0.44 0.02 0.13 
SGCOTAR Sorghum Ending Stocks 0.03 0.08 -1.20 0.01 
SBCOTAR Soybean Ending Stocks 0.07 0.10 0.04 . 0.26 
SMCOTAR Soymeal Ending Stocks 0.32 0.49 0.18 -3.39 3.47 2.60 
SOCOTAR Soyoil Ending Stocks 0.27 0.41 0.15 -2.85 2.92 2.19 
COUXNAR Corn Net Exports 1.78 0.12 -0.06 -0.02 
WMUXNAR Wheat Net Exports 0.44 2.08 0.06 0.54 
SGUXNAR Sorghum Net Exports -0.07 0.20 1.67 0.02 
SBUXNAR Soybean Net Exports 0.17 0.27 0.10 2.76 -1.49 -1.12 
SHUXNAR Soymeal Net Exports 0.29 0.43 0.17 -3.22 3.40 2.47 
SOUXNAR Soyoil Net Exports 0.31 0.48 0.18 -3.31 3.39 2.77 
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Most of the short-run demand elasticities are self-
explanatory, but a few are worthy of special note. Higher 
corn and sorghum prices reduce feed grain use not only because 
of direct price effects, but also because higher feed prices 
reduce poultry production. The effect on poultry production 
also accounts for the negative cross-price effect of corn and 
sorghum on soybean meal demand. Soybean crush is very 
responsive to the relative prices of soybeans and soybean 
products. Soybean product stocks always move in the same 
direction as crush. 
Considering all the supply and demand equations in the 
model, it is possible to determine the change in exports which 
would result from changes in domestic crop prices. Before 
supplies adjust, short-run own-price export supply 
elasticities are approximately 0.40 for corn, wheat and 
sorghum. Cross-price elasticities are negative, but small. 
In the short run, soybean, soybean meal and soybean oil 
exports are very sensitive to relative prices of beans, meal 
and oil, but are essentially unaffected by the other 
commodities (since crop supply does not change in the first 
year that price changes). If all soybean and soybean product 
prices were changed proportionately, the net effect on total 
soybean and soybean product exports would be small, since 
domestic demand for soymeal and soyoil is small relative to 
exports. 
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Long-run effects are generally quite different than the 
short-run effects. Long-run corn and sorghum demand actually 
increases with feed grain prices. This occurs because poultry 
production increases more than pork production falls, and 
because corn and sorghum production increase. These effects 
more than offset the demand-inhibiting effect of higher 
prices. Wheat demand still falls when the wheat price 
increases, but the long-run elasticity is smaller than the 
short-run, due to the effect of higher prices on wheat 
production. 
Higher grain prices increase soybean crush and other 
domestic use in the long run, since they result in an increase 
in soybean production. Soybean meal demand increases with 
grain prices because of increased demand from the poultry 
sector. In the model, soybean oil demand is not related to 
other commodities. Long-run own-price elasticities of stock 
demand are negative for corn, wheat, and sorghum, as the 
effects of higher prices outweigh the effects of more 
production. Positive cross-price elasticities reflect effects 
on supply. Soybean and soybean product stocks are primarily 
determined by supply in the long run. 
Long-run export demand elasticities are much larger than 
short-run elasticities, and only some cross-price elasticities 
are negative. Own-price elasticities for the grains range 
from 1.67 to 2.08. Soybean and soybean product export 
elasticities are even larger when one price is considered at a 
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time, but the net effect of changing all soybean sector prices 
at the same time would be a more modest change in exports. 
Supply-side effects account for most of the difference between 
short- and long-run export supply elasticities. 
Alternative Specifications 
The estimated model parameters and calculated 
elasticities presented in this chapter need to be treated with 
caution. Many of the parameters are very sensitive to the 
precise specification of the various equations in the model. 
Particularly troublesome are the shift and trend variables 
found in a number of equations where there is no obvious 
justification for their inclusion. Without these variables, 
the model would not fit the data nearly as well, and the 
behavior of the model would be quite different. 
Table 4.19 considers five equations that determine corn 
prices, supply and demand. Each of the equations includes at 
least two trend or shift variables that lack obvious 
justification (the export price and export tax equations for 
corn are relatively "clean"). Examination of Table 4.19 makes 
it clear why many of the suspect variables were included in 
the model. The table also makes it clear why model results 
should be treated with caution. 
In the case of the corn marketing margin equations (4.10 
and 4.10'), the trend and shift variables have very little 
effect on the response of the marketing margin to changes in 
the corn export price minus export taxes. However, the fit of 
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Table 4.19. Alternative specifications of corn equations 
Own-Price 
Equation (Dependent Var.) Elasticity t-Statistic R-squared 
4.10 (Corn Marketing Margin) 4.28 
4.10' Drops trend and 





4.22 (Total Area Harvested) 0.47 






4.23 (Corn Area Share) 









. 8 6 2 6  
4.35 (Corn and Sorghum Use) -0.10 
4.35' Drops trend and two 





4.47 (Corn Ending Stocks) -3.72 
4.47' Drops trend and two 






the equation without the trend and shift variables is very 
poor. The price term is statistically significant in Equation 
4.10, but not in Equation 4.10'. The fit is much better if 
the shift variable for 1975 is left in the equation, to 
represent the effect of Peronist price controls. The other 
trend and shift variables can be rationalized because the 
marketing margin data are suspect, and because the main effect 
of the variables is to improve the model fit rather than 
change the behavior of the model. 
The total area harvested equations (4.22 and 4.22') 
present a very different problem. Without the three shift 
variables, the fit of the equation is still reasonably good, 
and all the coefficients have the expected signs. However, 
the price response is very low and is not statistically 
significant. Including the shift variables results in a sharp 
increase in the estimated supply elasticity. This makes it 
more likely that the total supply effect will dominate the 
share effects when computing supply elasticities for 
individual crops. It also means that long-run export supply 
elasticities are substantially larger than they would 
otherwise be. Since demand depends, in part, on crop supplies 
in the model, long-run demand elasticities are more likely to 
be positive when the elasticity of supply is larger. 
In such a case, the inclusion of the shift variables is 
far from innocuous. One way to justify their use is to cite 
suspect data or the effect of weather and other omitted 
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variables on harvested area. Poor weather did affect crop 
production in both 1972 and 1986, but there is little evidence 
that weather was unusually good in 1976 and 1977. While the 
data are unreliable, there is no particular reason to suspect 
the data from one year more than another. Only the shift 
variable for 1986 can easily be justified; it represents a 
shift in producer expectations resulting from the knowledge 
that the U.S. Food Security Act of 1985 was likely to reduce 
1986 crop prices below the 1985 level. The only honest 
justification for inclusion of the other shift variables is.to 
say that a supply elasticity of 0.47 is more reasonable than 
one of 0.07 in a country where land can and does move in and 
out of crop production. 
In some respects, the share equations (4.23 and 4.23') 
appear to be relatively unaffected by the inclusion of a shift 
and a trend variable. Short-run share elasticities are almost 
identical, and the fit of the equation is good even without 
the suspect variables. The big difference is that the 
coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is much larger 
when the trend variable is omitted. A larger lagged dependent 
variable implies a larger long-run elasticity. The trend 
variable is included because it is judged unlikely that share 
elasticities are four times as large in the long run as in the 
short run. Not only would such a result contradict 
preconceived notions of what is reasonable, but it would also 
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be inconsistent with the estimated parameters of the other 
share equations. 
The corn and sorghum use equations (4.35 and 4*35') 
differ in a more obvious way. Without the trend and shift 
variables, the estimated own-price elasticity of demand is 
positive, contrary to established economic theory. Even 
though the effect is not statistically significant, at least 
the price term has the expected negative effect on demand when 
the trend and shift variables are included. 
In the case of the ending stocks equations (4.47 and 
4.47'), the shift and trend variables have some effect on the 
elasticity of stock demand, but their main effect is to 
improve the fit of the equation. Stocks data are particularly 
suspect and stocks are small relative to supply, demand and 
exports. While the inclusion of trend and shift variables may 
not be .fully justified from a theoretical perspective, it is 
relatively innocuous in terms of the model as a whole. 
The corn equations which have been reviewed are intended 
to provide a flavor of some of the issues involved in 
specifying the equations in ASMA. Since model parameters 
appear very sensitive to model specification, it is 
inappropriate to cite t-statistics, simulation statistics and 
the like as evidence that "true" parameters of the model have 
been discovered. The most that can be hoped is that the 
estimated parameters of the model are plausible and internally 
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consistent, and that they incorporate information contained in 
the historical data as well as the researcher's judgment. 
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CHAPTER V. MODEL VALIDATION AND BASELINE PROJECTION 
A number of techniques can be used to evaluate 
econometric models. The four sections of this chapter present 
four alternative ways to validate the Agricultural Sector 
Model for Argentina (ASMA): 
1) The first section presents common simulation 
statistics obtained when the model is simulated over the 1967-
84 period. A variety of statistics are presented, because any 
one statistic can be misleading. 
2) The second section includes graphs of actual and 
simulated values for key variables. Visual inspection of the 
graphs provides a "feel" for the model that statistics alone 
cannot give. Turning point errors can be counted, and 
problems can be identified. 
3) The third section examines the performance of the 
model in the historical post-sample period. If a model does a 
poor job of projecting key variables in the post-sample 
period, it is important to determine whether the poor 
performance is due to problems with the model or mistaken 
exogenous assumptions. 
4) The fourth section presents a baseline projection for 
the 1985-1995 period. A model that simulates well over the 
historical period is of limited value for forward-looking 




Not all of the equations in ASMA are estimated over the 
same period, due to data limitations. In most cases, prices 
are the limiting factor—crop prices are only available for 
the 1966-85 period, and soybean meal and oil prices are 
unavailable after 1984. All of the estimated equations, 
however, are estimated over a period that includes 1967-84. 
Table 5.1 presents simulation statistics that are 
obtained from a dynamic simulation of ASMA over the 1967-84 
period. In addition to reporting the mean of each variable, 
Table 5.1 presents root mean squared errors (RMSE), root mean 
squared percent errors (RMSPE), and Theil statistics. 
Aggregate variables (e.g., value of exports) are not included 
in the table. 
Root mean squared error is one way to measure the 
"average" absolute difference between the simulated and actual 
values of endogenous variables. A sense of how large the 
errors are in relative terms can be obtained by comparing the 
RMSE with the mean of each variable. As reported in Table 
5.1, the RMSE is small relative to the mean for most variables 
in ASMA. The main exceptions are the marketing margin 
variables, where the RMSEs are relatively large. However, 
this does not necessarily mean that the model does a poor job 
of reproducing historical marketing margins. Mean marketing 
margins are small in part because the marketing margin is 
sometimes negative. Other statistics indicate that the 
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Table 5.1. Dynamic simulation of ASMA over the 1967-84 period: Simulation statistics 
Variable Mean RMSE RMSPE 
Theil Statistics 
Bias Variance Covar. 
COPXEARD--Corn FOB Price 99.94 2.76 2.65 0.012 0.010 0.979 
UHPXEARD--Wheat FOB Price 119.56 8.15 6.65 0.024 0.000 0.976 
SGPXEARD--Sorghum FOB Price 84.33 4.20 5.96 0.001 0.001 0.998 
SBPXEARD--Soybean FOB Price 249.63 7.10 2.80 0.001 0.031 0.968 
CRTAXAR" Average Tax Rate 17.82 2.39 61.50 0.003 0.006 0.990 
COTAXAR" Corn Tax Rate 18.54 2.43 45.28 0.001 0.013 0.986 
WHTAXAR" Wheat Tax Rate 16.15 2.28 22.78 0.000 0.010 0.990 
SGTAXAR" Sorghum Tax Rate 18.51 2.83 43.84 0.001 0.041 0.959 
SBTAXAR" Soybean Tax Rate 7.97 1.87 18.48 0.001 0.019 0.980 
COPDFARR--Corn Marketing Margin 28.97 14.66 138.11 0.009 0.010 0.981 
WHPDFARR-•Wheat Marketing Margin 49.53 18.99 2672.30 0.023 0.004 0.973 
SGPDFARR--Sorghum Marketing Margin 31.19 18.37 1252.55 0.005 0.040 0.955 
SBPDFARR--Soybean Marketing Margin 89.36 29.81 93.27 0.000 0.131 0.868 
COPFMARR--Corn Wholesale Price 302.82 16.92 5.56 0.002 0.000 0.998 
WHPFMARR--Wheat Wholesale Price 345.70 22.80 7.10 0.001 0.070 0.929 
SGPFMARR--Wheat Wholesale Price 247.14 10.46 4.12 0.000 0.033 0.967 
SBPFHARR--Soybean Wholesale Price 655.45 14.87 2.33 0.003 0.152 0.846 
SMPXEARR--Soymeal Export Price 536.83 16.60 3.06 0.000 0.000 1.000 
SMPCOARR--Soymeal Domestic Price 596.30 18.40 3.06 . 0.000 0.000 1.000 
SOPHHARR--Soyoil Wholesale Price 1806.12 66.20 3.96 0.000 0.000 1.000 
CRGRTARR--Average Gross Returns 654.73 25.23 3.74 0.003 0.002 0.995 
CRAHHAR" 4 Crop Area Harvested 11193 525 5.06 0.014 0.001 0.984 
COANHARP--Corn Area Share 29.33 1.58 5.17 0.007 0.000 0.993 
UHAHHARP-•Wheat Area Share 46.43 2.19 5.20 0.001 0.239 0.760 
SGAHHARP--Sorghum Area Share 17.04 1.33 7.27 0.000 0.032 0.968 
SBAHHARP--Soybean Area Share 7,17 0.71 73.90 0.002 0.013 0.986 
COAHHAR" Corn Area Harvested 3202 277 8.09 0.000 0.027 0.973 
UHAHHAR" Wheat Area Harvested 5192 329 6.60 0.020 0.134 0.846 
SGAHHAR" Sorghum Area Harvested 1913 174 9.06 0.002 0.008 0.990 
SBAHHAR" Soybean Area Harvested 886 87 72.38 0.016 0.009 0.975 
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Table 5.1. (continued) 
Variable Mean RMSE RMSPE 
Theil Statistics 
Bias Variance Covar. 
COSPRAR- Corn Production 8507 727 8.09 0.002 0.057 0.942 
UHSPRAR- Wheat Production 7870 519 6.60 0.020 0.136 0.844 
SGSPRAR- Sorghum Production 5008 426 9.06 0.001 0.039 0.960 
SBSPRAR- Soybean Production 1802 174 72.38 0.006 0.017 0.977 
SMSPRAR- Soymeal Production 581 177 285.33 0.000 0.007 0.993 
SOSPRAR- Soyoil Production 122 38 285.33 0.000 0.009 0.991 
CSUDTAR- Corn and Sorghum Use 5640 407 8.01 0.000 0.004 0.996 
COUDTARP -Corn Use Share 63.15 3.67 5.97 0.002 0.000 0.997 
SGUDTARP -Sorghum Use Share 36.85 3.67 10.50 0.002 0.000 0.997 
COUDTAR- Corn Domestic Use 3524 299 8.52 0.000 0.100 0.900 
UHUDTAR- Wheat Domestic Use 4353 158 3.71 0.000 0.056 0.944 
SGUOTAR- Sorghum Domestic Use 2116 277 15.71 0.001 0.038 0.962 
SBUFEAR- Soytxan Crush 737 227 285.33 0.000 0.008 0,992 
SBUHTAR- Other Soybean Use 105 14 — 0.005 0.012 0.983 
SMUOTAR- Soymeal Domestic Use 136 25 35.50 0.002 0.025 0.974 
SOUDTAR- Soyoil Domestic Use 32 17 243.79 0.056 0.011 0.933 
COCOTAR- Corn Ending Stocks 289 100 72.56 0.002 0.033 0.965 
UHCOTAR- Wheat Ending Stocks 806 187 34.07 0.000 0.076 0.924 
SGCOTAR- Sorghum Ending Stocks 152 33 46.51 0.000 0.050 0-950 
SBCOTAR- Soybean Ending Stocks 171 24 16.07 0.000 0.016 0.984 
SMCOTAR- Soymeal Ending Stocks 22 9 167.92 0.000 0.021 0.979 
SOCOTAR- Soyoil Ending Stocks 9 4 104.04 0.002 0.098 0.900 
COUXNAR- Corn Net Exports 4982 580 10.92 0.005 0.157 0.838 
UHUXNAR- Wheat Net Exports 3457 543 21.68 0.013 0.111 0.876 
SGUXNAR- Sorghum Net Exports 2891 296 15.44 0.003 0.062 0.935 
SBUXNAR- Soybean Net Exports 945 180 ... 0.005 0.042 0.952 
SMUXNAR- Soymeal Net Exports 439 166 ... 0.000 0.021 0.979 
SOUXNAR- Soyoil Net Exports 87 30 ... 0.017 0.004 0.978 
CASNAAR- Cattle Numbers 54.06 0.95 1.84 0.004 0.022 0.975 
POSPRAR- Pork Production 233.06 12.61 5.56 0.010 0.011 0.979 
PYSPRAR- Poultry Production 226.50 11.12 4.65 0.017 0.122 0.861 
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simulated values of the marketing margins generally track 
observed variations quite well. 
Root mean squared percent error is a statistic 
specifically intended to indicate the relative size of 
simulation errors. However, it can be very misleading when a 
variable takes a value near zero in some years. For example, 
consider the case of the wheat marketing margin. The RMSE is 
18.99, which is substantially less than the mean value of 
49.53. Nevertheless, the calculated RMSPE is 2672.3, which 
implies that the "average" error is 27 times larger than 
actual marketing margin. This paradoxical result occurs 
because the observed marketing margin was sometimes very 
small. 
For the variables where the RMSPE is an appropriate 
measure, the calculated value is generally less than 10 
percent. Strictly speaking, RMSPE is undefined for any 
variable that takes the value zero in any year. For purposes 
of Table 5.1, observations where the actual value is zero are 
excluded, and the RMSPE is calculated for remaining 
observations. Nevertheless, the calculated RMSPEs for several 
variables are misleading, due to the inclusion of observations 
where actual values are very close to zero. Among such 
variables are export tax rates, marketing margins, and all 
quantity variables related to soybeans, soybean meal and 
soybean oil in the early years of the data period. 
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Theil statistics decompose simulation errors into three 
parts: 
1) The bias is that proportion of the simulation error 
which is due to a difference between the means of the actual 
and simulated variables. A large bias statistic indicates 
that the model is systematically under- or over-estimating the 
variable of interest. In ASMA, the bias never accounts for 
more than 2.3 percent of the total simulation error for any 
variable. 
2) The variance is that proportion of the simulation 
error which is due to difference between the variances of the 
actual and simulated variables. A large variance statistic 
indicates that the model cannot reproduce the degree of 
variability in the sample data. For most variables in ASMA, 
less than 10 percent of the simulation error can be attributed 
to a difference in the variance of actual and simulated 
values. The largest observed variance statistic is associated 
with the wheat area share. This is not surprising, since 
wheat is the residual crop in the supply side of the model. 
The wheat share, therefore, reflects all errors made in 
estimating the corn, sorghum and soybean shares. 
3) The covariance is the remaining proportion of 
simulation error. For a "perfect" model, the covariance 
statistic would take the value 1.0, while the bias and 
variance components would be zero. For 53 of the 61 variables 
included in Table 5.1, the covariance statistic is greater 
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than 0.9. Only the wheat share has a covariance statistic 
less than 0.8. 
In general, then, the statistics reported in Table 5.1 
indicate that ASMA performs well when simulated over the 
sample period. In one respect this is not surprising, given 
the good fit of most estimated equations. Considering the 
complex dynamics and other interactions in ASMA, however, the 
good simulation statistics are significant. 
Historical Simulation 
Actual and simulated values for key variables in ASMA 
over the 1967-84 period are shown in Figures 5.1-5.30. 
Wholesale prices, area harvested, domestic use, and net 
exports are plotted for all four crops. By way of example, 
all variables related to corn are plotted, and several other 
selected variables are also illustrated. Actual and simulated 
values for all 61 variables included in Table 5.1 can be found 
in the Appendix. 
As shown in Figure 5.1, the model does a good job of 
reproducing historical corn export prices. The model also 
simulates export prices for other crops quite well. Since 
export prices depend only on U.S. prices and other exogenous 
variables, the simulated values are exactly equal to the 
predicted values in the estimated equations. 
Actual and simulated values of the average export tax 
rate are shown in Figure 5.2. Except for the very modest 
decline in 1984, the model is able to reproduce all the 
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Figure 5.3. Corn export tax rate, actual and baseline 
simulation 
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Figure 5.4. Corn real marketing margin, actual and baseline 
simulation 
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Figure 5.5. Corn real wholesale price, actual and baseline 
simulation 
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Figure 5.6. Wheat real wholesale price, actual and baseline 
simulation 
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Figure 5.7. Sorghum real wholesale price, actual and baseline 
simulation 
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Figure 5.8. Soybean real wholesale price, actual and baseline 
simulation 
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Figure 5.9. Soybean meal real export price, actual and 
baseline simulation (no data prior to 1977) 
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Actual  —Basel ine 
Figure 5.10. Soybean oil real wholesale price, actual and 
baseline simulation (no data prior to 1977) 
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Figure 5.11. Average real returns to crop production, actual 
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Figure 5.13. Corn area harvested, actual and baseline 
simulation 
million hectares 
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1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 
—— Actual  —Basel ine 
Figure 5.16. Soybean area harvested, actual and baseline 
simulation 
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million metric tons 
1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1967 1969 
—— Actual  —Basel ine 
Figure 5.17. Corn domestic use, actual and baseline 
simulation 
million metric tons 
1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 
Actual  —Basel ine 
Figure 5.18. Wheat domestic use, actual and baseline 
simulation 
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Figure 5.19. Sorghum domestic use, actual and baseline 
simulation 
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Figure 5.20. Soybean crush, actual and baseline simulation 
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Figure 5.21. Corn ending stocks, actual and baseline 
simulation 
million metric tons 
1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 
——- Actual -+- Baseline 
Figure 5.22. Corn net exports, actual and baseline simulation 
188 
million metric tons 
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1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 
Actual Baseline 
Figure 5.23. Wheat net exports, actual and baseline 
simulation 
million metric tons 
1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 
—— Actual  —Basel ine 
Figure 5.24. Sorghum net exports, actual and baseline 
simulation 
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Figure 5.25. Soybean net exports, actual and baseline 
simulation 
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Figure 5.27. Soybean oil net exports, actual and baseline 
simulation 
million head 
1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 
Actual Baseline 
Figure 5.28. Cattle numbers, actual and baseline simulation 
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Figure 5.29. Pork production, actual and baseline 
simulation 
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Figure 5.30. Poultry production, actual and baseline 
simulation 
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turning points in the average export tax rate. The model also 
simulates the corn export tax rate very well (Figure 5.3). 
Simulated values for the other export tax rates track actual 
values equally well. 
Simulated values of the corn marketing margin generally 
are close to actual values (Figure 5.4), but a number of 
turning points are missed. The same pattern holds for the 
marketing margins for other crops. 
Simulated wholesale prices incorporate any errors made in 
simulating export prices, tax rates and marketing margins. In 
light of this. Figures 5.5-5.8 indicate that the model 
performs well. Simulated values generally track actual values 
quite closely, and relatively few turning points are missed. 
Actual and baseline soybean prices are identical prior to 1977 
by construction. The model simulates soybean meal and oil 
prices well in the years when data are available (Figures 5.9 
and 5.10). 
Average real returns to crop production depend on 
wholesale prices, trend yields, and area shares. The model 
tracks average returns quite well (Figure 5.11), although 
several minor turning point errors are made. Since total area 
harvested incorporates dynamics both directly and through 
cattle numbers, it is not surprising that there appears to be 
some serial correlation of simulation errors in Figure 5.12. 
Nevertheless, the model still captures most turning points, 
and tracks the historical data quite well. 
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For each of the crops, simulated values of area harvested 
incorporate any errors made in estimating total area and the 
area shares. In light of this, the model performance 
illustrated in Figures 5.13-5.16 is acceptable. Since wheat 
is modeled as the residual crop, the actual and simulated 
values in Figure 5.14 are surprisingly close. Serial 
correlation of simulation errors is an expected problem, due 
to the lagged dependent variables in both the total area 
harvested and the share equations. 
Errors made in simulating corn (Figure 5.17) and sorghum 
(Figure 5.19) domestic use can be attributed to errors in both 
the total feed grain use and the use share equations. Those 
errors, in turn, can be attributed to errors in simulating 
everything from prices to crop and livestock production. The 
simulation of wheat use (Figure 5.18), on the other hand, 
looks more like the single-equation estimates, since wheat 
demand depends on fewer model interactions. Errors in 
simulating soybean crush (Figure 5.20) are due, in large part, 
to errors in estimating soybean production. 
There is a high degree of variability in reported 
carryover stocks of corn. The ability of the model to track 
these stock changes (Figure 5.21) may appear remarkable, until 
one remembers the number of shift variables included in the 
corn stock equation. Although not illustrated here, the same 
story holds for stocks of the other commodities. 
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Since trade is modeled as the difference between domestic 
supply and demand, simulated values of net exports reflect all 
errors made in simulating the rest of the model. In light of 
this, the ability of the model to track actual values of net 
exports for all six commodities is quite good, as shown in 
Figures 5.22-5.27. Especially in the cases of corn, wheat and 
sorghum, much of the annual variation in exports is due not to 
the variables modeled in ASMA, but to changes in yields. 
The three livestock equations are presented in Figures 
5.28-5.30. The model captures the major turning point in 
cattle numbers in 1977, but misses several minor turning 
points. Since total crop area is very sensitive to cattle 
numbers, the ability of the model to track this variable is 
very important. The model misses several turning points in 
pork production in the early 1970s, but performs much better 
in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The model captures the 
major turning point in poultry production in 1972, and 
generally tracks poultry production quite closely. 
Comparing graphs of historical and simulated values of 
key variables confirms the ability of the model to reproduce 
sample data. Given the number of shift and trend variables in 
the model, any other result would have been very 
disappointing. However, it is far easier for a model to 




The current version of ASMA was estimated and simulated 
in early 1987, based on the best information available at that 
time. The estimation period for model equations was 
determined by data availability, but generally extended 
through 1985 or 1986. To simulate the model in the post-
sample period, it was necessary to specify values for all the 
exogenous variables in the model. Macroeconomic projections 
were taken from a December, 1986 publication of The WEFA 
Group. U.S. commodity prices were obtained from the Winter 
1986 agricultural outlook prepared by FAPRI and the WEFA 
Group. Argentine yields for 1986 and 1987 were obtained from 
January 1987 USDA reports; trend yields were used for later 
years. Shift variables, trends, and other variables were set 
at the discretion of the analyst, following patterns 
established in the sample period. 
In constructing the model, equations were selected or 
rejected in part based on whether they yielded projections for 
1986 and 1987 that seemed reasonable in light of what was then 
known. One would expect, therefore, that simulated values for 
1986 and 1987 would generally correspond well with USDA 
estimates available in early 1987. As is shown in Table 5.2, 
that is the case for most of the variables reported. 
Simulated values of corn, sorghum, and soybean area 
harvested are within 4 percent of January 1987 USDA estimates 
for both 1986 and 1987. The difference is larger for wheat. 
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Table 5.2. Post-sample performance of ASMA 
USDA Baseline Percent USDA Adjusted Percent 
Variable Year (Jan. 1987) Simulation Diff. (Nov. 1988) Baseline* Diff. 
4-Crop Area 1986 
(1000 ha.) 1987 
1988 
Corn Area 1986 
(1000 he.) 1987 
1988 
Wheat Area 1986 
(1000 ha.) 1987 
1988 
Sorghum Area 1986 
(1000 ha.) 1987 
1988 
Soybean Area 1986 
(1000 ha.) 1987 
1988 
Corn Production 1986 
(1000 mt) 1987 
1988 
Wheat Production 1986 
(1000 mt) 1987 
1988 
Sorghum Production 1986 
(1000 mt) 1987 
1988 
13,520 13,928 3.0% 
13,360 13,694 2.5% 
13,104 
3,500 3,448 -1.5% 
3,400 3,276 -3.6% 
2,883 
5,270 5,614 6.5% 
5,050 5,489 8.7% 
5,349 
1,400 1,410 0.7% 
1,260 1,300 3.2% 
1,173 
3,350 3,456 3.2% 
3,650 3,628 -0.6% 
3,698 
12,100 11,922 -1.5% 
12,000 11,564 -3.6% 
10,460 
8,500 9,055 6.5% 
9,200 10,000 8.7% 
10,503 
4,200 4,229 0.7% 
3,800 3,922 3.2% 
3,979 
13,367 13,968 4.5% 
12,310 13,526 9.9% 
12,700 13,145 3.5% 
3,351 3,567 6.4% 
2,900 3,048 5.1% 
2,600 2,787 7.2% 
5,300 5,521 4.2% 
4,900 5,621 14.7% 
4,800 5,522 15.0% 
1,400 1,414 1.0% 
1,000 1,266 26.6% 
1,000 1,095 9.5% 
3,316 3,466 4.5% 
3,510 3,590 2.3% 
4,300 3,741 -13.0% 
12,400 13,206 6.5% 
9,250 9,733 5.2% 
9,000 9,636 7,1% 
8,500 8,905 4.8% 
8,900 10,272 15.4% 
9,000 10,403 15.6% 
4,200 4,215 0.4% 
3,100 3,927 26.7% 
3,000 3,287 9.6% 
Soybean Production 1986 7,300 7,531 3.2% 7,300 7,607 4.2% 
(1000 mt) 1987 7,700 7,654 -0.6% 7,000 7,146 2.1% 
1988 8,411 9,900 8,620 -12.9% 
Soybean Crush 1986 4,450 4,472 0.5% 4,347 4,696 8.0% 
(1000 mt) 1987 4,675 4,294 -8.1% 4,969 5,127 3.2% 
1988 4,997 7,200 6,982 -3.0% 
" The adjusted baseline incorporates the current information summarized in Table 5.3. 
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Table 5.2. (continued) 
USDA Baseline Percent USDA Adjusted Percent 
Variable Year (Jan. 1987) Simulation Diff. (Nov. 1988) Baseline Diff. 
Corn Domestic Use 1986 
(1000 mt) 1987 
1988 
Wheat Domestic Use 1986 
(1000 mt) 1987 
1988 
Sorghum Domestic Use 1986 
(1000 mt) 1987 
1988 
Corn Exports 1986 
(1000 mt) 1987 
1988 
Wheat Exports 1986 
(1000 mt) 1987 
1988 
Sorghum Exports 1986 
(1000 mt) 1987 
1988 
Soybean Exports 1986 
(1000 mt) 1987 
1988 
Soymeal Exports 1986 
(1000 mt) 1987 
1988 
SoyoiI Exports 1986 
(1000 mt) 1987 
1988 
4,600 5,044 9.7% 
4,600 5,145 11.8% 
4,881 
4,400 4,545 3.3% 
4,500 4,607 2.4% 
4,633 
2,500 2,345 -6.2% 
2,500 2,169 -13.2% 
2,157 
7,500 7,001 -6.7% 
7,500 6,413 -14.5% 
5,606 
4,300 4,611 7.2% 
4,650 5,325 14.5% 
5,837 
1,950 2,151 10.3% 
1,250 1,754 40.3% 
1,812 
2,600 2,802 7.8% 
2,650 2,983 12.6% 
3,010 
3,150 3,197 1.5% 
3,450 3,155 -8.6% 
3,683 
620 644 3.9% 
645 623 -3.4% 
731 
5,000 5,397 7.9% 
5,250 4,712 -10.2% 
5,168 4,490 -13.1% 
4,400 4,523 2.8% 
4,500 4,597 2.2% 
4,700 4,574 -2.7% 
2,400 2,377 -1.0% 
2,100 2,162 3.0% 
1,900 1,950 2.6% 
7,367 7,851 6.6% 
4,032 5,163 28.1% 
4,100 5,235 27.7% 
4,300 4,498 4.6% 
4,400 5,604 27.4% 
4,200 5,868 39.7% 
1,950 2,131 9.3% 
975 1,768 81.3% 
1,100 1,359 23.5% 
2,566 2,652 3.4% 
1,292 1,662 28.6% 
2,100 1,211 -42.3% 
3,248 3,374 3.9% 
3,600 3,841 6.7% 
5,250 5,304 1.0% 
649 678 4.5% 
800 759 -5.1% 
1120 1,058 -5.5% 
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which is modeled as the residual crop. Since yields were set 
at the levels estimated by USDA for 1986 and 1987, production 
estimates for the four crops differ by the same percentages as 
the area estimates. The simulated 1987 value of soybean crush 
is approximately 8 percent less than the 1987 USDA estimate. 
On the demand side, simulated corn use in 1986 and 1987 
is higher than the January 1987 USDA estimates, and sorghum 
use is lower. For wheat, soymeal and soyoil, simulated 
domestic demand is relatively close to the 1987 USDA 
estimates. The percent differences between simulated exports 
and 1987 USDA estimates are generally larger than the 
corresponding differences for domestic production and 
utilization. This is not surprising, since trade is modeled 
as the residual of domestic supply and demand. Nevertheless, 
only in the case of 1987 sorghum is the difference between the 
simulated values and 1987 USDA estimates greater than 15 
percent. 
Since nearly two years have passed since the model was 
simulated, more information is now available to assess the 
post-sample performance of the model. USDA has estimated 
Argentine supply, demand and trade for 1988, and has revised 
estimates for 1986 and 1987, sometimes substantially. Table 
5.2 shows that the baseline simulation generally does not 
match current USDA estimates as well as it does the 1987 USDA 
estimates. 
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To assess the performance of the model in light of the 
current USDA estimates, it is important to separate problems 
with the model from problems with the exogenous assumptions. 
A number of the assumptions incorporated in the baseline 
simulation have proven to be mistaken, as more information has 
become available about the state of the Argentine 
macroeconomy, world commodity markets and the weather (Table 
5.3) : 
1) The austral was devalued more than twice as much 
between 1986 and 1988 as had been anticipated in December 
1986. Meanwhile, the 1988 inflation rate was more than three 
times as high as had been projected earlier. Argentine real 
GDP actually fell in 1988, in contrast to the earlier 
projection of 4 percent growth. The foreign debt was lower 
than reported earlier, but interest payments on medium and 
long-term debt were substantially higher (WEFA 1986, 1988). 
2) U.S. wheat and soybean prices were actually higher 
during the 1986/87 crop year than anticipated in late 1986, 
while while corn prices were lower. For 1987/88 and 1988/89, 
current estimates of prices for all crops are higher than the 
earlier estimates. The difference in 1987/88 is primarily due 
to stronger world demand, while the even larger difference in 
1988/89 is due to the drought that sharply reduced North 
American grain and oilseed production (FAPRI 1986, 1988). 
3) Revised estimates of Argentine crop yields 
substantially reduce 1987 corn and soybean production, but 
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Exchange Rate 1986 0.94 0.94 0. 0% 
(Australes/$) 1987 2.00 2.23 11. 5% 
1988 4.27 9.06 112. 2% 
Inflation Rate 1986 90.0% 90.0% 0. 0% 
(%, Wholesale) 1987 105.6% 131.3% 24. 3% 
1988 114.6% 325.9% 184. 4% 
Real GDP Growth 1986 4.0% 5.4% 35. 0% 
(%) 1987 2.9% 2.1% -27. 1% 
1988 3.7% -0.3% -108. 0% 
Interest on Debt 1986 $3.24 $4.30 32. 7% 
($ billion) 1987 $3.23 $4.10 26. 9% 
1988 $3.17 $5.00 57. 7% 
U.S. Corn Price 1986 $1.65 $1.50 -9. 1% 
($/bushel) 1987 $1.66 $1.94 16. 9% 
1988 $1.69 $2.71 60. 4% 
U.S. Wheat Price 1986 $2.29 $2.42 5. 7% 
($/bushel) 1987 $2.28 $2.57 12. 7% 
1988 $2.27 $3.68 62. 1% 
U.S. Soybean Price 1986 $4.65 $4.78 2. 8% 
($/bushel) 1987 $4.63 $6.15 32. 8% 
1988 $4.65 $8.00 72. 0% 
Corn Yield 1986 3.46 3.70 6. 9% 
(mt/ha.) 1987 3.53 3.19 -9. 6% 
1988 3.63 3.46 -4. 7% 
Wheat Yield 1986 1.61 1.61 0. 0% 
(mt/ha.) 1987 1.82 1.83 0. 5% 
1988 1.96 1.88 -4. 1% 
Soybean Yield 1986 2.18 2.20 0. 9% 
(mt/ha.) 1987 2.11 1.99 -5. 7% 
1988 2.27 2.30 1. 3% 
^Macro assumptions from WEFA (1988). U.S. prices and 
Argentine yields from FAPRI (1988), based on USDA data. 
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1988 yields are within 5 percent of the trend yields assumed 
in the baseline simulation (FAPRI 1986, 1988). 
Simulating ASMA using the revised exogenous assumptions 
results in the adjusted baseline reported in Table 5.2. In 
many cases, updating the exogenous assumptions improved the 
ability of the model to match current USDA estimates for the 
1987 and 1988 crops. Of the 19 variables in Table 5.2, the 
adjusted baseline comes closer than the original baseline to 
the current USDA estimates for both 1987 and 1988 in 11 cases. 
In five cases, the adjusted baseline approximated the USDA 
estimates better than the orignial baseline in one year, but 
not as well in the other. Only in the cases of corn domestic 
use, wheat area harvested and wheat exports are the original 
baseline estimates better than those of the adjusted baseline 
in both years. 
Major downward revisions were made in USDA estimates of 
1987 area harvested for all four crops. Based on the new USDA 
estimates, 1987 area harvested for the four crops was actually 
about 11 percent less than the simulated area. The downward 
revision can be explained by flooding that destroyed much of 
the corn and sorghum crops before harvest. Thus, the large 
difference between actual and simulated area does not 
necessarily imply major problems with the model. 
In 1988, the simulated total area in the adjusted 
baseline differs from the USDA estimate by just 3.5 percent, 
but the crop mix is substantially different. Simulated values 
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for wheat, corn and sorghum area harvested are 7 to 15 percent 
greater than the USDA estimates, while soybean area is 13 
percent less. This indicates that the model is not capturing 
all of the recent movement away from grains and towards 
soybeans in Argentina. Since recent estimates of Argentine 
prices are unavailable, it is not certain whether the problem 
is strictly with the area share equations, or whether errors 
made in estimating commodity prices may contribute to the 
problem. 
Soybean crush in the adjusted baseline is much higher in 
1987 and 1988 than in the original baseline, and it matches 
current USDA estimates quite closely. Actual crushing margins 
were much larger than those assumed in the original baseline, 
resulting in a greater incentive to crush soybeans in 
Argentina and export soymeal and soyoil rather than soybeans. 
Except in the case of corn, domestic use estimates are 
generally satisfactory. It is interesting to note that the 
USDA 1986 corn production estimate was increased by 300,000 
metric tons, while the corn domestic use estimate was 
increased by 400,000 metric tons. This reinforces the notion 
that the domestic use data are particularly suspect. The 
observed correlation between the use and production data may 
have more to do with how the data series are constructed than 
with actual behavior by Argentine farmers. Large revisions of 
domestic use estimates for soymeal and soyoil (not reported 
here) also raise questions about the integrity of the data. 
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In percent terms, the differences between the adjusted 
baseline values and USDA estimates of crop exports are quite 
large. Most of the differences can be attributed to errors in 
estimating production, rather than stocks or domestic use. 
For example, the 793,000 metric ton (81 percent) error in 
estimating 1987 sorghum exports is due almost entirely to a 
827,000 metric ton (27 percent) error in estimating sorghum 
production. 
The post-sample performance of the model in terms of 
export taxes, marketing margins, wholesale prices, livestock 
production and aggregate variables cannot be assessed, due to 
lack of information. It is known that export tax rates were 
reduced sharply in 1987 and 1988, and the baseline simulation 
also indicates a sharp decline in 1987. 
The large revisions of exogenous assumptions indicate why 
it is hazardous to use this (or any) econometric model for 
forecasting purposes. Even if the model were a perfect 
representation of the different relationships between 
variables of interest, forecasts prepared using the model 
would only be as good as the assumptions made about the 
exogenous variables. Poor exogenous assumptions account for 
many, but by no means all, of the errors made in simulating 
ASMA in the post-sample period. 
Baseline Projection 
Developing a baseline projection for the 1985-1995 period 
serves several purposes: 
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1) The model is lent more credibility if it can be used 
to construct a plausible set of projections. An extended out-
of-sample simulation provides a check on the internal 
consistency and dynamics of the model. 
2) The projections themselves may be of some interest. 
In spite of all the qualifications expressed in the previous 
section, a good baseline projection provides some information 
about possible market outcomes given a particular set of 
assumptions. 
3) Perhaps most importantly, the projections can serve as 
a baseline for forward-looking policy analysis. 
In order to answer questions about the effects of future 
policy changes, it is necessary to have a baseline from which 
to compute changes. Baselines are important, because the 
computed effects of imposing a policy change are often very 
dependent upon the baseline. For example, suppose a country 
decides to impose a price support program to ensure market 
prices never fall below a certain minimum price. An analyst 
asked to examine the effect of such a program may conclude it 
would have little or no impact if the baseline indicates that 
market prices would be likely to remain well above the minimum 
price even if the price support program is not implemented. 
On the other hand, the computed effects might be quite large 
if the baseline indicated that prices were likely to fall 
below the minimum price. 
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Some of the key assumptions that must be made to simulate 
ASMA over the 1985-1995 period are presented in Table 5.4. 
Commodity prices were obtained from the Winter 1986 
agricultural outlook prepared by FAPRI and Wharton 
Econometrics Forecasting Associates (WEFA). Macroeconomic 
projections were obtained from a December 1986 publication of 
WEFA. As discussed in the previous section, some of these 
assumptions would be substantially revised if the analysis 
were being conducted today. 
In FAPRI's Winter 1986 baseline, corn, wheat and soybean 
prices fell in 1986/87 due to the new U.S. farm legislation, 
stagnant world demand, and surplus stocks. Corn and wheat 
prices were projected to remain below the 1985/86 level 
throughout the 1986-1995 period, and soybean prices were only 
projected to increase slightly. Corresponding to high 
projected rates of inflation, WEFA's macroeconomic forecast 
for Argentina indicated large annual nominal devaluations of 
the austral. Deflating the nominal exchange rate by the 
wholesale price index indicates that the projected changes in 
the deflated exchange rate were relatively modest compared to 
the wild swings of the early 1980s. With U.S. inflation 
running at approximately 4 percent per year, the projections 
imply modest devaluations in the real value of the austral 
after 1986. 
Baseline projections for the major commodities included 
in ASMA are presented in Tables 5.5-5.11. For most supply and 
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Table 5.4. Key assumptions for the baseline projection 
Variable/Year 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
US Corn Price {$/bu) 2.35 1.65 1.66 1.69 1.97 1.71 1.88 1.96 2.18 2.12 2.01 
US Wheat Price ($/bu) 3.16 2.29 2.28 2.27 2.53 2.62 2.75 2.67 2.80 2.80 2.85 
US Soybean Price ($/bu) 5.10 4.65 4.63 4.65 5.90 5.57 5.96 5.67 5.78 5.30 5.28 
US Soymeal Price <$/ton) 154.90 142.00 143.50 144.00 165.00 160.52 171.07 168.15 172.00 162,00 162.50 
US Soyoil Price ($/cwt) 18.00 16.20 16.90 17.50 23.90 22.00 23.60 21.80 22.20 19.90 19.70 
Exchange Rate (Australes/*) 0.60 
Deflated Exchange Rate 3.40 
Inflation Rate (%) 662.4% 
Real GDP Growth Rate (%) -3.80% 
0.94 2.00 4.27 9.28 19.90 
2.80 2.90 2.88 2.95 2.97 
90.0% 105.6% 114.6% 112.4% 113.2% 
4.00% 2.88% 3.74% 2.70% 2.63% 
43.65 94.05 199.71 421.06 890.79 
3.05 3.07 3.05 3.01 2.98 
113.7% 113.7% 113.7% 113.7% 113.7% 
2.56% 2.20% 2.20% 2.20% 2.20% 
Table 5.5. Livestock sector baseline 
Variable/Year 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Beef Cattle (mil. head) 54.6 54.5 56.8 58.6 60.0 60.6 60.8 61.1 61.3 61.7 62.3 
Pork Production (1000 mt) 235.2 252.9 270.7 273.8 276.4 276.9 285.5 294.4 301.7 309.3 317.6 
Poultry Prod. (1000 mt) 240.0 260.6 263.6 260.9 254.6 251.5 253.3 256.8 262.4 269.9 278.5 
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Table 5.6. Corn supply and utilization baseline 
Variable/Year 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Area Harvested (1000 ha) 3350 3500 3277 2883 2614 2514 2452 2412 2464 2558 2617 
Yield (mt/ha) 3.43 3.46 3.53 3.63 3.70 3.78 3.85 3.93 4.00 4.08 4.15 
Production (1000 mt) 11500 12100 11564 10459 9678 9495 9446 9470 9858 10428 10864 
Beginning Stocks (1000 mt) 91 390 390 337 310 234 225 225 186 158 161 
TOTAL SUPPLY (1000 mt) 11591 12490 11954 10796 9988 9729 9671 9696 10043 10586 11025 
Domestic Use (1000 mt) 4075 4600 5145 4881 4617 4545 4568 4583 4679 4844 5021 
Net Exports (1000 mt) 7126 7500 6413 5605 5137 4959 4877 4927 5207 5581 5798 
TOTAL DEMAND (1000 mt) 11201 12100 11558 10486 9754 9505 9445 9510 9886 10425 10818 
ENDING STOCKS (1000 mt) 390 390 337 310 234 225 225 186 158 161 207 
Wh. Price (1000 1980 p/mt) 289 217 210 206 219 218 215 225 234 235 225 
FOB Price ($/mt) 110 87 71 72 79 80 78 84 91 94 90 
Export Tax Rate (%) 25% 22% 8% 9% 10% 10% 10% 10% 11% 11% 11% 
Value of Prod, (bil 1980 p) 3318 2624 2427 2158 2118 2069 2034 2127 2303 2455 2440 
Value of Exports ($ mil) 784 655 457 404 408 396 379 412 472 527 524 
Export Taxes ($ mil) 196 144 38 38. 41 40 38 43 52 59 57 
Variable Costs (bil 1980 p) 1283 1340 1255 1104 1001 963 939 924 943 980 1002 
Net Returns (bil 1980 p) 2035 1284 1173 1054 1117 1107 1095 1204 1359 1476 1438 
Net Ret./ha (1000 1980 p) 608 367 358 365 427 440 447 499 552 577 549 
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Table 5.7. Wheat supply and utilization baseline 
Variable/Year 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Area Harvested (1000 ha) 5950 5270 5490 5349 5083 5037 5195 5373 5442 5401 5300 
Yield (mt/ha) 2.22 1.61 1.82 1.96 2.00 2.04 2.07 2.11 2.14 2.18 2.22 
Production (1000 mt) 13200 8500 10001 10504 10165 10254 10763 11325 11667 11774 11744 
Beginning Stocks (1000 mt) 1259 451 251 466 499 463 444 449 473 490 493 
TOTAL SUPPLY (1000 mt) 14459 8951 10252 10970 10664 10717 11207 11774 12140 12264 12238 
Domestic Use (1000 mt) 4600 4400 4607 4633 4608 4584 4580 4609 4634 4637 4628 
Net Exports (1000 mt) 9408 4300 5326 5838 5592 5688 6178 6693 7016 7133 7114 
TOTAL DEMAND (1000 mt) 14008 8700 9933 10471 10201 10272 10758 11302 11650 11770 11743 
ENDING STOCKS (1000 mt) 451 251 466 499 463 444 449 473 490 493 495 
Wh. Price (1000 1980 p/mt) 293 221 210 205 215 226 236 238 237 238 237 
FOB Price ($/mt) 104 92 72 72 77 85 90 91 92 95 96 
Export Tax Rate (%) 18% 17% 6% 6% 7% 7% 8% 8% 8% 8% 8% 
Value of Prod, (bil 1980 p) 3867 1875 2095 2157 2185 2320 2541 2692 2768 2805 2781 
Value of Exports ($ mil) 978 394 386 420 433 484 555 609 646 677 683 
Export Taxes ($ mil) 176 67 22 27 30 36 44 48 51 54 56 
Variable Costs (bil 1980 p) 1269 1124 1171 1141 1084 1074 1108 1146 1160 1152 1130 
Net Returns (bil 1980 p) 2598 751 925 1016 1101 1246 1433 1547 1607 1653 1651 
Net Ret./ha (1000 1980 p) 437 142 168 190 217 247 276 288 295 306 311 
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Table 5.8. Sorghum supply and utilization baseline 
Variable/Year 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Area Harvested (1000 ha) 1987 1400 1300 1173 1040 961 905 872 882 912 929 
Yield (mt/ha) 2.97 3.00 3.02 3.39 3.46 3.53 3.60 3.67 3.74 3.81 3.88 
Production (1000 mt) 5900 4200 3922 3979 3598 3394 3260 3199 3297 3472 3604 
Beginning Stocks (1000 mt) 67 327 77 69 79 70 68 68 64 61 63 
TOTAL SUPPLY (1000 mt) 5967 4527 3999 4048 3677 3463 3328 3267 3360 3533 3667 
Domestic Use (1000 mt) 2500 2500 2169 2157 2075 2017 1990 1994 2047 2125 2183 
Net Exports (1000 mt) 3140 1950 1754 1812 1533 1378 1269 1210 1252 1345 1413 
TOTAL DEMAND (10Ô0 mt) 5640 4450 3922 3969 3607 3395 3259 3204 3299 3470 3597 
ENDING STOCKS (1000 mt) 327 77 69 79 70 68 68 64 61 63 70 
Uh. Price (1000 1980 p/mt) 207 172 170 160 166 165 163 167 171 171 166 
FOB Price ($/mt) 87 70 57 58 63 64 62 67 72 75 72 
Export Tax Rate (%) 24% 21% 9% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 11% 11% 11% 
Value of Prod, (bil 1980 p) 1223 723 665 639 596 560 533 535 563 594 597 
Value of Exports ($ mil) 273 136 100 105 97 88 79 81 90 101 102 
Export Taxes ($ mil) 66 28 9 10 10 9 8 8 10 11 11 
Variable Costs (bil 1980 p) 565 398 370 334 296 274 258 248 251 259 264 
Net Returns (bil 1980 p) 658 324 295 305 300 286 275 287 312 334 332 
Net Ret./ha (1000 1980 p) 331 232 227 260 289 298 304 329 354 367 358 
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Table 5.9. Soybean supply and utilization baseline 
Variable/Year 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Area Harvested (1000 ha) 3270 3350 3629 3698 3685 3827 4078 4344 4606 4815 4944 
Yield (mt/ha) 2.06 2.18 2.11 2.27 2.31 2.34 2.37 2.40 2.43 2.46 2.48 
Production (1000 mt) 6750 7300 7655 8411 8501 8950 9661 10422 11182 11825 12275 
Beginning Stocks (1000 mt) 278 294 180 209 231 234 247 267 289 312 330 
TOTAL SUPPLY (1000 mt) 7028 7594 7835 8620 8733 9184 9908 10689 11472 12136 12605 
Domestic Use (1000 mt) 3780 4814 4668 5378 5969 6598 7286 7966 8528 8933 9189 
Net Exports (1000 mt) 2954 2600 2984 3010 2530 2339 2355 2433 2632 2874 3073 
TOTAL DEMAND (1000 mt) 6734 7414 7651 8389 8499 8937 9640 10399 11160 11806 12262 
ENDING STOCKS (1000 mt) 294 180 209 231 234 247 267 289 312 330 344 
Wh. Price (1000 1980 p/mt) 452 417 461 461 509 542 559 569 564 551 537 
FOB Price ($/mt) 203 186 178 178 200 215 216 218 215 209 200 
Export Tax Rate (%) 30% 28% 8% 9% 9% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 
Value of Prod, (bil 1980 p) 3052 3047 3526 3876 4325 4855 5401 5931 6312 6519 6592 
Value of Exports (S mil) 600 484 532 536 505 503 509 530 565 599 615 
Export Taxes ($ mil) 180 135 41 46 47 48 49 52 56 60 61 
Variable Costs (bil 1980 p) 1270 1301 1409 1437 1431 1487 1584 1687 1789 1870 1920 
Net Returns (bil 1980 p) 1781 1746 2117 2440 2893 3368 3817 4244 4522 4648 4671 
Net Ret./ha (1000 1980 p) 545 521 583 660 785 880 936 977 982 965 945 
211 
Table 5.10. Soymeal supply and utilization baseline 
Variable/Year 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Soybean Crush (1000 mt) 3445 4450 4294 4997 5590 6204 6866 7520 8055 8438 8681 
Yield (%) 79.5% 79.3% 79.3% 79.3% 79.3% 79.3% 79.3% 79.3% 79.3% 79.3% 79.3* 
Production (1000 mt) 2739 3530 3406 3964 4434 4921 5447 5965 6390 6694 6886 
Beginning Stocks (1000 mt) 119 34 134 143 167 187 207 230 252 270 283 
TOTAL SUPPLY (1000 mt) 2858 3564 3540 4107 4601 5108 5654 6195 6642 6964 7169 
Domestic Use (1000 mt) 224 280 257 257 243 234 229 226 229 237 247 
Net Exports (1000 mt) 2600 3150 3155 3683 4171 4667 5196 5718 6143 6444 6631 
TOTAL DEMAND (1000 mt) 2824 3430 3412 3941 4414 4901 5425 5943 6372 6681 6878 
ENDING STOCKS (1000 mt) 34 134 143 167 187 207 230 252 270 283 291 
Exp. Price (1000 1980 p/mt) 400 399 397 398 441 470 494 511 509 491 471 
Dom. Price (1000 1980 p/mt) 464 463 461 462 513 546 574 593 591 571 547 
FOB Price ($/mt) 118 142 137 138 150 159 162 166 167 163 158 
Value of Prod, (bil 1980 p) 1095 1408 1351 1576 1958 2315 2690 3047 3251 3290 3244 
Value of Exports (S mil) 306 449 432 508 624 740 843 951 1024 1052 1048 
Table 5.11. Soyoil supply and utilization baseline 
Variable/Year 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Soybean Crush (1000 mt) 3445 4450 4294 4997 5590 6204 6866 7520 8055 8438 8681 
Yield (X) 16.8% 16.7% 16.7% 16.7% 16.7% 16.7% 16.7% 16.7% 16.7% 16.7% 16.751 
Production (1000 mt) 579 745 719 837 936 1038 1149 1259 1348 1413 1453 
Beginning Stocks (1000 mt) 48 40 70 54 63 71 79 87 96 103 108 
TOTAL SUPPLY (1000 mt) 627 785 789 891 999 1109 1228 1346 1444 1515 1561 
Domestic Use (1000 mt) 47 95 98 97 89 84 83 83 85 87 90 
Net Exports (1000 mt) 540 620 623 730 839 947 1058 1168 1257 1320 1360 
TOTAL DEMAND (1000 mt) 587 715 721 827 928 1031 1141 1250 1342 1408 1450 
ENDING STOCKS (1000 mt) 40 70 54 63 71 79 87 96 103 108 111 
Uh. Price (1000 1980 p/mt) 1522 1207 1209 1242 1473 1614 1641 1647 1595 1519 1431 
FOB Price ($/mt) 448 431 417 431 499 544 539 536 523 505 480 
Value of Prod, (bil 1980 p) 881 899 869 1039 1378 1676 1886 2073 2150 2146 2080 
Value of Exports ($ mil) 242 267 260 315 419 515 570 626 657 666 653 
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use variables, the 1985 and 1986 values reported in the tables 
are set equal to values reported by USDA in early 1987. The 
baseline projection is conducted on a spreadsheet version of 
ASMA, which facilitates the use of adjustment factors to align 
the simulated values with actual reported data. While it is 
common practice to utilize adjustment factors throughout the 
projection period, the numbers reported in Tables 5.5 to 5.10 
have not been adjusted for years after 1986. Several checks 
verify that the spreadsheet version of the model yields the 
same baseline projection for the 1987-1995 period, within 
rounding error, as the AREMOS version of the model. 
The equations used to determine most of the variables 
reported in the tables are discussed in Chapter IV. Yields 
are assumed to follow historical trends for years after 1987. 
For each crop, the value of production and of exports is 
determined simply by multiplying price by quantity. Total 
variable costs of producing each crop are determined by 
multiplying the area harvested by the variable cost per 
hectare. Net returns per hectare are obtained by dividing the 
total net returns by the harvested area. The reported FOB 
prices for soymeal and soyoil convert the domestic prices to 
dollars per ton. 
Rather than reviewing the baseline projections for each 
commodity in great detail, it is useful to consider some of 
the major themes which cut across the commodities: 
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1) Lower U.S. commodity prices result in significant 
reductions in Argentine FOB prices for all four crops in 1986 
and 1987. Wheat, corn and sorghum prices increase after 1987, 
but never return to the levels of 1985, which were already far 
below the prices of the early 1980s. 
2) Lower FOB prices and lower rates of inflation result 
in a reduction in export tax rates, from 17-28 percent in 1986 
to 6-9 percent in 1987. With inflation remaining relatively 
constant and FOB prices increasing only slightly, projected 
changes in export tax rates are small after 1987. 
3) Wholesale prices for all crops fall in 1986 due to 
falling export prices and a real appreciation of the austral. 
In 1987, wheat, corn and sorghum wholesale prices fall, as the 
effect of lower export prices offsets the effect of lower 
export tax rates. For soybeans, wholesale prices actually 
increase, due primarily to the reduction in export taxes. 
After 1987, wholesale prices generally move with export 
prices, since export taxes and marketing margins are 
relatively constant. Soybean meal and soybean oil prices 
follow U.S. prices. 
4) With the drop in commodity prices, total area 
harvested falls and cattle inventories increase. Corn and 
sorghum area fall the most, each bottoming in 1992 at a level 
almost 1 million hectares less than that of 1985. Soybean 
area, on the other hand, increases by more than 1 million 
hectares during the same period, as soybean prices and net 
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returns improve relative to those for other crops. These 
cropping pattern changes result, in part, from the large 
increase in the soybean/corn price ratio caused by U.S. 
programs under the Food Security Act of 1985. Wheat area 
falls less than feed grain area, because of the 
complementarity of wheat and soybean production in the model. 
5) Cattle numbers increase throughout the projection 
period, due primarily to sustained economic growth. In the 
1987-1989 period, declining returns to crop production also 
provide a stimulus to increasing beef production. Falling 
feed grain prices result in sharp increases in pork and 
poultry production between 1985 and 1987. Less growth occurs 
in later years, as higher feed grain prices and beef 
production partially offset the effects of higher incomes. 
6) Domestic demand for corn increases between 1985 and 
1987 with the fall in corn prices and the increase in pork and 
poultry production. Both corn and sorghum domestic use are 
limited in later years by declining production. Wheat 
domestic use remains relatively flat. Net exports of corn, 
wheat and sorghum generally follow changes in production, as 
movements in both domestic use and stocks are relatively 
modest after 1987. 
7) Soybean crush increases in every year after 1987, due 
to increases in soybean production, trend growth in crushing 
capacity, and consistently positive crushing margins that 
encourage further expansion. With only modest changes in 
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domestic use of soymeal and soyoil, net exports of soymeal and 
soyoil more than double between 1987 and 1995, while soybean 
exports remain relatively flat. This is consistent with the 
notion that Argentina would prefer to export value-added 
products. 
Baseline projections of a number of aggregate indicators 
are presented in Table 5.12. For the four crops included in 
ASMA, total area harvested falls by slightly more than 2 
million hectares between 1985 and 1990. As prices increase 
and the increase in cattle production slows, total area 
harvested recovers slightly in the 1990s. The value of 
production, measured at wholesale prices, falls dramatically 
in 1986 due both to the decline in production and the fall in 
market prices. The value of production increases over time, 
as prices and production increase, and as farmers plant a 
higher proportion of their land in soybeans, which yield a 
higher economic return. Total variable production costs 
generally follow total area harvested, and total net returns 
generally follow the value of production. 
Value added by the soybean crushing industry falls in 
1987, due to a drop in the crushing margin when soybean export 
taxes are reduced (Lower soybean export taxes mean soybean 
prices increase relative to the prices of soybean products, 
which are not taxed). The value added moves both with total 
soybean crush and the crushing margin in later years. 
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Table 5.12. Crop sector indicators baseline 
Variable/Year 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Corn, Wheat, Sorg. & Beans 
Area Harvested (1000 ha) 14557 13520 13695 13104 12422 12339 12630 13001 13393 13686 13790 
Value Prod, (bil 1980 p) 11460 8268 8714 8829 9225 9804 10509 11286 11945 12373 12409 
Var. Costs (bil 1980 p) 4387 4164 4205 4015 3812 3797 3888 4005 4144 4261 4317 
Net Returns (bil 1980 p) 7073 4104 4509 4814 5412 6007 6621 7281 7801 8112 8092 
Soy Value Add. (bil 1980 p) 418 450 242 311 492 626 738 839 855 784 662 
Value Exports ($ mil) 3183 2384 2166 2288 2486 2726 2935 3208 3454 3622 3625 
Export Taxes ($ mil) 618 375 109 121 129 134 139 152 169 185 186 
Tabic 5.13. Merchandise exports and debt baseline (UEFA 1986) 
Variable/Year 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
Merchandise Exports ($ mil) 8248 6890 8115 9174 10140 11071 12094 
6 Commodities 3183 2384 2166 2288 2486 2726 2935 
Other 5065 4506 5949 6886 7654 8345 9159 
Outstanding Debt ($ mil) 50244 54597 57739 59312 60804 61484 62442 
Interest on Debt ($ mil) 3186 3243 3225 3168 3328 3137 3066 
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Lower export prices and quantities reduce the dollar 
value of Argentine exports of the six modeled commodities from 
$3.2 billion in 1985 to $2.2 billion in 1987. Only in 1992 is 
the 1985 value again attained. Export tax revenue falls 
dramatically between 1985 and 1987, due to the decline in 
exports and the sharp drop in export tax rates. 
Projections by WEFA of Argentina's merchandise exports, 
outstanding foreign debt, and interest payments on that debt 
are presented in Table 5.13. Subtracting the value of the 
exports of the six modeled commodities yields the implied 
value of other merchandise exports. As explained in chapter 
III, policy scenarios will be run assuming the value of these 
other merchandise exports remains constant, and that any 
increase in the value of exports of the six modeled 
commodities is applied to reducing the foreign debt. 
The previous section discussed some of the problems with 
the projections for the 1986-1988 period that have become 
apparent since the baseline was first prepared nearly two 
years ago. Current information indicates that there may be 
additional problems with the projections for years after 1988. 
One problem is that the U.S. commodity prices used in the 
projections appear out of line, particularly in light of the 
1988 drought and its likely aftermath. Another problem is 
that the model appears to underestimate the amount of 
switching from grain to soybean production which has actually 
occurred in Argentina, and which is likely to continue. 
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For these and other reasons, it may have been desirable 
to develop a revised baseline incorporating more current 
information. However, continuing to use the baseline 
developed in early 1987 has certain advantages. A primary 
purpose of this study is to examine the effects of changes in 
the U.S. Food Security Act of 1985 on Argentina, and to 
consider the possible impacts of policies Argentina might 
implement to counteract the U.S. legislation. Such analysis 
was of greater interest in 1986 and 1987 than it is today, and 
analysis done at that time would have been limited to the 
information incorporated in this baseline. 
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CHAPTER VI. EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS 
The U.S. Food Security Act of 1985 (FSA-85) included a 
number of provisions intended to increase U.S. 
"competitiveness" in world commodity markets. Lower loan 
rates and the introduction of generic certificates reduced the 
effective level of support for market prices of grains and 
oilseeds. World grain prices fell sharply in response to 
these measures and the expanded use of export subsidies by the 
United States and the European Community. As discussed in 
Chapter II, most analysts agree that the impact on other 
agricultural exporters, like Argentina, has been devastating. 
The Agricultural Sector Model for Argentina (ASMA) can be 
used to examine the consequences for Argentina of the FSA-85 
and of various possible policy responses by the Argentine 
government. Policy assumptions in ASMA can be altered, and 
the results of simulating the model with the changed 
assumptions can be compared to a baseline which assumes a 
continuation of current policies. 
The first section in this chapter utilizes ASMA to 
estimate what the consequences for Argentina might have been 
had the FSA-85 never been implemented. The remaining sections 
examine the consequences of different actions which could be 
taken by Argentine policymakers to offset the impacts of the 
U.S. legislation. 
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Maintaining U.S. Prices at 1984 Levels 
In the early 1980s, growth in world demand for grains and 
oilseeds slackened, while production continued to increase. 
High U.S. loan rates put a floor on market prices, so the U.S. 
government accumulated large stocks of grain and soybeans. 
The FSA-85 proposed a two-pronged approach to deal with the 
problem of excess supplies: 
1) Programs to encourage farmers to remove land from 
production were continued and expanded. Farmers would 
continue to be required to idle land each year in order to 
qualify for government payments, and the Conservation Reserve 
Program would idle additional land for a ten-year period. 
2) Loan rates were reduced and other measures were taken 
to reduce world market prices. It was hoped that lower prices 
would increase world utilization and inhibit foreign 
production of grains and oilseeds. U.S. farm income would be 
maintained by holding target prices high, thus increasing 
government payments to offset the expected reductions in 
market returns (FAPRI 1986). 
If the 1985 legislation had not been enacted, the United 
States might have chosen to rely more heavily on production 
control programs to reduce excess supplies. Loan rates could 
have been kept at the levels mandated by previous legislation, 
and market prices would have been likely to remain at levels 
comparable to those observed before the 1985 legislation was 
implemented. 
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To estimate the consequences for Argentina of the FSA-85, 
it is assumed that U.S. commodity prices would have remained 
at 1984/85 levels if alternative legislation requiring tighter 
U.S. supply controls had been implemented instead of the FSA-
85. The FSA-85 was signed into law during the 1985/86 
marketing year, and even though most of its provisions did not 
take effect until the following year, market expectations did 
affect prices in 1985/86. In 1984/85, U.S. corn and wheat 
prices were less than 5 percent above their respective loan 
rates, and soybean prices were about 15 percent above the 
soybean loan rate. 
In terms of the model, implementing the scenario in ASMA 
requires only two changes in the exogenous assumptions; 
1) For the 1985-95 period, U.S. commodity prices are set 
at 1984/85 levels. As shown in Table 6.1, the percent change 
from baseline price assumptions varies across commodities and 
years. In general, U.S. corn and soyoil prices are increased 
the most by the change in assumptions, while soymeal prices 
actually fall (Soymeal prices were quite low in 1984/85 
relative to soyoil prices). 
2) The value of a shift variable in the total area 
harvested equation is changed from 1 to 0. The variable, 
DM186, represents changed expectations of market prices by 
Argentine producers as a result of the FSA-85. The estimated 
coefficient on the variable is negative. This is consistent 
with the notion that Argentine farmers harvested less in 1986 
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Table 6.1. Impacts of maintaining U.S. prices at 1984 levels 
1987-90 1991-95 
Variable 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 Average Average 
Exogenous Variables 
U.S. Corn Price 11.5% 58.8% 57.8% 55.0% 33.0% 53,2% 49.8% 29.1% 
U.S. Wheat Price 7.0% 47.6% 48.2% 48.9% 33.6% 29.0% 39.9% 21.8% 
U.S. Soybean Price 13.3% 24.3% 24.8% 24.3% -2.0% 3,8% 12.7% 3.3% 
U.S. Soymeal Price -19.3% -11.9% -12.9% -13.2% -24.2% -22.1% -18.1% -25.2% 
U.S. Soyoil Price 63.9% 82.1% 74.6% 68.6% 23.4% 34.1% 50.2% 37.6% 
Endogenous Variables 
Corn Wholesale Price 3.4% 18.6% 36.2% 35.4% 28.3% 28.2% 32.0% 22.1% 
Wheat Wholesale Price 2.5% 17.0% 35.6% 36.0% 31.0% 24.3% 31.7% 18.4% 
Sorghum Wholesale Price 2.2% 11.1% 21.1% 21.5% 17.7% 17.6% 19.5% 14.0% 
Soybean Wholesale Price 3.1% 8.0% 11.2% 10.9% 2,9% -2.2% 5.7% -0.7% 
Soymeal Export Price -13.5% -17.5% -13.9% -14.6% -20,9% -25.3% -18.7% -27.3% 
Soyoil Wholesale Price 25.8% 57,9% 62.4% 57.4% 35,4% 24.2% 44.9% 30.4% 
4-Crop Area Harvested 0.0% 8.9% 8.0% 16.0% 23,6% 25.2% 18.2% 18,4% 
Corn Area Harvested 0.0% 9.0% 11,4% 25.2% 35.9% 39.5% 28.0% 36,7% 
Wheat Area Harvested 0.0% 9.1% 7.2% 14.0% 20.9% 21.6% 15.9% 12,4% 
Sorghum Area Harvested 0.0% 8.0% 4.9% 11.1% 18.7% 24.9% 14.9% 27,5% 
Soybean Area Harvested 0.0% 8.9% 7.1% 13.4% 19.9% 20.7% 15.3% 13.6% 
Corn Domestic Use -0,5% 2.4% 0,8% 7.6% 14.8% 17,9% 10.3% 17.1% 
Wheat Domestic Use -0.2% -0.4% -1.5% -0.8% -0.1% 0,6% -0.5% 0.2% 
Sorghum Domestic Use 0.0% 5.4% 6.2% 10.2% 14.6% 18,3% 12.3% 18.7% 
Soybean Domestic Use 2.7% 14.0% 14.1% 16.3% 15.0% 12,0% 14.4% 6.3% 
Soymeal Domestic Use 7.1% 7.1% 5.8% 6.6% 12.8% 17,9% 10,8% 20.5% 
Soyoil Domestic Use -29.8% -25.3% -26.5% -25.8% -20.2% -16,7% -22.3% -19.4% 
Corn Net Exports 0.8% 14.1% 21.8% 39.5% 53.0% 59,1% 43.3% 54.2% 
Wheat Net Exports 0.2% 19.0% 16.4% 25.3% 37.2% 38.0% 29.2% 20.9% 
Sorghum Net Exports 0.1% 10.9% 4.2% 12.1% 23.7% 34.4% 18.6% 41.3% 
Soybean Net Exports -3.5% -1.6% -3.6% 7.8% 30.6% 44.9% 19.9% 36.5% 
Soymeal Net Exports 2.4% 15.0% 15.5% 17.2% 14.9% 11.3% 14.7% 5.5% 
Soyoil Net Exports 5.5% 20.2% 21.2% 22.0% 18.6% 14.2% 19.0% 7.8% 
Cattle Numbers 0.0% -0.5% . -2.1% -4.5% -5.7% -5.5% -4.5% -4.0% 
Pork Production 0.0% -0.8% -2.4% -3.0% 0.4% 2.8% -0.5% 1.8% 
Poultry Production -0.5% -1.7% -2.4% 0.5% 5.3% 8.7% 3.0% 9.3% 
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Table 6.1. (continued) 
1987-90 1991-95 
Variable 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 Average Average 
4-Crop Value of Product. 2.9% 23.8% 35.1% 44.3% 44.4% 40.4% 41.0% 29.6% 
4-Crop Net Returns 4.7% 39.0% 60.1% 67.4% 58.6% 49.5% 58.9% 35.1% 
Soy Products Value Added 33.8% 111.0% 79.3% 60.6% 13.7% -7.6% 36.5% -18.3% 
FOB Value of Exports 5.4% 38.3% 56.4% 65.7% 59.6% 50.8% 58.1% 35.1% 
Export Taxés 6.9% 52.2% 137.6% 153.5% 147.5% 140.8% 144.8% 105.3% 
Outstanding Foreign Debt -0.3% -2.0% -4.0% -6.4% -8.7% -10.9% -7.5% 
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because they knew that market prices were likely to be lower 
in 1986 than in 1985 due to the change in U.S. farm 
legislation. Since the scenario assumes.that the FSA-85 was 
not implemented, it is not appropriate to assume an adjustment 
in market price expectations in 1986. 
Table 6.1 reports the changes in important endogenous 
variables that result from assuming U.S. prices are frozen at 
1984/85 levels. Argentine wholesale prices increase for corn, 
wheat, sorghum, and soyoil, but the percent increases are less 
than the percent increases in U.S. prices. This is consistent 
with price transmission elasticities less than one for those 
commodities. Higher world prices result in higher export tax 
rates and increased marketing margins. 
Wholesale soybean prices increase initially, but actually 
fall slightly relative to the baseline in the 1990-95 period, 
in spite of a small increase in U.S. prices. This result can 
be explained by a significant increase in soybean export tax 
rates. In the model, soybean export tax rates increase 
because of higher U.S. prices for soybeans and for the grains, 
and because of lower U.S. soymeal prices. Lower soymeal 
prices can be expected to result in higher soybean export 
taxes, as the Argentine government tries to maintain the 
profitability of the domestic crushing industry by reducing 
domestic soybean prices. 
Total area harvested for the four major crops increases 
by 9 percent relative to the baseline in 1986, due primarily 
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to the assumed change in market price expectations. By 1990, 
the change is 25 percent, or about 3 million hectares. Corn 
area increases the most in percent terms, which is consistent 
with the fact that wholesale corn prices increase more than 
prices for the other crops. The increase in wheat area is 
less in percent terms, but comparable in absolute terms to the 
increase in corn area. 
Domestic use of corn, wheat, and soyoil fall in 1985 
relative to the baseline in response to higher wholesale 
prices. Sorghum use is essentially unchanged, as sorghum 
prices increase in absolute terms, but fall relative to corn 
prices. Soybean crush increases due to a small increase in 
the crushing margin, while soymeal use increases due to lower 
prices. 
In spite of higher prices, domestic use of corn, wheat, 
and sorghum actually increase in later years relative to the 
baseline. In the model, this can be explained by the 
inclusion of production as one of the determinants of domestic 
demand—as production increases over time, the positive effect 
of production on domestic use dominates the negative effect of 
higher prices. Such a result is plausible if farmers choose 
to market part of the increase in grain production in the form 
of livestock rather than grain. Also, the increase in area 
devoted to crop production would reduce the amount of land 
available for grazing and forage production, so increased use 
of grain for feed may be necessary to maintain beef herds. 
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Finally, the model indicates that pork and poultry production 
would increase in the long run, due to the drop in beef 
production. This would also tend to increase the demand for 
feed. 
With the exception of soybeans during the 1985-87 period, 
net exports of all six commodities increase relative to the 
baseline. As with production, the largest percent increase is 
for corn. Soybean net exports fall in the early years because 
the increase in crush is larger than the increase in soybean 
production, but the production effect dominates in later 
years. In spite of lower soymeal prices, Argentine soymeal 
exports increase. This occurs because domestic crush inceases 
in response to higher soyoil prices and soybean production. 
Since domestic use of soymeal is very small relative to crush, 
the increase in domestic use of soymeal that results from 
lower prices has very little impact on soymeal exports. 
Cattle numbers fall relative to the baseline due to the 
increased profitability of crop production. Pork and poultry 
production also fall initially, due to the impact of higher 
feed prices. Later, however, pork and poultry production 
increase, due to reduced competition from beef. 
Changes in important aggregate variables are reported in 
Table 6.1 and illustrated in Figures 6.1 to 6.4. The graphs 
show baseline and scenario values of variables that are 
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Figure 6.1. Total area harvested, baseline and at 1984 U.S. 
commodity prices 
billion real pesos 
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Figure 6.2. Total producer net returns, baseline and at 1984 
U.S. commodity prices 
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Figure 6.3. Dollar value of exports of six commodities, 
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Figure 6.4. Dollar value of export taxes, baseline and at 
1984 U.S. commodity prices 
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1) Total area harvested for the four major crops (Figure 
6.1) is approximately 18 percent higher during the 1987-1995 
period when U.S. prices are frozen than in the baseline. 
Total area harvested is not only an indicator of land use, but 
it is also closely correlated with the use of other 
agricultural inputs. The results imply that the FSA-85 
significantly reduced Argentine crop area, and therefore 
probably reduced demand for agricultural labor and 
manufactured inputs like fertilizer. Results indicate that 
cattle numbers are higher than they would have been if U.S. 
crop prices had been maintained at 1984/85 levels, but cattle 
production tends to use labor and manufactured inputs less 
intensively than crop production. 
2) Estimated net returns to crop production are more than 
60 percent higher in 1987 and 1988 when U.S. prices remain at 
1984/85 levels than in the baseline. For the 1987-1995 period 
as a whole, the average increase from the baseline is almost 
50 percent. It is not surprising to find that the FSA-85 had 
negative consequences for Argentine crop producers, but the 
magnitude of the effect is startling. 
3) The dollar value of exports of the six major 
agricultural commodities exceeds the baseline value by more 
than $1.0 billion every year after 1987 when U.S. prices are 
frozen at 1984/85 levels. If all of the revenue from this 
increase in exports were applied to Argentina's foreign debt, 
the debt could be reduced by more than $6.6 billion, or almost 
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11 percent, by 1990. The negative effect of the FSA-85 on 
Argentine exports implies major costs to both Argentina and 
its international creditors. Lower export earnings mean the 
debt cannot be reduced as quickly, and measures must be taken 
to limit imports and promote non-agricultural exports. These 
measures are likely to slow economic growth and reduce living 
standards. 
4) Export tax revenues more than double relative to the 
baseline when U.S. prices remain at 1984/85 levels. Both the 
total value of exports and the export tax rate increase, so 
tax revenues increase dramatically. This implies that the 
FSA-85 resulted in a major drain on Argentina's government 
budget. Even at 1984/85 U.S. prices, export taxes are 
projected to decline sharply in 1986 and 1987, as the drop in 
Argentine inflation rates (and government deficits) assumed in 
the baseline reduces the need for export tax revenue. 
In summary, the results indicate that freezing U.S. 
prices at 1984/85 levels (i.e., retaining previous legislation 
with modifications to limit supplies rather than implementing 
the FSA-85) would have been good for Argentine farmers, 
agricultural laborers, input suppliers, taxpayers, and 
international creditors. Consumers of meat might lose due to 
reduced beef supplies and the meat price increases which would 
be likely to result. Livestock producers would lose, at least 
in the short run, due to the increase in feed costs. While no 
attempt is made here to assess the effects on global welfare, 
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it appears likely that Argentine real gross domestic product 
would increase. 
10-Percent Devaluation 
By devaluing the Argentine currency, some of the negative 
consequences for Argentina of the FSA-85 can be mitigated. In 
fact, if the exchange rate were freely determined in world 
financial markets, the loss in export revenue resulting from 
the FSA-85 would be expected to result automatically in a 
devaluation of the Argentine currency. The Argentine 
government adjusts the exchange rate frequently in light of 
market developments, but does not allow the austral to float 
freely. The baseline assumes only modest changes in the 
inflation-adjusted exchange rate after 1986. 
To estimate the consequences for Argentine agriculture of 
a currency devaluation, it is assumed that the austral/dollar 
exchange rate is increased by 10 percent above the baseline 
level in each year beginning in 1987. All other assumptions 
incorporated in the baseline projection are held constant. 
The inflation rate is assumed to be unaffected by the 
devaluation, even though a devaluation would generally be 
expected to result in an increase in the price level. It may 
be better to interpret the scenario as a 10-percent real 
devaluation, which might well require a larger nominal 
devaluation of the Argentine currency. U.S. commodity prices 
are also held constant, even though the devaluation does 
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affect Argentine exports of grains and oilseeds, and therefore 
would be likely to affect U.S. commodity prices. 
Impacts of a 10-percent devaluation of the Argentine 
austral are reported in Table 6.2. For the four major crops, 
export prices measured in australes increase by exactly 10 
percent, since it is assumed that the devaluation does not 
affect U.S. commodity prices. Except for soybeans, export tax 
rates are unaffected, since both U.S. prices and Argentine 
inflation rates are assumed to remain unchanged (Soybean 
export tax rates fall in response to the increase in soymeal 
prices). Marketing margins increase in response to the 
increase in after-tax border prices. As a result, wholesale 
prices increase by less than 10 percent for the four major 
crops. Soymeal and soyoil prices increase more than soybean 
prices because there are few barriers to free trade in those 
products. 
Other results follow from the increase in wholesale 
prices. Total area harvested increases relative to the 
baseline, with the effect growing over time due to the 
dynamics of the model. The increases in area harvested for 
corn, wheat, and soybeans are comparable in percent terms, 
which is consistent with the fact that corn, wheat and soybean 
prices increase proportionally. Sorghum area actually falls 
relative to the baseline in 1988, and the increases in later 
years are smaller than the increases for the other crops. 
This occurs because sorghum prices increase less than the 
233 
Table 6.2. Impacts of a 10 percent devaluation, beginning in 1987, holding all else constant 
Percent Change from Baseline 






Exchange Rate 0.0% 0.0% 10.0% 10.0% 10.0% 10.0% 10.0% 10.0% 
Endogenous Variables 
Corn Wholesale Price 0.0% 0.0% 6.3% 6.4% 6.7% 6.8% 6.5% 7.2% 
Wheat Wholesale Price 0.0% 0.0% 5.8% 5.8% 6.1% 6.4% 6.0% 6.7% 
Sorghum Wholesale Price 0.0% 0.0% 3.7% 3.9% 4.2% 4.3% 4.0% 4.7% 
Soybean Wholesale Price 0.0% 0.0% 7.0% 6.9% 7.1% 7.1% 7.0% 7.0% 
Soymeal Export Price 0.0% 0.0% 11.1% 11.1% 11.1% 11.1% 11.1% 10.9% 
Soyoil Wholesale Price 0.0% 0.0% 7.9% 8.1% 8.4% 8.5% 8.2% 8.5% 
4-Crop Area Harvested 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2.6% 5.1% 7.0% 3.7% 9.7% 
Corn Area Harvested 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2.6% 5.2% 7.1% 3.7% 9.9% 
Wheat Area Harvested 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 3.1% 5.6% 7.5% 4.1% 10.1% 
Sorghum Area Harvested 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% -0.3% 1,5% 3.2% 1.1% 5.6% 
Soybean Area Harvested 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2.7% 5.3% 7.2% 3.8% 9.8% 
Corn Domestic Use 0.0% 0.0% -0.8% 0.1% 1.8% 3.1% 1.0% 5.0% 
Wheat Domestic Use 0.0% 0.0% -0.3% -0.0% 0.2% 0.3% 0.0% 0.6% 
Sorghum Domestic Use 0.0% 0.0% 0.6% 0.6% 1.7% 2.9% 1.5% 4.8% 
Soybean Domestic Use 0.0% 0.0% 4.6% 6.6% 3.5% 9.6% 7.3% 10.5% 
Soymeal Domestic Use 0.0% 0.0% -5.1% -5.4% -5.8% -6.4% -5.7% -5.9% 
Soyoil Domestic Use 0.0% 0.0% -3.1% -3.1% -4.5% -6.0% -4.2% -5.4% 
Corn Net Exports 0.0% 0.0% 1.4% 4.6% 8.1% 10.8% 6.2% 14.2% 
Wheat Net Exports 0.0% 0.0% 0.8% 5.3% -9.9% 13.2% 7.3% 16.5% 
Sorghum Net Exports 0.0% 0.0% -0.4% -1.3% 1.2% 3.6% 0.8% 6.9% 
Soybean Net Exports 0.0% 0.0% -7.3% -4.4% -2.5% 0.4% -3.4% 7.5% 
Soymeal Net Exports 0.0% 0.0% 5.7% 7.6% 9.5% 10.5% 8.3% 11.2% 
Soyoil Net Exports 0.0% 0.0% 5.9% 8.1% 10.0% 11.0% 8.8% 11.6% 
Cattle Nmbers 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% -0.9% -1.3% -1.7% -1.0% -2.3% 
Pork Production 0.0% o.ox 0.0% -1.0% 0.1% 0.6% -0.1% 1.5% 
Poultry Production 0.0% 0.0% -0.6% -0.5% 0.6% 1.7% 0.3% 3.8% 
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Table 6.2. (continued) 
1987-90 1991-95 
Variable 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 Average Average 
4-Crop Value of Product. 0.0% 0.0% 6.2% 9.0% 12.0% 14.2% 10.4% 17.2% 
4-Crop Net Returns 0.0% 0.0% 12.1% 14.4% 16.9% 18.8% 15.5% 21.3% 
Soy Products Value Added 0.0% 0.0% 40.5% 41.3% 37.3% 36.8% 39.0% 40.1% 
FOB Value of Exports 0.0% 0.0% 0.4% 3.5% 6.6% 9.0% 4.9% 11.9% 
Export Taxes 0.0% 0.0% -2.3% 0.7% 3.9% 7.1% 2.4% 12.1% 
Outstanding Foreign Debt 0.0% 0.0% -0.0% -0.2% -0.4% -0.8% -0.3% 
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prices of the other crops due to a smaller price transmission 
elasticity. 
Domestic use of corn, wheat, soymeal and soyoil all fall 
relative to the baseline in 1987 due to the increase in 
domestic prices. Sorghum use increases because sorghum prices 
increase substantially less than corn prices, so sorghum is 
substituted for corn in livestock rations. Soybean use 
increases because an increase in the crushing margin (soymeal 
and soyoil prices increase more than soybean prices) provides 
the incentive for an increase in domestic crush. After 1987, 
the increase in crop production offsets the effects of higher 
prices on domestic grain consumption. Just as occurs in the 
case of the previous scenario, the net effect of higher prices 
on domestic use of wheat, corn, and sorghum is positive in the 
long run. 
Net exports of corn, wheat, soymeal and soyoil increase 
in response to the increase in production. Sorghum net 
exports fall in 1987 and 1988, primarily due to the increase 
in domestic use. After 1988, the increase in production 
outweighs the increase in domestic use, and net exports 
increase relative to the baseline. For soybeans, net exports 
fall initially because of the increase in domestic crush. As 
with sorghum, the increase in soybean production dominates in 
the long run, and net exports increase. 
Cattle numbers fall due to the increase in crop returns. 
Pork and poultry production fall in 1988 due to the negative 
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effect of higher feed prices on livestock production. Pork 
and poultry production increases in later years, however, due 
to reduced competition from beef. 
Examining the impact of a devaluation on several 
aggregate variables reveals that a number of groups would gain 
from a devaluation. The increase in area harvested indicates 
an increase in demand for agricultural labor and manufactured 
inputs. Crop producers would benefit, as indicated by the 
increase in producer net returns. Value added in the crushing 
industry increases substantially, due to the increase in the 
crushing margin and in soybean production. The dollar value 
of exports increases because of the increase in the quantity 
exported, and export tax revenues generally increase for the 
same reason (tax revenues fall in 1987 due to the reduction in 
soybean exports and soybean export tax rates). 
In sum, a 10-percent devaluation of the austral, given 
the assumptions of the scenario, would benefit Argentine 
farmers, agricultural laborers, input suppliers, taxpayers and 
international creditors. Livestock producers and meat 
consumers would be adversely affected. This mix of winners 
and losers is the same as in the scenario that freezes U.S. 
commodity prices at 1984/85 levels, but the magnitudes are not 
large enough to offset the effects of the FSA-85. However, it 
is less certain that the net effect on Argentine real gross 
domestic product is positive. The devaluation would increase 
import prices, which would adversely affect consumers and 
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industries which rely heavily on imported products. A general 
equilibrium model would be needed to assess the net welfare 
effect on Argentina of a devaluation. 
Elimination of Export Taxes 
In the baseline, export tax rates fall by more than 50 
percent between 1986 and 1987, due to the fall in U.S. 
commodity prices and Argentine inflation rates. Eliminating 
export taxes completely would be another way to offset some of 
the negative effects on Argentine agriculture of the FSA-85. 
Export taxes are endogenous in the model, so it is 
necessary to exogenize the export tax rate equations in the 
model to simulate the effects of their elimination. All 
other assumptions incorporated in the baseline projection are 
held constant. As in the devaluation scenario, U.S. commodity 
prices and Argentine inflation rates are held constant, even 
though they would probably be affected by a change in export 
tax rates. 
Table 6.3 reports the changes in important endogenous 
variables that result from assuming that all export tax rates 
are set to zero, beginning in 1987. Relative to the baseline, 
wholesale prices for corn, sorghum and soybeans all change by 
about the same amount as they do in the devaluation scenario. 
This is not surprising, since baseline export tax rates for 
all three commodities are approximately 10 percent, the same 
proportion by which the austral is devalued in the devaluation 
scenario. Wheat prices are less affected when export taxes 
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Table 6.3. Impacts of eliminating export taxes, beginning in 1987, holding all else constant 






All Export Tax Rates 0.0% 0.0% -100.0% -100.0% •100.0% -100.0% -100.0% -100.0% 
Endogenous Variables 
Corn Wholesale Price 0.0% 0.0% 5.8% 6.6% 7.6% 7.7% 6.9% 8.7% 
Wheat Wholesale Price 0.0% 0.0% 3.5% 4.0% 4.5% 5.2% 4.3% 5.8% 
Sorghum Wholesale Price 0.0% 0.0% 3.5% 4.2% 4.9% 4.9% 4.4% 5.6% 
Soybean Wholesale Price 0.0% 0.0% 5.7% 6.4% 7.2% 7.5% 6.7% 7.6% 
Soymeal Export Price 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Soyoil Wholesale Price 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
4-Crop Area Harvested 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2.1% 4.4% 6.6% 3.3% 10.0% 
Corn Area Harvested 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2.6% 5.2% 7.6% 3.8% 11.2% 
Wheat Area Harvested 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2.1% 4.3% 6.4% 3.2% 9.9% 
Sorghum Area Harvested 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.4% 2.1% 3.9% 1.6% 6.6% 
Soybean Area Harvested 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2.2% 4.6% 6.8% 3.4% 10.2% 
Corn Domestic Use 0.0% 0.0% -0.8% 0.1% 1.6% 3.0% 1.0% 5.4% 
Wheat Domestic Use 0.0% 0.0% -0.1% 0.1% 0.3% 0.4% 0.2% 0.8% 
Sorghum Domestic Use 0.0% 0.0% 0.5% 0.8% 1.9% 3.2% 1.6% 5.5% 
Soybean Domestic Use 0.0% 0.0% -6.4% -4.4% •3.5% -2.1% -4.1% 1.5% 
Soymeal Domestic Use 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.2% 
Soyoil Domestic Use 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Corn Met Exports 0.0% 0.0% 1.3% 4.6% 8.4% 11.7% 6.5% 16.4% 
Wheat Net Exports 0.0% 0.0% 0.4% 3.5% 7.5% 11.2% 5.6% 15.9% 
Sorghum Net Exports 0.0% 0.0% -0.3% -0.3% 2.5% 4.9% 1.7% 8.5% 
Soybean Net Exports 0.0% 0.0% 10.1% 13.8% 23.5% 31.7% 19.8% 37.7% 
Soymeal Net Exports 0.0% 0.0% 
-7.2% -5.3% -4.3% -2.9% -4.9% 0.8% 
Soyoil Net Exports 0.0% 0.0% -7.5% -5.7% -4.6% •3.0% •5.2% 0.8% 
Cattle Numbers 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% -0.7% -1.1% -1.6% -0.9% -2.4% 
Pork Production 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% -0.9% -0.1% 0.3% •0.2% 1.3% 
Poultry Production 0.0% 0.0% •0.6% -0.5% 0.3% 1.3% 0.1% 3.7% 
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Table 6.3. (continued) 
1987-90 1991-95 
Variable 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 Average Average 
4-Crop Value of Product. O.OX 0.0% 5.0% 8.0% 11.3% 14.0% 9.6% 18.2% 
4-Crop Net Returns 0.0% 0.0% 9.7% 12.8% 16.1% 18.6% 14.3% 22.6% 
Soy Products Value Added 0.0% 0.0% -50.4% -49.8% -44.1% -42.0% -46.6% -43.0% 
FOB Value of Exports 0.0% 0.0% 0.5% 2.7% 5.7% 8.3% 4.3% 12.2% 
Export Taxes 0.0% 0.0% -100.0% -100.0% -100,0% -100.0% -100.0% -100.0% 
Outstanding Foreign Debt 0.0% 0.0% -0.0% -0.1% -0.4% -0.7% -0.3% 
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are eliminated because the baseline export tax rate for wheat 
is less than that for other commodities. Domestic soymeal and 
soyoil prices are unaffected by the change in export taxes, 
since those commodities are not taxed. 
Total area harvested increases in response to the 
increase in wholesale prices. Since corn and soybean prices 
increase more than wheat and sorghum prices, the proportional 
increases in corn and soybean area are larger than those for 
wheat and sorghum. 
The effects of eliminating export taxes on domestic use 
of grains and on the livestock sector are almost identical to 
those obtained in the devaluation scenario. Domestic crush 
falls initially, since the elimination of export taxes means 
that domestic soybean prices increase and crushing margins are 
squeezed. Only after 1990 does soybean crush increase, as the 
increase in soybean production outweighs the reduction in the 
crushing margin. Domestic use of soymeal and soyoil are 
essentially unchanged from the baseline, since wholesale 
prices of those commodities are unaffected. 
Observed changes in net exports of corn, wheat, and 
sorghum are similar to those obtained in the devaluation 
scenario. Soybean net exports increase, due both to the 
reduction in domestic crush in the 1980s and the increase in 
soybean production throughout the period. Soymeal and soyoil 
net exports fall below baseline levels in the 1980s due to the 
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decline in crush, but slightly exceed baseline levels in the 
1990s as crush increases. 
Eliminating export taxes has almost the same effect as a 
10-percent devaluation on total area harvested, producer net 
returns, and export values (Figures 6.5-6.7). Thus, either 
policy alternative would have comparable effects on Argentine 
farmers, agricultural laborers, input suppliers, and 
international creditors. 
However, eliminating export taxes obviously has a 
different effect on export tax revenue than a devaluation, as 
shown in Figure 6.8. Offsetting the loss to the government 
treasury is the fact that the elimination of export taxes 
would not have some of the other detrimental effects of a 
devaluation. Eliminating export taxes would not necessarily 
increase import prices, so it would be less likely to have a 
significant effect on domestic inflation rates. 
10-Percent Devaluation and Elimination of Export Taxes 
To mitigate the effects of the FSA-85, the Argentine 
government could have chosen both to devalue the currency and 
to eliminate export taxes. To evaluate the effects of such a 
policy, two different sets of assumptions are made about the 
effects it might have on U.S. commodity prices and Argentine 
inflation rates: 
1) The first holds U.S. commodity prices and Argentine 







1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1994 1990 1992 
—Basel ine —Devaluat ion —Tax El iminat ion 
Figure 6.5. Total area harvested, baseline, 10% devaluation, 
and elimination of export taxes 
billion real pesos 
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Figure 6.6. Total producer net returns, baseline, 10% 
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2) The second increases the Argentine price level by 80 
percent of the increase in the austral/dollar exchange rate, 
and allows U.S. commodity prices to respond to changes in 
Argentine exports (the "adjusted" scenario). 
The results of the unadjusted scenario are reported in 
Table 6.4. Argentine wholesale prices of the six commodities 
increase by 8 to 15 percent above baseline levels during the 
1987-1990 period. The largest increases are recorded for corn 
and soybeans. Wheat prices increase slightly less than corn 
and soybean prices because of the lower baseline export tax 
rate for wheat. Sorghum prices increase less because the 
price transmission elasticity for sorghum is less than that 
for the other crops. Soymeal and soyoil prices increase only 
because of the devaluation, since there are no export taxes on 
those products in the model. 
With the increase in wholesale prices, total area 
harvested and the area harvested for each crop increases 
relative to the baseline. Sorghum area increases the least, 
due to the smaller increase in sorghum prices. Domestic use 
falls in 1987 for all commodities other than sorghum. 
Domestic grain use and soybean crush increase in later years 
due to the increase in crop production. 
Net exports of wheat, corn and soybeans increase by 13-18 
percent during the 1987-1990 period relative to the baseline, 
while the increases are even larger in the 1990s. Sorghum 
exports fall initially due to the increase in domestic use. 
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Table 6.4. Impacts of a 10% devaluation and elimination of export taxes, holding all else constant 
Percent Change from Baseline 






Exchange Rate 0.0% 0.0% 10.0% 10.0% 10.0% 10.0% 10.0% 10.0% 
All Export Tax Rates 0.0% 0.0% -100.0% -100.0% -100.0% -100.0% •100.0% -100.0% 
Endogenous Variables 
Corn Wholesale Price 0.0% 0.0% 12.6% 13.6% 15.0% 15.3% 14.1% 16.8% 
Wheat Wholesale Price 0.0% 0.0% 9.6% 10.2% 11.1% 12.0% 10.7% 13.1% 
Sorghum Wholesale Price 0.0% 0.0% 7.6% 8.5% 9.6% 9.6% 8.8% 10.8% 
Soybean Wholesale Price 0.0% 0.0% 13.2% 13.8% 15.0% 15.4% 14.4% 15.3% 
Soymeal Export Price 0.0% 0.0% 11.1% 11.1% 11.1% 11.1% 11.1% 10.9% 
Soyoil Wholesale Price 0.0% 0.0% 7.9% 8.1% 8.4% 8.5% 8.2% 8.5% 
4-Crop Area Harvested 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 4.9% 9.9% 14.2% 7.2% 20.6% 
Corn Area Harvested 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 5.4% 10.9% 15.5% 7.9% 22.2% 
Wheat Area Harvested 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 5.4% 10.4% 14.6% 7.6% 20.9% 
Sorghum Area Harvested 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.3% 4.0% 7.4% 2.9% 12.7% 
Soybean Area Harvested 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 5.1% 10.3% 14.7% 7.5% 20.9% 
Corn Domestic Use 0.0% 0.0% -1.6% 0.3% 3.5% 6.3% 2.1% 11.0% 
Wheat Domestic Use 0.0% 0.0% -0.4% 0.1% 0.5% 0.7% 0.2% 1.5% 
Sorghum Domestic Use 0.0% 0.0% 1.1% 1.5% 3.8% 6.3% 3.2% 10.8% 
Soybean Domestic Use 0.0% 0.0% -2.4% 1.7% 4.6% 7.2% 2.8% 12.1% 
Soymeal Domestic Use 0.0% 0.0% -5.4% -5.8% -5.8% -6.0% -5.8% •4.5% 
Soyoil Domestic Use 0.0% 0.0% -3.1% -3.1% -4.5% •6.0% •4.2% -5.4% 
Corn Net Exports 0.0% 0.0% 2.8% 9.6% 17.3% 23.6% 13.3% 32.3% 
Wheat Net Exports 0.0% 0.0% 1.2% 9.2% 18.1% 25.5% 13.5% 34.0% 
Sorghum Net Exports 0.0% 0.0% -0.6% -1.0% 4.2% 9.0% 2.9% 15.8% 
Soybean Net Exports 0.0% 0.0% 3.8% 10.8% 23.2% 35.2% 18.2% 48.8% 
Soymeal Net Exports 0.0% 0.0% -2.2% 1.8% 4.7% 7.3% 2.9% 12.1% 
Soyoil Net Exports 0.0% 0.0% -2.2% 1.8% 5.0% 7.7% . 3.1% 12.6% 
Cattle Numbers 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% -1.6% -2.6% •3.4% •1.9% -4.9% 
Pork Production 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% •2.0% 0.0% 0.9% -0.3% 2.9% 
Poultry Production 0.0% 0.0% -1.3% -1.0% 0.9% 3.1% 0.4% 7.9% 
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Table 6.4. (continued) 
1987-90 1991-95 
Variable 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 Average Average 
4-Crop Value of Product. O.OX O.OX 11.7X 18.0X 25. IX 30.7% 21.4% 38.8X 
4-Crop Net Returns 0.0% O.OX 22.7% 29.0X 35.8X 41.IX 32.1% 48.6X 
Soy Products Value Added O.OX O.OX -19.5X -18.2X -16.0X -14.IX -16.9% -11.7% 
FOB Value of Exports O.OX O.OX 1.0% 6.5X 12.9X 18.1X 9.6% 25.3% 
Export Taxes O.OX O.OX -100.0% -100.OX -100.OX -100.OX -100.0% -100.0% 
Outstanding Foreign Debt O.OX O.OX -O.OX -0.3% -0.8X -1.6X -0.7% 
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and do not increase as much in later years due to the smaller 
increase in sorghum production. Soymeal and soyoil exports 
fall in 1987 due to a decline in domestic crush, but increase 
modestly in later years as crush exceeds baseline levels. 
As in the scenarios involving only a devaluation or only 
the elimination of export taxes, cattle numbers fall in 
response to the increase in crop returns. Pork and poultry 
production fall initially, but increase in later years. 
Aggregate results indicate that farmers, agricultural 
laborers, input suppliers, and international creditors would 
all benefit by a devaluation coupled with the elimination of 
export taxes. Value added in the soybean crushing industry 
falls due to reduced crushing margins, but the decline is much 
less than if export taxes are eliminated without a 
devaluation. Obviously, government export tax revenues 
disappear if export taxes are eliminated. 
Table 6.5 reports the assumptions and the results of the 
adjusted scenario, which allows U.S. commodity prices and 
Argentine inflation rates to change in response to changes in 
government policy. When a 10-percent devaluation is 
implemented in 1987, it is assumed that the general price 
level in Argentina increases by 8 percent. This increases the 
1987 inflation rate from 105.6 percent to 113.6 percent. In 
a country with such a high rate of inflation and a relatively 
open economy, it seems reasonable to assume that most of the 
expected effect of a devaluation would be immediately offset 
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Table 6.5. Impacts of a 10% devaluation and elimination of export taxes, allowing U.S. prices and 
Argentine inflation rates to adjust 






Exchange Rate 0.0% 0.0% 10.0% 10.0% 10.0% 10.0% 10.0% 10.0% 
All Export Tax Rates 0.0% 0.0% -100.0% -100.0% -100.0% -100.0% -100.0% -100.0% 
U.S. Corn Price 0.0% 0.0% •0.6% -1.2% -2.0% -2.9% -1.7% -3.1% 
U.S. Wheat Price 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% -1.8% -3.2% -4.2% -2,3% -5.5% 
U.S. Soybean Price 0.0% 0.0% -0.4% -0.6% -0.8% -1.3% -0,8% -1.9% 
U.S. Soymeal Price 0.0% 0.0% 0.3% 0.0% -0.1% -0.3% -0.0% -0.8% 
U.S. Soyoil Price 0.0% 0.0% 1.4% 0.2% -0.5% -1.3% -0.1% -3.3% 
Inflation Rate 0.0% 0.0% 7.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.9% 0.0% 
Endogenous Variables 
Corn Wholesale Price 0.0% 0.0% 9.6% 10.1% 10.7% 10.2% 10.2% 10.7% 
Wheat Wholesale Price 0.0% 0.0% 7.0% 6.7% 6.1% 5.8% 6,4% 4,8% 
Sorghum Wholesale Price 0.0% 0.0% 5.8% 6.4% 6.9% 6.5% 6.4% 6,9% 
Soybean Wholesale Price 0.0% 0.0% 10.0% 10.4% 11.2% 11.4% 10.7% 10.8% 
Soymeal Export Price •0.0% 0.0% 6.5% 6.5% 6.6% 6.2% 6.5% 5.6% 
Soyoil Wholesale Price 0.0% 0.0% 5.3% 5.3% 4.7% 4.2% 4.9% 2.3% 
4-Crop Area Harvested 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 3.6% 7.4% 10.3% 5.3% 13.6% 
Corn Area Harvested 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 4.2% 8.2% 11.3% 5.9% 14,8% 
Wheat Area Harvested 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 4.0% 7.6% 10.3% 5.5% 13.3% 
Sorghum Area Harvested 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.3% 3.1% 5.7% 2.3% 8.7% 
Soybean Area Harvested 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 3.9% 7.7% 10.8% 5.6% 14.3% 
Corn Domestic Use 0.0% 0.0% -1.3% 0.2% 2.7% 4.8% 1.6% 7.4% 
Wheat Domestic Use 0.0% 0.0% -0.3% 0.1% 0.5% 0.8% 0.3% 1.4% 
Sorghum Domestic Use 0.0% 0.0% 0.8% 1.2% 2.9% 4.7% 2.4% 7.2% 
Soybean Domestic Use 0.0% 0.0% -3.5% -0.1% 1.5% 3.1% 0.3% 5,7% 
Soymeal Domestic Use 0.0% 0.0% 
-3.1% -3.5% -3.3% -3.4% -3.3% -2.0% 
Soyoil Domestic Use 0.0% 0.0% -2.0% -2.1% -2.2% -2.4% -2.2% -1.6% 
Corn Net Exports 0.0% 0.0% 2.2% 7.3% 12.9% 17.0% 9.9% 21.4% 
Wheat Net Exports 0.0% 0.0% 0.8% 6.7% 12.9% 17.7% 9,5% 21,4% 
Sorghum Net Exports 0.0% 0.0% -0.5% -0.6% 3.4% 7.0% 2,3% 11.2% 
Soybean Net Exports 0.0% 0.0% 5.5% 10.6% 22.0% 32.0% 17.5% 41.3% 
Soymeal Net Exports 0.0% 0.0% -3.6% -0.3% 1.3% 2.9% 0,1% 5,4% 
Soyoil Net Exports 0.0% 0.0% -3,7% -0.4% 1.4% 3.0% 0.1% 5.6% 
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Table 6.5. (continued) 





Cattle Numbers 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% -1.2% -1.9% -2.4% -1.4% -3.2% 
Pork Production 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% -1.5% 0.0% 0.7% -0.2% 2.0% 
Poultry Production 0.0% 0.0% -0.9% -0.7% 0.7% 2.4% 0.4% 5.4% 
4-Crop Value of Product. 0.0% 0.0% 8.9% 13.2% 17.8% 21.0% 15.2% 24.4% 
4-Crop Net Returns 0.0% 0.0% 17.1% 21.2% 25.1% 27.7% 22.8% 30.2% 
Soy Products Value Added 0.0% 0.0% -28.1% -25.4% -25.3% -25.1% -26.0% -30.1% 
FOB Value of Exports 0.0% 0.0% 0.7% 4.4% 8.3% 11.2% 6.1% 13.4% 
Export Taxes 0.0% 0.0% -100.0% -100.0% -100.0% -100.0% -100.0% -100.0% 
Outstanding Foreign Debt 0.0% 0.0% -0.0% -0.2% -0.5% -1.0% -0.4% 
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by a general rise in domestic prices. Whether precisely 80 
percent of the devaluation would be offset by inflation is 
debatable, but it is certainly more realistic than to assume 
no change in the inflation rate. Since the rate of 
devaluation is assumed unchanged in later years, the inflation 
rate is also assumed to remain at baseline levels for years 
after 1987. 
U.S. commodity prices are adjusted in the scenario by 
assuming U.S. price flexibilities with respect to Argentine 
exports, and solving the model simultaneously. The 
flexibility assumptions were obtained by conducting 
experiments with the FAPRI trade models for wheat, feed grains 
and soybeans. The experiments involved exogenously changing 
Argentine exports, solving the models for equilibrium prices, 
and observing the relationship between the change in Argentine 
exports and the change in U.S. prices. 
For the 1987-95 period, the average price flexibilities 
ranged from 0.05 for soybeans, to 0.15 for soymeal and corn, 
0.22 for wheat, and 0.60 for soyoil. These flexibilities 
imply export demand elasticities facing Argentina of 
approximately -21.0 for soybeans, -6.9 for soymeal, -6.5 for 
corn, -4.5 for wheat, and -1.7 for soyoil. Except, perhaps, 
in the case of soyoil, these large export demand elasticities 
imply the small-country assumption used in the other scenarios 
probably introduces only a relatively small bias into the 
analysis. 
251 
Only the assumed change in U.S. wheat prices is greater 
than 3.3 percent during the 1991-95 period, and the 5.5 
percent change in wheat prices results from a 21 percent 
change in Argentine exports. In all cases, the assumed change 
in the general price level has a greater impact on real 
Argentine commodity prices than does the feedback effect of 
Argentine exports on U.S. commodity prices. 
The real wholesale prices of all six commodities increase . 
in the adjusted scenario, but the increases are considerably 
smaller than in the unadjusted scenario. Patterns of change 
in area harvested, domestic use and net trade, and livestock 
production are all the same as in the unadjusted scenario, but 
the effects are muted somewhat. 
Figures 6.9 to 6.12 compare the values of aggregate 
variables in the baseline and the two scenarios where a 
devaluation and the elimination of export taxes are 
simultaneously implemented. In terms of total area harvested, 
total producer net returns, and the dollar value of exports, 
the differences from the baseline are larger when Argentine 
inflation rates and U.S. commodity prices are not allowed to 
adjust. However, the patterns of change are similar, and the 
results under the two alternative scenarios are closer to one 
another than they are to the baseline. In terms of export tax 
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Figure 6.9. Total area harvested, baseline, and with the 
devaluation-tax package, unadjusted and allowing 
prices to respond (adjusted) 
billion real pesos 
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Figure 6.10. Total producer net returns, baseline, and with 
the devaluation-tax package, unadjusted and 
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Figure 6.11. Dollar value of exports, baseline, and with the 
devaluation-tax package, unadjusted and 
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Figure 6.12. Dollar value of export taxes, baseline, and with 
the devluation-tax package, unadjusted and 




The various alternative scenarios are intended to examine 
the consequences of various policies which the Argentine 
government might follow in order to offset the effects of the 
U.S. Food Security Act of 1985. Figures 6.13 to 6.16 show how 
successful a combination of a 10-percent devaluation and the 
elimination of export taxes might be at achieving that aim. 
For purposes of these comparisons, the adjusted scenario is 
used, since it probably is a closer approximation of what 
would really occur under the assumed change in Argentine 
policy. 
By 1995, total area harvested is approximately the same 
under the adjusted devaluation and tax scenario as in the 
scenario where U.S. prices are frozen at 1984/85 levels. 
Between 1987 and the early 1990s, however, area is much lower 
under the adjusted devaluation and tax scenario. Total 
producer net returns follow a similar pattern. By 1995, 
producers are as well off under the assumed change in 
Argentine policy as they would be if U.S. prices remained 
constant at 1984/85 levels. Until the early 1990s, however, 
they would benefit more by higher world prices than by a 10-
percent devaluation and the elimination of export taxes. 
The picture is somewhat different in the case of export 
values. The change in Argentine policies does result in an 
increase in the dollar value of commodity exports, but 
freezing U.S. prices at 1984/85 levels results in 
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Figure 6.13. Total area harvested, baseline, with the 
adjusted devaluation-tax package, and at 1984 
U.S. commodity prices 
billion real pesos 
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Figure 6.14. Total producer net returns, baseline, with the 
adjusted devaluation-tax package, and at 1984 
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Figure 6.15. Dollar value of exports, baseline, with the 
adjusted devaluation-tax package, and at 1984 
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Figure 6.16. Dollar value of export taxes, baseline, with the 
adjusted devaluation-tax package, and at 1984 
U.S. commodity prices 
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terms of government revenue, higher U.S. prices results in a 
substantial increase in export taxes, while the elimination of 
export taxes destroys an important revenue source. 
The results indicate that it is possible to devise 
policies to offset the negative effects on Argentine farmers 
of the FSA-85. Devaluing the currency and reducing or 
eliminating export taxes can increase domestic crop prices so 
that farmers do not suffer as much as they would otherwise 
from the drop in world commodity prices. However, such policy 
changes do have negative effects on other groups in society. 
A devaluation would be detrimental to consumers and industries 
that rely on imports. Eliminating export taxes would require 
an increase in other taxes, a decrease in government spending, 
or an increase in public borrowing. While ASMA is a partial-
equilibrium model which cannot answer some important 
distributional questions, it is a useful tool for identifying 
at least some of the winners and losers from changes in U.S. 
and Argentine policies. 
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CHAPTER VU. SUMMARY AMD CONCLUSIONS 
This study develops an econometric model of Argentine 
agriculture and uses the model to assess the consequences for 
Argentina of several changes in U.S. and Argentine policies. 
This chapter summarizes important features of the model and 
key empirical results, and discusses implications of the study 
for the practice of policy analysis. 
The Model 
The Agricultural Sector Model for Argentina (ASMA) 
incorporates several innovative features in a model designed 
to address a variety of policy issues: 
1) Argentine and U.S. commodity prices are linked in a 
way that breaks the price transmission process into its 
several steps. Argentine export tax policy is endogenized in 
the model, so that export tax rates respond to changes in 
world commodity prices and domestic macroeconomic conditions. 
Marketing margins adjust in response to changes in world 
prices, exchange rates, and export taxes. 
2) Crop production is determined by a two-stage process. 
In the first stage, farmers decide how much land, in total, to 
devote to the production of four major crops, based on 
expected returns to crop production and the size of the cattle 
herd. In the second stage, farmers decide how to allocate 
land among the four crops, based on expected relative returns. 
3) Although the livestock sector is represented in a very 
simplified manner, a number of important relationships are 
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captured by the model. Cattle numbers respond to changes in 
crop returns, reflecting competition between the crop and 
livestock sectors for land resources. Pork and poultry 
production are affected by changes in cattle production, feed 
costs, and income. 
4) The model calculates a number of aggregate variables 
that make it easier to assess the impacts of policy changes on 
different groups in society. Measures like total cropped 
area, net returns to crop producers, the dollar value of 
commodity exports, and export tax revenue are likely to be of 
interest to policymakers. 
In addition to the innovations in the structure of the 
model, ASMA has a number of other strengths as a tool for 
policy analysis. The model is small enough to be manageable, 
but large enough to consider a number of important 
relationships. The model is flexible enough that it could be 
expanded to endogenize other crops, the Argentine non-
agricultural economy, or world commodity prices. Having a 
spreadsheet version of the model makes it possible to use the 
model on a micro-computer with commonly available software. 
It also makes it easy to calibrate the model to incorporate 
new information, and it makes it possible to generate camera-
ready tables and graphs just minutes after the assumptions to 
be used in a policy analysis are decided. 
Weaknesses of the model, of course, are also numerous. 
The structure of the model does not incorporate all of the 
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restrictions implied by economic theory. Some of the data 
used to estimate the model is of poor quality, and Ordinary 
Least Squares may not be the appropriate estimation technique. 
Parameter estimates are often very sensitive to the use or 
omission of dummy variables that lack theoretical 
justification. The partial equilibrium nature of the model 
limits the types of questions the model is capable of 
handling, and it raises doubts about the validity of model 
results. 
Empirical Results 
Shortcomings of the model mean it is not possible to rely 
solely on economic and econometric theory to convince the user 
of this analysis that the results are valid. The same could 
be said of most economic policy analysis. Rather, it is 
necessary to use personal judgment, based on an understanding 
of Argentina and the workings of commodity markets, to assess 
the results. With those qualifications in mind, key empirical 
results of the study include the following; 
1) Estimated price transmission elasticities range from 
0.38 for sorghum to 0.68 for corn. Both export tax rates and 
marketing margins increase when U.S. commodity prices 
increase. 
2) Short-run own-price supply elasticities range from 
0.39 for soybeans to 0.71 for sorghum. These elasticities 
generally are larger than those estimated by Reca (1980), but 
much smaller than those estimated by Fulginiti (1986). Long-
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run supply elasticities are much larger, as farmers adjust 
crop and cattle production to changes in relative returns. 
3) Short-run demand elasticities are generally small, 
although soybean crush is sensitive to the relative prices of 
soybeans and soybean products. Since domestic grain use is, 
in part, a function of domestic production, long-run domestic 
demand elasticities are positive. 
4) For the grains, short-run export supply elasticities 
with respect to Argentine wholesale prices range from 0.37 for 
sorghum to 0.44 for corn. Own-price elasticities for soybeans 
and soybean products are much larger when other prices are 
held constant, but are comparable in magnitude when all prices 
change by the same proportion. Long-run export supply 
elasticities range from 1.67 to 2.08 for the grains. 
5) The U.S. Food Security Act of 1985 (FSA-85) resulted 
in substantial reductions in Argentine crop area, net returns 
to crop production, exports and export tax revenue. If the 
United States had extended previous farm legislation with 
supply-management modifications to keep U.S. commodity prices 
at 1984/85 levels, the value of exports for six major 
commodities would have been approximately 58 percent higher 
during the 1987-1990 period. 
6) Devaluing the Argentine currency and eliminating 
export taxes are two policy responses that would offset some 
of the deleterious effects of the FSA-85 for Argentine crop 
farmers. Each policy involves costs to other sectors of 
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Argentine society, however. A devaluation would increase the 
price of imports, contributing to inflation rates already in 
triple digits. Eliminating export taxes would reduce revenues 
to a government already facing severe fiscal austerity because 
of Argentina's foreign debt. 
7) The estimated impacts on Argentina's agricultural 
sector of a devaluation and the elimination of export taxes 
are significantly smaller when world commodity prices are 
allowed to respond to the change in Argentine exports, and 
Argentine inflation rates are allowed to adjust to the 
devaluation. This points out the importance of endogenizing 
world commodity prices and the Argentine general economy if 
the model is to be used for policy analysis. 
Concluding Comments 
As stated in the introduction, this study is not only 
intended to develop a model that can be used for policy 
analysis, but it is also intended to consider the art of 
model-building. The concluding comments which follow are 
personal, and are based on the experience of a novice policy 
modeler: 
1) Humility is an important trait in a policy modeler. 
At most, a good policy model can provide conditional answers 
to particular questions. Model results are often presented as 
being definitive, even when the modeler knows, or should know, 
that there are any number of reasons why the results may be 
suspect. Self-delusion is particularly dangerous. When the 
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baseline for this study was prepared in early 1987, it seemed 
that the projections were very sensible, and that it was 
reasonable to argue with other analysts about whether 1988 
soybean area was likely to be 3.7 or 3.8 million hectares. 
Actual 1988 soybean area, as reported by USDA, was 4.3 million 
hectares. 
2) Identifying the variables and relationships of 
interest is crucial in developing a policy model. Any partial 
equilibrium model omits at least some factors that affect the 
variables of interest, and treats others exogenously. 
Deciding what to ignore or hold constant strongly influences 
model results. In the case of ASMA, the decision to treat the 
Argentine inflation rate and U.S. commodity prices as 
exogenous variables has a significant impact on the estimated 
consequences of certain policy changes. 
3) Model development is a circular rather than a linear 
process. In the process of specifying, estimating, or 
simulating a policy model, it often becomes clear that the 
model, as originally conceived, either does not work or does 
not yield useful results. Even when the process proceeds 
smoothly, the modeler will often have additional insights that 
cause major revisions in model design. At a minimum, the 
specification of particular model equations is likely to 
change several times in the course of model development. ASMA 
has evolved considerably since it was first conceived, and 
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further changes would be made if the model were to be used for 
further policy analysis. 
4) In assessing model results, it is important to 
consider a number of criteria, not limited to statistical 
tests and consistency with economic and econometric theory. 
It is proper to be concerned with whether all the appropriate 
restrictions are imposed, whether the right estimation 
technique is used, and whether the simulation statistics 
indicate the model is able to reproduce history. However, if 
a model is to be useful for policy analysis, it is perhaps 
more important to ask whether the results can be defended and 
explained to people who are cynical about economic modeling 
but know a lot about the issues addressed by the model. 
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COPXEARD: Corn WHPXEARD: Wheat SGPXEARD: Sorg. 
FOB Price ($/mt) FOB Price ($/mt) FOB Price ($/mt) 
Year Actual Base Actual Base Actual Base 
1967 56 .00 53.45 59.00 63. 18 45 .00 46 .07 
1968 49 .00 49.71 55.00 54. 66 41 .00 43 .18 
1969 53 .00 52.75 58.00 51. 60 39 .00 45 .53 
1970 58 .00 58.59 54.00 53. 56 52 .00 50 .03 
1971 57 .00 56.72 59.00 55. 53 51 .00 48 .59 
1972 63 .00 62.33 64.00 64. 93 54 .00 52 .92 
1973 99 .00 96.68 130.00 121. 97 89 .00 79 .43 
1974 133 .00 130.56 176.00 172. 89 100 .00 105 .57 
1975 126 .00 130.33 147.00 164. 37 99 .00 105 .39 
1976 114 .00 110.00 128.00 134. 65 97 .00 89 .70 
1977 93 .00 97.84 100.00 107. 77 81 .00 80 .33 
1978 103 .00 100.18 126.00 113. 23 82 .00 82 .13 
1979 117 .00 111.87 159.00 144. 92 95 .00 91 .15 
1980 161 .00 161.00 206.00 206. 00 150 .00 150 .00 
1981 136 .00 136.00 190.00 190. 00 124 .00 124 .00 
1982 109 .00 109.00 163.00 154. 54 97.00 98 .54 
1983 134 .00 138.97 143.00 151.91 115 .00 112 .06 
1984 138, .00 137.57 135.00 123. 54 107 .00 110 .98 
1985 110, .00 110.00 104.00 115. 46 87 .00 87 .00 
1986 87.33 91. 64 69 .51 
SBPXEARD: Soyb. CRTAXAR: Avg. COTAXAR: Corn 
FOB Price ($/mt) Ex. Tax Rate (%) Ex. Tax Rate (%) 
Year Actual Base Actual Base Actual Base 
1967 0.00 0.00 18.61 19.10 22.17 19.75 
1968 0.00 0.00 16.22 16.73 16.08 17.41 
1969 0.00 0.00 7.61 10.40 8.00 11.11 
1970 0.00 0.00 13.87 12.62 14.54 13.51 
1971 0.00 0.00 18.86 20.30 19.50 21.24 
1972 0.00 0.00 31.44 26.84 31.00 27.87 
1973 0.00 0.00 32.97 30.12 34.25 31.01 
1974 0.00 0.00 29.08 27.86 31.73 28.63 
1975 0.00 0.00 33.78 36.37 33.75 37.49 
1976 0.00 0.00 42.11 44.22 43.50 45.52 
1977 257.00 244.25 1.11 3.67 1.67 4.39 
1978 237.00 241.72 0.00 -2.30 0.00 -1.74 
1979 259.00 248.47 0.00 -1.12 0.00 -0.88 
1980 256.00 263.82 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.41 
1981 257.00 259.77 9.00 12.56 9.00 12.64 
1982 223.00 228.05 18.50 16.05 18.50 16.20 
1983 255.00 257.92 25.00 21.00 25.00 22.35 
1984 253.00 250.86 22.67 23.52 25.00 25.50 
1985 203.00 205.14 22.33 24.52 25.00 25.89 
1986 186.07 19.24 22.00 20.34 
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WHTAXAR: Wheat SGTAXAR: Sorg. SBTAXAR: Soyb. 
Ex. Tax Rate (%) Ex. Tax Rate (%) Ex. Tax Rate (%) 
Year Actual Base Actual Base Actual Base 
1967 12.00 17.03 21.67 20.54 0.00 0.00 
1968 14.00 14.49 18.58 18.41 0.00 0.00 
1969 6.00 8.07 8.83 12.22 0.00 . 0.00 
1970 12.54 10.00 14.54 14.64 0.00 0.00 
1971 17.58 17.59 19.50 22.31 0.00 0.00 
1972 32.33 24.09 31.00 28.74 0.00 0.00 
1973 27.67 28.53 37.00 30.53 0.00 0.00 
1974 31.00 27.34 24.50 26.98 11.50 10.27 
1975 36.00 35.06 31.58 36.13 45.08 47.71 
1976 36.00 42.07 46.83 44.86 9.33 11.46 
1977 0.00 2.26 1.67 4.29 0.00 3.48 
1978 0.00 -3.31 0.00 -2.01 0.00 -2.45 
1979 0.00 -1.06 0.00 -1.98 0.00 -1.36 
1980 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.85 0.00 -0.06 
1981 9.00 12.95 9.00 12.40 9.00 12.28 
1982 18.50 15.91 18.50 16.12 18.50 15.94 
1983 25.00 19.13 25.00 21.44 25.00 21.50 
1984 18.00 20.07 25.00 25.47 25.00 25.50 
1985 18.00 22.13 24.00 25.40 30.00 25.88 
1986 17.00 16.97 21.00 20.29 28.00 19.40 
COPDFARR: Corn WHPDFARR: Wheat SGPDFARR: Sorg. 
Margin (80 P/mt) Margin (80 P/mt) Margin (80 P/mt) 
Year Actual Base Actual Base Actual Base 
1967 10.62 1.35 36.99 34.77 3.66 24.99 
1968 14.98 -4.65 26.69 15.27 14.77 15.10 
1969 -5.58 11.08 40.12 13.64 -20.40 35.48 
1970 12.27 26.02 0.11 12.21 59.67 43.86 
1971 20.40 5.55 10.80 -8.54 24.65 3.02 
1972 -6.98 1.49 -29.24 2.75 14.46 -6.25 
1973 6.77 22.91 128.76 138.35 12.80 16.09 
1974 68.71 48.35 162.26 174.73 36.84 52.83 
1975 172.91 170.39 145.48 150.20 126.75 125.73 
1976 29.98 11.05 137.09 117.38 -0.12 6.34 
1977 96.86 79.14 75.60 73.50 103.66 82.57 
1978 49.75 69.36 41.83 52.91 53.51 64.23 
1979 34.15 34.94 59.08 28.10 30.57 16.43 
1980 31.95 39.53 41.59 44.11 39.69 33.69 
1981 -8.67 -11.33 -54.85 -45.26 14.55 5.26 
1982 8.13 -15.75 -13.14 -32.01 6.02 8.20 
1983 -7.82 7.08 27.12 49.84 12.14 23.37 
1984 -6.90 -0.20 55.21 17.84 28.14 33.68 
1985 -8.38 0.65 -3.35 26.11 17.22 20.08 
1986 
-22.04 -7.49 -16.92 
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SBPDFARR: Soyb. COPFMARR: Corn WHPFMARR: Wheat 
Margin (80 P/mt) W.Price (80 P/mt) W.Price (80 P/mt) 
Year Actual Base Actual Base Actual Base 
1967 -601. 82 -601.82 388 .27 391 .17 438 .19 444.97 
1968 -710. 89 -710.89 349 .12 368 .16 392 .13 398.58 
1969 -703. 71 -703.71 412 .69 380 .37 415 .07 382.40 
1970 -667. 00 -667.00 378 .45 373 .41 372 .18 367.81 
1971 -662.53 -662.53 295 .29 301.78 323 .77 323.40 
1972 -817. 14 -817.14 301.45 303 .05 322 .62 331.14 
1973 -800. 78 -800.78 312 .07 303 .80 331 .82 288.68 
1974 -788. 99 -788.99 301 .87 331 .94 333 .37 338.01 
1975 -582. 89 -582.89 171 .69 165 .93 242 .90 290.43 
1976 -932. 27 -932.27 256 .94 255 .91 227 .83 230.10 
1977 322. 85 274.32 316 .33 343 .53 376 .24 402.43 
1978 168. 73 205.10 316 .02 292 .60 405 .62 362.50 
1979 103. 14 102.67 240 .88 230 .33 314 .69 316.19 
1980 54. 23 61.53 266 .23 257 .43 339 .92 335.51 
1981 15. 67 -14.11 268 .50 260 .77 417.83 392.49 
1982 5. 60 4.71 248 .88 280 .00 397 .48 407.97 
1983 -26. 56 20.85 316 .51 324 .38 302 .30 327.48 
1984 71. 24 55.58 309 .65 300 .02 268 .60 271.00 
1985 30. 45 39.91 288 .53 276 .19 292 .95 279.18 
1986 2.59 216 .84 220.54 
SGPFMARR: Sorg. SBPFMARR: Soyb. SMPXEARR: Meal 
W.Price (gO P/mt) W.Price (80 P/mt) X.Price (80 P/mt) 
Yea Actual Base Actual Base Actual Base 
1967 318. 94 310.04 601.82 601.82 0.00 0.00 
1968 280. 81 296.88 710.89 710.89 0.00 0.00 
1969 317. 27 298.17 703.71 703.71 0.00 0.00 
1970 290. 64 292.80 667.00 667.00 0.00 0.00 
1971 257. 82 256.70 662.53 662.53 0.00 0.00 
1972 237. 94 261.71 817.14 817.14 0.00 0.00 
1973 261. 85 254.17 800.78 800.78 0.00 0.00 
1974 271. 30 261.79 788.99 788.99 0.00 0.00 
1975 152. 88 152.16 582.89 582.89 0.00 0.00 
1976 229. 87 214.01 932.27 932.27 0.00 0.00 
1977 256. 21 264.80 838.36 790.84 882.30 867.38 
1978 237. 68 233.27 672.90 674.30 632.40 661.95 
1979 192. 75 202.07 505.70 489.38 473.80 459.00 
1980 238. 11 241.75 419.88 427.36 402.49 387.99 
1981 222. 35 222.79 475.32 492.49 426.67 441.33 
1982 222. 70 230.93 520.21 549.89 510.37 525.63 
1983 252. 78 247.03 613.98 601.03 585.30 570.04 
1984 206. 60 208.27 483.81 491.11 381.37 381.37 
1985 207. 32 200.32 452.10 476.45 399.66 
1986 172.06 417.36 398.84 
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SMPCOARR: Meal SOPWHARR: Meal CRGRTARR: Avg. 
D.Price (80 P/mt) W.Price (80 P/mt) Returns (80 P/ha) 
Year Actual Base Actual Base Actual Base 
1967 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 634.77 643.30 
1968 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 580.25 607.39 
1969 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 673.11 633.77 
1970 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 648.06 645.31 
1971 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 573.38 568.41 
1972 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 568.84 585.38 
1973 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 613.86 585.56 
1974 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 653.69 668.25 
1975 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 419.59 441.10 
1976 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 540.41 519.80 
1977 911.02 895.62 2633.63 2707.78 720.18 757.31 
1978 687.46 719.59 2455.11 2354.60 791.88 742.63 
1979 514.80 498.72 1699.04 1725.25 633.44 632.00 
1980 470.90 453.94 1288.24 1382.87 686.82 676.18 
1981 501.06 518.27 1482.41 1387.92 769.95 748.88 
1982 561.97 578.77 1375.53 1396.65 765.51 808.72 
1983 680.13 662.40 1847.47 1826.35 786.77 809.73 
1984 442.97 442.97 1667.46 1667.46 724.71 736.28 
1985 464.21 1521.55 758.49 749.17 
1986 463.26 1207.40 639.90 
CRAHHAR: 4-Crop COAHHARP: Corn WHAHHARP : Wheat 
Area (1000 ha) Area Share (%) Area Share (%) 
Year Actual Base Actual Base Actual Base 
1967 9445 9540 36.5 37.8 55.2 54.3 
1968 10293 10655 32.8 35.4 56.5 54.9 
1969 10723 11005 33.2 36.0 54.4 50.4 
1970 11106 11436 36.2 36.7 46.7 46.2 
1971 10038 9365 40.5 37.1 36.9 42.5 
1972 8949 8028 35.2 34.3 48.2 49.5 
1973 10818 9924 33.0 33.7 45.9 44.2 
1974 10112 10191 34.5 33.5 39.1 42.4 
1975 9597 10205 32.0 32.8 44.1 43.9 
1976 10304 11344 26.8 24.9 51.1 52.6 
1977 11997 11615 21.1 20.8 53.6 52.4 
1978 10074 10321 26.4 27.4 38.8 40.6 
1979 11301 11296 25.7 25.4 41.5 40.4 
1980 10586 10483 23.5 22.6 45.2 46.7 
1981 12257 11466 27.7 25.6 41.0 40.5 
1982 13592 13248 23.3 23.8 43.6 43.3 
1983 15091 14816 19.7 20.4 48.5 46.5 
1984 15185 15395 19.9 21.6 45.3 43.3 
1985 14557 15167 23.0 23.0 40.9 40.5 
1986 13520 13928 25.9 24.8 39.0 40.3 
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SGAHHÂRP: : Sorg. SBAHHARP: Soyb. COAHHAR: Corn 
Area Share (%) Area Share (%) Area (1000 ha) 
Year Actual Base Actual Base Actual Base 
1967 8.1 7.8 0.2 0.1 3450 3607 
1968 10.5 9.8 0.2 -0.1 3378 3777 
1969 12.1 13.2 0.3 0.4 3556 3965 
1970 16.9 16.4 0.2 0.7 4017 4202 
1971 22.3 19.5 0.4 0.8 4066 3477 
1972 15.9 14.8 0.8 1.4 3147 2757 
1973 19.7 19.7 1.5 2.4 3565 3345 
1974 23.0 21.1 3.4 3.0 3486 3418 
1975 20.2 20.4 3.7 2.9 3070 3345 
1976 17.8 19.0 4.2 3.4 2766 2827 
1977 19.8 21.4 5.5 5.4 2532 2419 
1978 22.4 20.1 12.4 11.8 2660 2832 
1979 18.7 18.8 14.2 15.5 2899 2864 
1980 12.1 13.0 19.2 17.6 2490 2373 
1981 17.1 19.2 14.2 14.7 3394 2937 
1982 18.5 18.8 14.6 14.1 3170 3158 
1983 16.7 18.5 15.1 14.6 2970 3029 
1984 15.6 15.2 19.2 19.9 3025 3329 
1985 13.6 13.7 22.5 22.9 3350 3483 
1986 10.4 10.1 24.8 24.8 3500 3448 
WHAHHAR: Wheat SGAHHAR: Sorg. SBAHHAR: Soyb. 
Area (1000 ha) Area (1000 ha) Area (1000 ha) 
Year Actual Base Actual Base Actual Base 
1967 5214 5176 764 749 17 9 
1968 5812 5848 1083 1042 20 -13 
1969 5837 5546 1302 1452 28 42 
1970 5191 5282 1872 1872 26 79 
1971 3701 3984 2235 1826 36 79 
1972 4315 3974 1419 1188 68 110 
1973 4965 4390 2131 1956 157 233 
1974 3958 4322 2324 2150 344 302 
1975 4233 4477 1938 2086 356 296 
1976 5270 5970 1834 2159 434 388 
1977 6428 6084 2377 2485 660 628 
1978 3910 4192 2254 2076 1250 1221 
1979 4685 4558 2117 2123 1600 1750 
1980 4787 4897 1279 1366 2030 1846 
1981 5023 4647 2100 2197 1740 1685 
1982 5926 5732 2510 2489 1986 1868 
1983 7320 6884 2520 2740 2281 2164 
1984 6880 6660 2370 2338 2910 3068 
1985 5950 6140 1987 2074 3270 3470 
1986 5270 5614 1400 1410 3350 3456 
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COSPRAR: Corn WHSPRAR: Wheat SGSPRAR: Sorg. 
Prod. (1000 mt) Prod. (1000 mt) Prod. (1000 mt) 
Year Actual Base Actual Base Actual Base 
1967 8000 8364 6247 6201 1380 1352 
1968 6560 7335 7320 7365 1897 1826 
1969 6860 7650 5740 5454 2484 2771 
1970 9360 9793 7020 7143 3820 3821 
1971 9930 8491 4920 5296 4660 3807 
1972 5860 5134 5680 5231 2360 1975 
1973 9000 8444 6900 6100 4600 4223 
1974 9900 9706 6560 7163 5900 5459 
1975 7700 8391 5970 6315 4830 5199 
1976 5855 5984 8570 9709 5060 5957 
1977 8300 7930 11000 10411 6600 6900 
1978 9700 10329 5700 6111 7200 6630 
1979 9000 8891 8100 7881 6500 6520 
1980 6400 6100 8100 8286 2960 3162 
1981 12900 11164 7780 7197 7100 7427 
1982 9600 9565 8300 8029 8000 7933 
1983 9000 9179 15000 14106 7600 8268 
1984 9200 10125 12750 12342 7200 7102 
1985 11500 11956 13200 13621 5900 6160 
1986 12100 11922 8500 9055 4200 4229 
SBSPRAR: Soyb. SMSPRAR: Meal SOSPRAR: Oil 
Prod. (1000 mt) Prod. (1000 mt) Prod. (1000 mt) 
Year Actual Base Actual Base Actual Base 
1967 21 11 4 45 1 11 
1968 22 -14 8 32 2 8 
1969 32 47 12 59 3 15 
1970 27 82 16 69 4 17 
1971 59 130 27 86 6 19 
1972 78 126 35 86 8 20 
1973 272 404 151 193 29 37 
1974 496 435 214 202 47 44 
1975 485 404 406 191 92 43 
1976 695 622 384 276 81 58 
1977 1400 1331 455 680 96 144 
1978 2700 2637 536 677 112 142 
1979 3700 4048 499 879 106 187 
1980 3600 3273 561 437 121 94 
1981 3500 3390 838 548 183 120 
1982 4150 3904 1500 1085 312 226 
1983 4200 3984 1924 1973 393 403 
1984 7000 7379 2893 2929 593 600 
1985 6750 7163 2739 3149 579 666 
1986 7300 7531 3530 3548 745 749 
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CSUDTAR: Feed Gr. COUDTARP: Corn SGUDTARP: Sorg. 
Use (1000 mt) Use Share (%) Use Share (%) 
Year Actual Base Actual Base Actual Base 
1967 4717 4690 80.2 76.0 19.8 24.0 
1968 4603 4528 73.4 74.3 26.6 25.7 
1969 4256 5003 72.9 70.8 27.1 29.2 
1970 5726 5941 66.8 69.3 33.2 30.7 
1971 5204 4697 57.2 58.0 42.8 42.0 
1972 5755 4817 67.0 67.7 33.0 32.3 
1973 6241 5903 63.1 66.7 36.9 33.3 
1974 7457 7268 59.8 64.2 40.2 35.8 
1975 5930 6105 61.2 64.3 38.8 35.7 
1976 4531 5292 63.2 53.9 36.8 46.1 
1977 5980 5901 56.9 53.4 43.1 46.6 
1978 5950 6162 59.4 59.3 40.6 40.7 
1979 6152 6284 53.6 59.8 46.4 40.2 
1980 4633 4787 65.8 66.1 34.2 33.9 
1981 5750 5477 64.3 62.6 35.7 37.4 
1982 5590 5110 62.6 57,3 37.4 42.7 
1983 5900 6077 54.2 53.4 45.8 46.6 
1984 7150 7348 55.2 56.2 44.8 43.8 
1985 6575 6665 62.0 61.9 38.0 38.1 
1986 7100 7389 64.8 68.3 35.2 31.7 
COUDTAR: Corn WHUDTAR: Wheat SGUDTAR: Sorg. 
Use (1000 mt) Use (1000 mt) Use (1000 mt) , 
Year Actual Base Actual Base Actual Base 
1967 3781 3563 4078 4103 936 1127 
1968 3377 3365 4393 4237 1226 1163 
1969 3103 3543 3794 3825 1153 1460 
1970 3823 4118 4768 4778 1903 1823 
1971 2977 2722 4056 4250 2227 1975 
1972 3855 3262 4356 4227 1900 1555 
1973 3936 3940 4301 4366 2305 1963 
1974 4457 4669 4221 4320 3000 2599 
1975 3632 3926 4498 4218 2298 2179 
1976 2863 2850 5380 5416 1668 2442 
1977 3401 3154 4242 4304 2579 2747 
1978 3533 3656 4349 4165 2417 2506 
1979 3296 3755 4093 4293 2856 2529 
1980 3048 3163 4000 4304 1585 1623 
1981 3700 3430 3970 4120 2050 2047 
1982 3500 2930 4300 4135 2090 2180 
1983 3200 3243 4849 4617 2700 2834 
1984 3950 4131 4700 4634 3200 3216 
1985 4075 4128 4600 4652 2500 2537 
1986 4600 5044 4400 4545 2500 2345 
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SBUFEAR: Soyb, SBUHTAR: Soyb. SMUDTAR: Meal 
Crush (1000 mt) 0th.Use (1000 mt) Use (1000 mt) 
Year Actual Base Actual Base Actual Base 
1967 5 56 2 6 3 0 
1968 11 43 2 3 6 2 
1969 15 74 3 9 15 9 
1970 21 91 4 13 16 22 
1971 36 114 7 13 25 32 
1972 46 112 16 16 35 34 
1973 195 250 35 28 137 150 
1974 281 265 42 35 174 146 
1975 529 249 45 35 265 258 
1976 • 496 357 71 88 131 143 
1977 589 881 136 113 141 126 
1978 686 867 185 173 156 162 
1979 639 1126 205 227 244 • 236 
1980 720 561 177 193 277 251 
1981 1081 707 198 176 241 227 
1982 1907 1379 220 195 261 210 
1983 2399 2460 238 225 116 181 
1984 3617 3662 305 317 206 250 
1985 3445 3961 335 358 224 247 
1986 4450 4472 364 356 280 253 
SOUDTAR: Oil COCOTAR: Corn WHCOTAR: Wheat 
Use (1000 mt) Stocks (1000 mt) Stocks (1000 mt) 
Year Actual Base Actual Base Actual Base 
1967 0 5 182 197 245 440 
1968 3 4 137 225 1008 979 
1969 2 7 129 166 850 920 
1970 5 8 107 231 780 642 
1971 6 9 620 434 675 643 
1972 7 9 89 65 370 261 
1973 5 17 451 391 269 389 
1974 14 21 178 60 1026 703 
1975 67 20 761 859 714 759 
1976 18 27 515 449 742 1045 
1977 33 56 183 175 1600 1464 
1978 52 67 434 417 1176 1338 
1979 4 41 173 261 1103 782 
1980 25 9 108 71 448 762 
1981 103 92 210 195 413 594 
1982 82 92 545 397 775 603 
1983 76 77 289 216 1056 1059 
1984 78 82 91 322 1259 1088 
1985 47 87 390 453 451 499 
1986 95 98 390 330 251 398 
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SGCOTAR: Sorg. SBCOTAR: Soyb. SMCOTAR: Meal 
Stocks (1000 mt) Stocks (1000 mt) Stocks (1000 mt) 
Year Actual Base Actual Base Actual Base 
1967 66 57 35 28 1 0 
1968 113 76 44 43 3 -1 
1969 129 85 58 62 0 1 
1970 53 102 60 81 0 1 
1971 152 139 76 99 2 2 
1972 106 114 92 99 2 2 
1973 123 146 134 107 2 6 
1974 73 152 307 252 30 29 
1975 263 262 218 252 13 6 
1976 222 207 235 257 15 10 
1977 121 164 287 278 4 27 
1978 252 194 147 172 14 18 
1979 141 125 227 215 9 27 
1980 22 48 204 192 16 8 
1981 132 114 235 195 22 13 
1982 498 489 107 100 52 44 
1983 201 198 332 326 95 82 
1984 67 64 278 312 119 123 
1985 327 337 294 305 34 51 
1986 77 70 180 206 134 149 
SGCOTAR: Oil COUXNAR: Corn WHUXNAR: Wheat 
Stocks (1000 mt) Export (1000 mt) Export (1000 mt) 
Year Actual Base Actual Base Actual Base 
1967 1 -0 4117 4684 2099 1834 
1968 0 -0 3228 3943 2164 2589 
1969 1 0 3765 4166 2104 1688 
1970 0 0 5559 5609 2322 2644 
1971 0 1 6440 5567 969 1044 
1972 1 1 2536 2241 1629 1386 
1973 3 2 4702 4178 2700 1607 
1974 3 2 5716 5367 1582 2529 
1975 8 2 3485 3667 1784 2041 
1976 4 4 3238 3543 3162 4007 
1977 3 10 5231 5051 5900 5688 
1978 4 10 5916 6430 1775 2072 
1979 4 13 5965 5291 4080 4144 
1980 12 6 3417 3127 4755 4002 
1981 8 8 9098 7611 3845 3246 
1982 18 16 5765 6432 3638 3885 
1983 37 30 6056 6118 9870 9033 
1984 48 45 5448 5888 7847 7678 
1985 40 50 7126 7698 9408 9558 
1986 70 57 7500 7001 4300 4611 
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SGUXNAR: Sorg. SBUXNAR: Soyb. SMUXNAR: Meal 
Export (1000 mt) Export (1000 mt) Export (1000 mt) 
Year Actual Base Actual Base Actual Base 
1967 417 207 0 -57 0 44 
1968 624 644 0 -77 -0 30 
1969 1315 1301 0 -54 0 49 
1970 1993 1981 0 -40 0 47 
1971 2334 1795 0 -16 0 53 
1972 506 446 0 -1 0 51 
1973 2278 2228 -0 118 14 39 
1974 2950 2854 0 -11 12 33 
1975 2342 2909 0 119 158 -44 
1976 3433 3571 111 172 251 129 
1977 4122 4195 623 316 325 537 
1978 4652 4095 1969 1703 370. 524 
1979 3755 4060 2776 2653 260 635 
1980 1494 1616 2726 2542 277 204 
1981 4940 5313 2190 2504 591 316 
1982 5544 5378 2151 2426 1209 843 
1983 5197 5724 • 1338 1073 1765 1755 
1984 4134 4019 3132 3414 2663 2638 
1985 3140 3349 2954 2851 2600 2974 
1986 1950 2151 2600 2802 3150 3197 
SGUXNAR: Oil CASNAAR: Cattle POSPRAR: Pork 
Export (loop mt) Numbers (mil.) Prod. (1000 mt) 
Year Actual Base Actual Base Actual Base 
1967 0 6 49.4 49.0 217.0 206.8 
1968 0 5 50.3 48.6 183.0 202.3 
1969 0 7 50.1 49.7 205.0 222.3 
1970 0 9 48.4 50.4 210.0 219.8 
1971 0 10 49.8 51.2 248.0 226.5 
1972 • 0 10 52.3 53.0 216.0 206.6 
1973 22 18 54.8 54.3 258.0 239.9 
1974 33 23 55.4 56.1 240.0 251.1 
1975 20 23 57.0 56.0 255.0 233.0 
1976 67 30 58.2 58.5 258.0 261.6 
1977 64 81 61.1 60.3 242.0 256.3 
1978 59 75 58.5 57.6 214.0 208.5 
1979 102 142 56.9 57.7 259.0 262.2 
1980 88 92 55.8 56.8 270.0 275.5 
1981 84 26 54.2 54.3 250.0 240.4 
1982 220 126 52.7 53.7 235.0 232.6 
1983 298 313 53.8 53.3 215.0 204.2 
1984 504 503 54.4 53.5 220.0 222.6 
1985 540 573 54.5 53.7 220.0 235.2 
1986 620 644 54.5 252.9 
FYS PRAR: Foultry 
Frod. (1000 mt) 
Year Actual Base 
1967 157.0 156.5 
1968 173.0 169.6 
1969 182.0 183.3 
1970 243.0 252.4 
1971 294.0 296.6 
1972 349.0 327.5 
1973 256,0 263.8 
1974 255.0 234.0 
1975 249.0 236.2 
1976 208.0 209.4 
1977 194.0 196.0 
1978 181.0 188.2 
1979 193.0 214.8 
1980 231.0 219.2 
1981 235.0 218,8 
1982 218.0 220.7 
1983 214.0 212.4 
1984 245.0 251.3 
1985 240.0 249.5 
1986 260.6 
